

Quartermaster

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

WINTER 2004

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WARRIOR LOGISTICIANS






From The Quartermaster General

We are at the start of a new year and faced with the awesome challenge of transforming Soldiers into Warrior Logisticians. What makes this year different than those in years past is our nation's ongoing commitment against terrorism while transforming to a more "Ready and Relevant" Army.

We must change to match our Army's interest to remain relevant and must organize ourselves better to endure the global war on terrorism (GWOT). We are conducting an internal assessment of our organization to ensure we are organized to support our Number One priority of providing support to the GWOT.

We will support the GWOT by providing the operational force with Quartermaster Soldiers capable of survival in a contemporary operational environment. To accomplish this task, we have identified 42 critical Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, as part of the Warrior Ethos initiative, to prepare Quartermaster Soldiers for combat on a battlefield that has no boundaries. We will also conduct convoy live-fire exercises under conditions similar to those they might encounter in combat. Their survival on the battlefield may well be the result of training received at the US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, VA.

We will focus resources on improving training and training facilities to ensure the training they receive is as realistic as possible, because we cannot afford to allow Quartermaster Soldiers to leave this institution untrained in basic combat skills. When



Brigadier General Scott G. West

they depart our institution, they must be capable of performing their duties under the most dangerous and arduous conditions on the streets of Baghdad or the mountains of Afghanistan.

However, our support to the GWOT starts at Fort Lee but does not end here. We have sent mobile training teams (MTTs) to assist in the deploying process of units headed to support *Operation Enduring Freedom* and *Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Our MTTs are also providing assistance to combatant commanders in theater to overcome the challenges of sustaining America's military forces as we transform to a distribution-based sustainment system. This is a transformation that has altered the way traditional logistical units provide combat service support.

Congratulations to the Quartermaster Warriors of the US Army Culinary Arts Team (USACAT) in their quest for gold during the World Culinary Olympics competition in Erfurt, Germany. The success of USACAT is a result of Soldiers working together as a team to accomplish the mission (page 41).

It saddens me to inform you that we have lost two great Quartermaster Warriors since our last publication: Major General (Retired) Bruce E. Kendall and Major General (Retired) William K. Hunzeker (pages 42 and 43). These great leaders are credited with improving logistics in various areas of supply management, and General Hunzeker served as Commander of the Quartermaster Center and School from 1980 to 1981.

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The Quartermaster General

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
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OUTSIDE BACK COVER: A Soldier lines up with his target in the grenade portion of the 262d Quartermaster Battalion's quarterly Soldier Stakes Competition at Fort Lee, Virginia, where training emphasis is shifting to preparing Quartermasters for combat. Photograph by Paul Sweeney, Fort Lee Public Affairs Office.

INSIDE BACK COVER: The full pages on battalion-size units that Keith K. Fukumitsu, Quartermaster, has researched and illustrated for each edition since 1991 are archived on the Quartermaster Home Page under Professional Bulletin, Quartermaster Unit Lineages, at www.Quartermaster.army.mil.



Making Good on a Promise To US Army Reserve Soldiers



Command Sergeant Major Jose L. Silva

The gate appeared to be locked - no Military Police, no guards. I realized I needed a "swipe card." I had no choice but to park the car 10 meters from the gate at Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico. This was something not covered while planning the visit to the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) - how to get in. I grabbed my cell phone and began searching for a crumpled 3x5 card, which had the phone number for these Quartermasters in the US Army Reserve (USAR). The drive had taken 2 1/2 hours from my address while on leave in Caguas to Base Ramey in Aguadilla. Not bad considering there are almost 4 million cars in Puerto Rico. At one point during my trip, I was certain at least half of them were lined up in front of me.

Aguadilla is a small beach town in northwest Puerto Rico. A curious mix of modern technology and historical structures, Aguadilla has long been the home of Base Ramey. Military airplanes of all types land and take off each day. The necessity of an Air Force base on the island of Puerto Rico was recognized as an extension of the air defense of the Panama Canal in 1936. The air base played important roles throughout World War II when it housed bombardment groups and aerial reconnaissance squadrons, as well as serving as the launching base for many antisubmarine patrolling missions by other tactical units.

Less than a mile north of Base Ramey's back gate sits a small compound housing Quartermasters who serve in two USAR mortuary affairs units: the 246th Quartermaster Company and the 311th Quartermaster Company. I met with some of the 311th Soldiers in Landshtul, Germany, during *Operation Enduring Freedom* in January 2002 and was very impressed with their professionalism. Back then I promised them a visit. Now that I was home on leave in October 2004, I would make good on my word.

After identifying myself to an arriving Soldier with a valuable identification "swipe card," I was allowed inside the fence. Their area was not as big as I thought, maybe 10 acres total and surrounded on three sides by thick vegetation and palm trees. Two long, three-story concrete buildings sit side by side, facing the flagpole. About 50 feet behind the concrete structures is the motor pool. There I met the battalion

maintenance noncommissioned officer (NCO). Maintenance of vehicles and equipment is taken very seriously here because proximity to the beach encourages rusting. "That's the price we must pay for the scenic location," he says. The compound sits on high ground, 212 feet above sea level and a couple of miles from the beach, where its location provides an excellent view of the North Atlantic Ocean. During the warmest months whales skim the waters, traveling from as far as Stellwagen Bank, a newly designated marine sanctuary off the Massachusetts coast. I had my camera at the ready; but, no luck, no humpbacks today.

Walking towards the 311th, I ran into a master sergeant in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) attached to the 311th. He deployed with the mortuary affairs company as a sergeant during *Operation Desert Storm* in Southwest Asia in the early 1990s

Back then I had promised them a visit. Now that I was home on leave in October 2004, I would make good on my word.

to support the 1st Armored Division. Also, he was the first sergeant for the 311th Mortuary Affairs Company during 9/11 when four jetliners were hijacked by terrorists 11 Sep 01 within the continental United States. Under his supervision, the 311th Mortuary Affairs Company deployed to the Pentagon's fiery disaster site. Their mission lasted 11 months after initial recovery operations at the Pentagon because the USAR Soldiers set up a Joint Personal Effects Depot at Fort Myer, VA, to safeguard, catalogue, clean, identify and return personal effects to the family members of those killed.

In all, the master sergeant in the IRR had 7 years of active Army service and 20 years in the USAR assigned to the 311th. Now, as the battalion's acting sergeant major, he made sure I knew how great a mortuary affairs mission his Soldiers accomplished. I agreed with him whole-heartedly. As we toured the facility, I had the pleasure of meeting with the Soldiers, civilians and senior NCOs on duty that day in Aguadilla.


The 246th and 311th always work together to ensure all missions are accomplished and that all deploying Soldiers are properly trained and equipped. This includes the cross-leveling of personnel and equipment - a very familiar task embedded in both mortuary affairs companies. The 246th mission is to provide support at echelons above corps: set up the theater mortuary evacuation point (TMEP) and the personal effects depot. The 311th mission is to set up collection points throughout the theater of operations, up to a total of 25 collection points with an average of six Soldiers each. With an assigned

strength of 127 Soldiers, it is understandable why the companies support and cross-train each other. The current 311th first sergeant who has been in the mortuary affairs company for eight years says that "I know this company like the back of my hands." His years of active service along with his myriad deployments (*Operations Noble Eagle, Desert Shield/Storm* and *Just Cause*) bring a lot of experience to the table. He also participated in the 9/11 mission to the Pentagon.

Part of the 311th Quartermaster Company is currently deployed to Kuwait, working in theater with the 54th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs), the only active duty mortuary affairs company in the US Army inventory and stationed at Fort Lee, VA. Other current missions of the 311th include augmentee training at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA; Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), Hickham Air Force Base, Hawaii; Vietnam, Kosovo and Landshtul. In addition to the 311th overseas mission, the company must accomplish other local taskings, such as the rendering of funeral honors.

There are nearly 360,000 men and women serving in the USAR. The dedication to duty of Soldiers in the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) and the 246th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) illustrates how these citizens train to excel as USAR Soldiers on all fronts during the continuing global war on terrorism. The success stories of the 311th and the 246th are among the many that are repeated each time Quartermasters in a USAR unit are alerted, mobilized and deployed.

CSM Jose L. Silva is the 8th Regimental Command Sergeant Major (CSM) for the Quartermaster Corps. He deployed to Uzbekistan for Operation Enduring Freedom, 7 Nov 01-26 Jul 02, as the 507th Logistics Task Force CSM and also served as the first Camp Sergeant Major for Camp Stronghold Freedom in Karshi-Khanabad. His responsibilities took him to Bagram, Mazar-e-Shariff and Kabul. Then as the CSM for the 10th Division Support Command, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, he redeployed to Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom IV to serve as the Joint Logistics Center CSM before coming to the US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, Virginia. CSM Silva enlisted in the Army in July 1982 as an 11B (Infantryman) in the 82d Airborne Division. He became a Petroleum Supply Specialist in July 1986.



A New Direction For Warrant Officer Professional Development



Chief Warrant Officer Five James C. Tolbert

Over the past couple of months during my visits to the field, I've been able to interact with Quartermaster Soldiers from both the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve. My travels have taken me from the historical stones of West Point in New York to the sunny basin of California. Along the way, I've encountered a significant number of Soldiers who are enthusiastically in pursuit of continuing their careers as Quartermaster Warrant Officers.

I am elated to tell them that now more than ever is a great time to become a warrant officer, regardless of whether they are affiliated with the Active or Reserve Component. As the Army transforms to modular organizations, the Warrant Officer Corps also is transforming into a cohort of officer technicians to ensure their skill sets remain current and relevant to serve in the future, modular Army.

Significant Progress in Past Year

During the past year, significant progress has been made in warrant officer professional development. As the Army enters the 21st Century poised to operate as modular organizations, the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) is also reorganizing so that it seamlessly aligns with the functionalities of modularity. This change is necessary because the current WOES model does not adequately train warrant officers to serve in the modular organizational structure of the future.

The WOES "select-train-utilize" concept does not synchronize with the Army's "force stabilization" ini-

tiative of modularity because the WOES concept selects warrant officers for promotion, then identifies them for further training and utilization in the next higher grade. For example, only those chief warrant officer twos (CW2s) who are selected for promotion to CW3 are identified to attend the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC). Because warrant officers are only identified to attend military educational schooling after selection to the next higher grade, the current "select-train-utilize" WOES model creates a seven- to eight-year training gap that extends after completion of the Warrant Officer Basic Course up to selection to CW3. It is important to note that CW2s comprise more than 60 percent of the total Warrant Officer Corps, yet the current WOES model does not train this significant segment of warrant officers.

More importantly, the current WOES model does not synchronize with the "force stabilization" requirements inherent in the Army's future modular structure. In order for warrant officers to effectively operate in the future modular force that better stabilizes the total force, WOES must be reconfigured with future force requirements in mind.

To correct this inequity, the Quartermaster Corps formally proposed a different WOES model, one that encompasses a "train-select-utilize" concept, to the Army G1 (Personnel) in March 2004 during the Quartermaster Functional Review. Specifically for junior warrant officers, all CW2s are identified between their third and fifth year of warrant officer service to attend the WOAC. It's important to note

that the new model provides training in advance of a warrant officer's consideration for promotion to the next higher grade. The proposed model not only eliminates the enormous training gap between the ranks of W01 and CW3, it also aligns WOAC with the training timeline for the Officer Education System (OES) while synchronizing warrant officer training with the future Army modular concept.

This alignment with the OES is important because it creates shared training opportunities between officers and warrant officers while both cohorts are attending their respective advanced courses. This new model supports the recent operations order (OPORD) issued by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) on 17 Sep 04 titled *Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) Redesign*.

Consolidated Officer Education

The CAC OPORD 04-261A supports numerous Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) recommendations to improve and transform warrant officer professional development. The central theme of WOES redesign is the consolidation of military education for warrant officers and officers into a single officer education system that takes full advantage of shared training opportunities.

There is no intent to fully consolidate officer and warrant officer training. Rather, the intent is to create a deliberate process to seek opportunities for integrated and shared training, shared curriculum training and to identify technical training that must remain specific to warrant officers. The goal is to develop a consolidated officer education system that provides training specifically tailored for officers and provide training specifically tailored for warrant officers. Additionally, the process must recognize existing or new training that is common to both officers and warrant officers and can be delivered in a shared training environment. In order to accomplish key tasks set forth in the CAC OPORD, the US Army Quartermaster Center and School will conduct a Needs and Critical Task Analysis for each warrant officer specialty and military education level.

Simultaneously, DA Pamphlet 600-11 (Warrant Officer Professional Development Program) has

been folded into DA Pamphlet 600-3 (Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management). Upon release of a new DA Pamphlet 600-3, the word "commissioned" will be removed and thereby recognize a professional development publication for a single officer corps. As all of these changes occur, many Soldiers will continue to echo that sinister attempts are underway to mirror warrant officer functions with those of traditional branch officers. From my perch, that viewpoint has no substance. However, there are deliberate and sequential actions to branch-affiliate warrant officers and to create one officer education system to operate within one officer corps with the realization that each cohort of officers will continue to serve specific roles and responsibilities in the Army.

From my foxhole, I see that the modular Army will continue to need strategically focused officers, a cohort of professional officers and a cache of technically sound warrant officers to serve in a dynamically different Army of the future. All Army officers, regardless of their roles and functions, must be trained to respond to a multitude of military operational requirements.

Always Members of a Team

As a warrant officer candidate in the early 1980s, I took many values from the Warrant Officer Candidate Course: one of them was "teamwork." We were taught to realize early on and throughout our careers that warrant officers always will be members of a team and to understand the need to rely on all team members in order to accomplish the mission. The Army is moving in an irreversible direction to operate as a key component on the joint forces team of the future. It is the combined joint forces team that will conduct military operations to ensure the peace, security and national interests of the United States.

Comparably, warrant officers are but one component of the Army's officer corps. Current and future initiatives will continue to merge warrant officer professional development and education into a single officer corps. While the functionalities of warrant officers will remain technical, warrant officers will continue to operate as members of one officer team all working to achieve a common Army vision.

(Continued to Page 25)

Tactical Logistics and Operation Pacific Guardian in An Najaf, Iraq – A Company Command Perspective

CPT John H. Chaffin IV

Over a career, the professional Soldier memorizes list upon list of tenets and principles. These lists seek to capture a tradition of initiative and ingenuity spanning all ranks - from troops with their improvised contraptions of steel teeth and spikes welded to tanks during the invasion of Normandy, to senior leaders harnessing information networks to mass complex effects in time and space. The principles that embody this tradition also enabled the success of the 364th Supply Company (Direct Support), Logistics Task Force Victory, and the 264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne) during *Operation Pacific Guardian* in An Najaf, Iraq during August 2004. The three such principles critical for 364th operations were anticipation, unity of command and flexibility.

Before the Battle

Before the battle the initial concerns were command and control (C2), especially the formal relationship between the 364th Supply Company and augmenting support, and building the right support package at each location as we conducted split-base operations. These decisions were heavily influenced by Army and Marine differences in how to deliver logistics support and the availability of contracted support. One measure of success would be how well we were positioned to provide support during the fight.

As the battle began, the 364th Supply Company was headquartered at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Echo, near Diwaniyah, Iraq. A detachment also was operating at FOB Duke near An Najaf. This area of operations was three hours south of battalion headquarters in Baghdad. From the outset, the 364th conducted split-base operations in support of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The company provided potable water from 3,000-gallons per hour reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs), retail JP8, wholesale JP8 distribution using seven 5,000-gallon M969 tankers, direct support (DS) maintenance at FOB Duke with the maintenance support team (MST) from the 659th Ordnance

Company attached to the 364th, and field services with the attached shower, laundry and light clothing repair (SLCR) team from the 259th Field Services Company. At the same time, the 364th was establishing its supply support activity at FOB Echo.

Integrating attachments such as maintenance and field services posed no special challenge because corps support battalions often task-organize this way. Reception and integration of small elements was something the 364th Soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) had done before. As the 364th prepared to receive augmentation, most planning revolved around establishing proper command relationships. The battalion commander chose to attach all elements to the battalion and give me, as the company commander, tactical control (TACON). Negotiation and compromise are parts of this process. Failure to consider all implications of the kind of control allowed to the tactical commander leads to problems in execution. By war-gaming the 364th task organization, we ensured a responsive, agile support capability. Clear command structure facilitated responsive logistics.

Company leadership worked hard to ensure a clear C2 plan during split-base operations. Because of the way the battle space was drawn, the 11th MEU was operating across two provinces and five FOBs. The 364th had to ensure support over the same area. The challenges would revolve around the solid integration of 364th capabilities, the organic assets of the MEU, and contracted civilian logistics within the area of operations.

Getting the right mix of capabilities at each location was fundamental. The joint environment in which we operated in Iraq increased the challenge of building the right initial logistics set. We needed to quickly learn how logistics information flowed, and decisions were made, within an MEU. There is no support operations officer synchronizing plans and

execution between operators and supporters. Requirements are developed by the MEU S4 (Logistics) and executed by the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). How the Marines provide support is left up to the MSSG commander. As an Army unit providing capabilities above what the MEU possessed organically, we had to work with both the requirements generation of the S4 and the support execution of the MSSG. We identified broad requirements early, moved the key capabilities into place and refined those capabilities through routine coordination between the MEU S4, MSSG operations officer, and myself or the FOB Duke detachment officer in charge (OIC). This coordination would prove too slow during high-intensity operations.

Another challenge in developing initial logistics architecture was the integration of contracted services into the decision-making process. A case in point is field services. A civilian contractor provided shower and laundry support at FOB Echo, but not at FOB Duke. Based on the contracting picture, we determined where to position our field services. This information also influenced how we determined the water production effort. In both cases, we capitalized on the contractor's capability without completely giving away our mission. We recognized, with the civilian contractor, that our organizations had different but complementary capabilities. For example, the 364th ROWPUs can desalinate water; but the contractor's ROWPUs, while bigger, cannot. (Water from wells in southern Iraq is often salty.) Therefore, it was important to meet the contractors, learn their capabilities and limitations, and develop agreements on how we would work together.

During the Battle

On the morning of 4 Aug 04 a Marine UH-1 aircraft went down over the city of An Najaf. This event triggered fighting that developed in intensity and complexity during the next three weeks. At its height, the operation involved the equivalent of six battalions of Marine, Army, coalition, Iraqi and aviation assets. The 364th Supply Company was the only direct support logistics unit in this area of operations. As the battle progressed, we would be required to receive attachments that would bring our strength up to 275 Soldiers.

The battle focused on two pieces of interrelated terrain, both of significant cultural importance to the Muslim community: the Najaf Cemetery (the largest cemetery in the world) and the Imam Ali Mosque (the second holiest site in Islam). The complex urban terrain, coupled with the battlefield's cultural and political significance, shaped our logistics operations. The greatest challenge, however, came not from the fight itself, but from the theater logistics architecture.

Within days of the start of combat operations, the 364th Supply Company's greatest enemies were time and distance. In order of priority, the commodities critical to sustaining the fight were fuel, ammunition and water. The lines of communication (LOC) over which we had to operate were defined by the MEU battle space and the theater logistics architecture. Within the MEU battle space, 57 miles of bad road separated FOB Echo from FOB Duke. Our source for bulk JP8 fuel was over 160 miles of even worse road, and a single round-trip fuel mission required Soldiers to drive 320 miles in 130-degree heat. During the battle, the 364th Supply Company would routinely be spread across 220 miles of desert with date palms and mud huts. Because three hours was the best response time we could achieve for an emergency push of supplies from FOB Echo to FOB Duke, accurate estimates were essential.

In the case of bulk fuel, the mission was threefold: to reach back over the LOC with organic and attached fuel tankers from FOB Duke to our source of supply, maintain and operate two fuel farms, and push fuel from FOB Duke to outposts in the edges of An Najaf two to three times a week. This LOC was the longest route in our area of operations. Fuel was the also the most complex mission overall.

As a result, wholesale JP8 distribution commanded most of our attention throughout the fight. Sustaining the steady flow of fuel was vital to the mechanized formations the 364th supported. The most important consideration was keeping crews fit for the 320-mile trip. The G1/G4 Battle Book defines line-haul operations as a round-trip distance that can be traveled twice per day. This LOC was something beyond line-haul. Army doctrine suggests tactical units do not do this sort of mission.

Success would require some creative planning and great NCO leadership. Early in the operation, the 364th received two separate teams of M969 fuel tankers, giving the company 12 tankers we could count on to line-haul fuel. We created two fuel teams, complete with gun truck security elements. We kept these teams together, to include convoy commanders, throughout the operation.

We then built a schedule that had each team on the road for two days, with a “down” day, and then back on the road. A given team would be on the road 4.5 days out of each week. As Soldiers became familiar with the route, safe travel time became about 5.5 hours one way. By using one day per “leg,” soldiers got rest in the middle of each mission. The “down” day was then used for maintenance in the morning, then more rest in the afternoon. We thought this rhythm was sustainable for the time we had to execute reach-back for fuel.

This was a sustainable rhythm until two battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived at the start of the second week of fighting. The 364th now had three mechanized elements, plus aviation, in our area of operations. We decided that if we could briefly surge our wholesale distribution capability, we could then revert to our planned rhythm and sustain for the duration of the operation. The single theater push of fuel we received during the battle came earlier than expected. We capitalized on this windfall to delay one fuel mission for one day, which enabled each team to make subsequent back-to-back runs with no “down” day.

NCO Leadership

It was during this period, about the second week of the fight, that NCO leadership became the key to success. Enforcing rest plans and staying sharp on precombat checks (PCCs) and precombat inspections (PCIs) enabled us to surge temporarily in order to keep up with the flow of operations. We did this with no combat losses, no injuries and no days lost to vehicle maintenance or illness.

Because bottled water was abundant before the battle, the supply of bottled water never required a surge or change in rhythm. The concept of water support was a constant. This remained true even as

new units continued to pile on. Due to this influx of warfighters, consumption rates and on-hand quantities of water constituted a key piece of information. This information became a transportation enabler.

Staying Responsive

By not having to react blindly to an imagined shortage of water, we were able to free up ground transportation to move ammunition. This information enabled our support to stay responsive to the warfighter’s priorities. Because of the size of the force the 364th Supply Company supported and also the tremendous distances we had to travel to deliver support, knowing exactly what we had and how much of it we would have in a few days constituted essential data throughout the operation.


We moved bottled water with a palletized loading system (PLS) platoon we had received just before *Operation Pacific Guardian* began. This capability had enabled us to build up a sustainable stock of bottled water. As the fighting intensified, this element was also used to move ammunition. Our visibility of bottled water stocks enabled us to keep two PLS systems reserved for on-call ammunition transport requests from the MEU. Since the bottled water was next to the ammunition supply point for southern Iraq, we integrated these PLSs into the water mission. Seeing an opportunity and being in a position to seize it allowed the 364th to provide a capability that had not even been identified as a requirement before the start of the fight.

As the fight entered its second week and *Operation Pacific Guardian* approached its culminating point, some critical types of ammunition were running low. The particular ordnance was Marine-specific and could not be moved during our routine water mission using “opportunity” PLS. Again, by keeping careful track of our on-hand commodities, we were able to shift our PLS schedule. We built in an emergency reach-back operation to a Marine ammunition supply point, picked up the necessary ammunition, and got back before the specific rounds were depleted. All 364th ammunition transport missions were only possible because of careful asset visibility. Without this critical information, we would not have been able to develop an ammunition supply plan “on the fly.” We would



Class IX Retrograde Operations in Southern Iraq


**364th Supply Company (Direct Support)
Operation Pacific Guardian, Iraq
August 2004
Forward Operating Bases Echo and Duke**




Fueling an Intense Air Effort



'Hot loading' Class IV for the Fight



Maintenance Team Replacing Forklift Tire



Class III Bulk Fuel Download

have required further augmentation: additional assets that probably were not available.

Throughout *Operation Pacific Guardian*, continuing to revise estimates and plan accordingly were the keys to our success. Because of the complex terrain and the political sensitivities involved in fighting around the mosque and the cemetery, the Marines depended on careful planning and resource allocation. It was not feasible to simply blast holes through the city in order to engage insurgent forces. Instead,

precision fires - from snipers to laser-guided munitions - were used to limit collateral damage.

This had a tremendous impact on logistics. The relatively small transportation section of the MEU was required to navigate narrow streets with low-hanging wires and debris to deliver supplies to widely separated elements. The tactical supply routes tended to radiate through the city like spokes, with few cross-mobility corridors. As a result, the availability of organic lift to conduct resupply operations was

extremely limited. Our ability to augment that lift by conducting wholesale supply transportation operations was therefore a very real asset. While most of the wholesale resupply was by air, on at least two occasions our ability to get emergency supplies for the warfighter ensured assets were available for tactical resupply missions.

Before *Operation Pacific Guardian*, the 364th conducted coordination with the MEU S4 through company command channels. As the fight developed, this proved too cumbersome. Between split-base operations, continuous convoys and multiple logistics capabilities, execution was all-consuming. There was little time to validate new requirements.

This problem was resolved by the addition of a battalion support operations liaison officer (LNO). This LNO was virtually embedded within the MEU S4 and served to gather and complete initial validation of all emerging requirements. This allowed Logistics Task Force Victory to maintain clearer visibility on what was happening in An Najaf, which in turn led to faster and more efficient allocation of resources. Adding an LNO also freed key leaders within the company from spending time on requirements that were clearly beyond the company's capabilities, allowing us to focus on the mission.

The other significant challenge for the 364th was the integration of new Soldiers as we continued to expand our capabilities. At its peak, the 364th "Guardian Eagles" numbered 275 soldiers. We were performing tactical fuel distribution; wholesale line-haul of fuel; bulk fuel storage and issue; providing Class II (general supplies), Class III (petroleum, oils and lubricants), Class IV (construction and barrier materiel), Class V (ammunition), Class IX (repair parts) support; PLS medium transportation support; heavy equipment transporter (HET) support; DS maintenance; field services; and potable water production. The 364th operated five out of six tactical logistics functions within one company headquarters.

This would not have been possible without using common sense to integrate short-term augmentation. Our focus was almost entirely on the mission. As far as military discipline, the 364th focused on the basics. The commander or detachment OIC visited each

work area every day, and the first sergeant or detachment NCOIC visited living areas every day. We conducted a nightly Battle Update Brief (BUB) and a daily ground movement order. Orderly rooms were very focused on personnel accountability.

Also, short-term (less than 30 days) attachments to the 364th were held accountable only for mission-conducted safely, energetically and to standard. The 364th provided additional command support as needed, from providing DSN telephone access to coordinating airlift for a platoon so its Soldiers could attend a memorial service in their parent company.

After the Battle

Logistics is largely a game of numbers. Whether discussing time, distance, quantity received or quantity required, logisticians always are talking about numbers. The success of the 364th Supply Company during the battle of An Najaf is shown by the "Key Assets" and "Productivity" charts of the company's capabilities and productivity, 12-25 Aug 04.

Key Assets 12-25 Aug 04
Peak Personnel: 275
Fuel Trucks: 17
3K ROWPUs: 3
Ullage in Fuel Farms: 320K gallons
Potable Water Storage: 189K gallons

Productivity 12-25 Aug 04
Fuel:
Received: 400K gallons
Issued: 300K gallons
Convoys: 14
Miles Traveled: 4,000
Water:
Produced: 1,250,000 gallons
Issued: 1,100,000 gallons
Palletized Load System:
Pallets Moved: 985
Convoys: 24
Miles Traveled: 3,400

These are only some of the statistics describing the 364th logistics effort required to support *Operation Pacific Guardian*. The hours spent on materials handling equipment (MHE) missions or operating retail fuel points will never be fully accounted. Of course, the hard work of the 364th Warrior Logisticians is more than simple numbers. Their hard work is a reflection of their pride and professionalism. In the final analysis, supply statistics reflect the commitment of each Soldier on the ground and nothing more, or less.

Principles

The 364th began by acknowledging a tradition of creativity and ingenuity, a “can-do” attitude. Based on common sense, our operating principles will assist any logistics company operating far from the flagpole in the complex arena of Iraq.

The most important principle for logistics success in the fighting at An Najaf was anticipation. From our initial logistics set to developing requirements and capabilities in the midst of the battle, the 364th Supply Company maintained its ability to support the warfighter because the company was always looking ahead. This required close coordination with civilian contractors and joint military organizations. It was also necessary to carefully monitor consumption of key commodities. In whatever way at whatever time, we were always trying to see the way ahead.

Another key principle was unity of command and unity of effort. The 364th worked hard to clarify exactly how each element fit into the larger picture.

As units and capabilities were added, we developed a simple, easy-to-execute routine for maintaining C2. Leaders remained visible and present throughout operations. All decisions came from or were approved by the company commander. Subordinate leaders understood the importance of not allowing any external organization to task the company without going through the proper channels.


Though other logistics principles were at work, the final significant principle for the 364th was flexibility. We experienced this principle as the ability to act on critical information and seize opportunities as quickly as they arose. We were able to make a significant contribution to the warfighter by assisting with ammunition transportation, for example, and we could do this only because we could accurately visualize our entire operation. Communication within the company was absolutely critical in order for us to rapidly shift assets and missions without falling into chaos. Flexibility was largely the contribution of the NCOs and Soldiers who made the mission happen each and every day during *Operation Pacific Guardian*.

The 364th Supply Company’s support of the battle 5-27 Aug 04 in An Najaf was a success. For achievement, we tackled key objectives before and during the operation. Before combat, the 364th focused on establishing the right mix of capabilities and developing support relationships. During the fight, the 364th focused on providing fuel, ammunition and water to the warfighter. Anticipation, unity of command and flexibility contributed the most directly to mission accomplishment.

CPT John H. Chaffin IV, Quartermaster, is currently serving as Company Commander, 364th Supply Company (Direct Support), Logistics Task Force 264 in Iraq. He is a 1996 graduate of the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) Officer Basic Course who began his career as a 91A (Combat Medic) in 1989, serving in the Minnesota National Guard. He has been on active duty since completing the Officer Basic Course (OBC). His first assignment after completing OBC was Executive Officer, Company E, 187th Medical Battalion, AMEDD Center and School. Subsequent assignments include Medical Platoon Leader, 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division; S4 (Logistics), 215th Forward Support Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division; and Assistant S3 (Operations) for the Special Operations Support Command. He branch-transferred from the Medical Service Corps to the Quartermaster Corps in 2001 while at the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, Fort Lee, Virginia.

Quick Reaction Force - 264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne)

LT Bryan E. Swartz



**Soldiers of the Quick Reaction Force on a gun truck mission 10 Sep 04
protect a 40th Quartermaster Company convoy.**

In Afghanistan as part of *Operation Enduring Freedom*, the 264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne) saw a need for a small force of Soldiers that could provide security for the entire battalion. Later notified to deploy from Fort Bragg, NC, to Iraq for *Operation Iraqi Freedom* in Spring 2004, the 264th used its previous experience in Afghanistan to create such a force. Upon arrival in Southwest Asia, the 264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne) became the Logistics Task Force 264.

On 1 May 04, the 264th was alerted to deploy to Kuwait en route to Iraq. A "Quick Reaction Force" was created at Fort Bragg to perform convoy and security force protection of the battalion's base camp. The battalion's outgoing commander defined the need for creating a Quick Reaction Force, heavily armed and fast. He envisioned a small force to provide the firepower to protect the combat service support (CSS) convoys conducting operations throughout Iraq. He selected the platoon leader and platoon sergeant. The Soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)

for this new platoon were chosen from the battalion's companies that were not deploying: the 623d Quartermaster Company (Aerial Equipment Repair and Supply), the 600th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Equipment and Repair) and the 503d Maintenance Company (Direct Support).

The Quick Reaction Force platoon includes personnel trained in different military occupational specialties (MOSs) that range from parachute riggers to generator mechanics. These Soldiers have varied backgrounds, including former Marines and infantrymen who give the platoon expertise on weapon emplacement and small unit tactics. The personnel from the 503d Maintenance Company (Direct Support) help keep vehicles running. These Soldiers are aggressive and passionate about their mission and the safety of the Quick Reaction Force and the 264th.

The mission - determined at Fort Bragg - was to act as the Quick Reaction Force for the 264th and to


provide gun truck support for the battalion. Upon arrival in country, the Quick Reaction Force took on the additional tasks of providing support to armed civilian contractors who ride along as security for civilian trucks and providing gun truck support to units outside the Logistics Task Force 264. The Quick Reaction Force platoon had completed more than 150 missions in support of *Operation Iraqi Freedom* by Autumn 2004.

In the United States, realistic training for the Quick Reaction Force included the convoy live-fire exercise where the platoon battle drills were rehearsed and trained. The Quick Reaction Force also trained on mounted reconnaissance, land navigation and ground assault convoys. In Kuwait, the Soldiers trained on entry control point procedures, Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) and how to enter and clear rooms. The Quick Reaction Force conducted other convoy live-fire exercises that taught the tactics, techniques and procedures for the Iraqi theater of operations. They honed their techniques for gun truck support throughout Iraq.

'Soft-Skinned' Trucks

Initially, the 264th brought four HMMWVs (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) and two LMTVs (light medium tactical vehicles) in country. These vehicles were "soft-skinned" trucks with no mounting systems for heavy weapons. Logistics Task Force 264 has four MK19 grenade machine guns and two M2 50-caliber machine guns. Other personal weapons for the 26-man platoon are 2 M60 machine guns, 11 M249 squad automatic weapons, 8 M203 grenade launchers and M16 rifles for all Soldiers. The 264th deployed with PVS7A night vision goggles and M68 red dot scopes for the M16 rifles.

After arriving in Kuwait and receiving the trucks from the port, the trucks for the 264th were taken to Arifjan for bolting on armor from recycled Add on Armor (AOA) kits and for installing both air-conditioning and hard tops with ring mounts for heavy weapons. Hardening or "up-armor" vehicles became a priority for one month in Kuwait, as Logistics Task Force 264 faced the long convoy north to the Camp Victory Annex near the Baghdad International Airport.



Welders worked through the nights in Kuwait in June 2004 to 'up-armor' vehicles before the Logistics Task Force 264 convoy into Iraq.

Convoy ambushes in Iraq were causing more US casualties than any other single threat. The Army hired contractors to install this armor for units in Kuwait and Iraq. The contractors used steel specifically hardened to stop small arms fire from multiple threats to personnel, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and rocket-propelled grenades. The contractors and soldiers also replaced windshields with thick bulletproof glass. The contractors trained Soldiers how to install the armor plating and also how to install and repair the air-conditioning systems that combated temperatures of 120 degrees Fahrenheit and higher during the day. In fact, the welding section began to work on the vehicles after sundown, from 1800 to 0500 for cooler temperatures and less stress on the Soldiers.

Workers also installed a mobile tracking system (MTS) in two of the trucks, so Soldiers could send and receive messages such as electronic mail. Once in Iraq, the 264th received the warlock system - an improvised explosive-jamming device - and installed the warlock system into several trucks. This system helps jam radio frequencies that may set off an IED.

In summary, the personnel of the Quick Reaction Force with their equipment have come together as a cohesive unit, providing security to 264th. As platoon leader for this specially trained unit, I have observed

(Continued on Page 24)

Quartermaster Commentary

10 Tips for Successful Predeployment and Deployment

CPT Timothy E. Matthews

During *Operation Enduring Freedom* in 2002, the 264th Corps Support Battalion (CSB) (Airborne), 1st Corps Support Command, Fort Bragg, NC, was preparing for deployment to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. I will discuss our preparation from my viewpoint as the battalion adjutant/battle captain. This article will provide 10 helpful *tips* that the leaders of the 264th CSB successfully employed in the predeployment phase and deployment phase. While not all-inclusive, the 10 tips will offer tools necessary for a unit's readiness posture.

Tip 1: Conduct a Unit Soldier Readiness Program.

Ensure that 100 percent of the assigned personnel in the unit or battalion conduct the unit Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) because constraints will prevent some critical personnel from deploying. For an adjutant, all documents and records will be coordinated through local agencies on the installation such as the personnel servicing battalion (PSB), finance, legal, medical and dental facilities for the SRP. Unit success with the SRP will be challenging because of identifying replacements for critical military occupational specialties (MOSs) on the installation and even within the Army, which will be the foundation of the unit's accomplishment of future operations. Conducting a 100 percent SRP will not only increase unit readiness, but also identify the unit's training goals for Soldiers who are not deploying.

Tip 2: Identify Critical MOSs and Key Personnel.

Identifying critical MOSs will be crucial to the organization's readiness. Examples of critical MOSs are 92Y (Unit Supply Specialist), 92A (Automated Logistical Specialist) and 92F (Petroleum Supply Specialist). However, conduct a thorough mission analysis to establish a viable *Troop to Task* list of personnel deploying and not deploying. Many of the identified personnel either will be on levy or required to attend mandatory schools such as the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) or Officer Candidate School (OCS).

However, when a unit is put on deployable status, the Army policies of STOP LOSS/STOP MOVE take effect. STOP LOSS is a short-term policy that stabilizes Soldiers in their current assignments by preventing them from leaving the Army at the end of their service, and STOP MOVE is a policy that stabilizes Soldiers in their current assignments by preventing their move to another unit. Soldiers who are scheduled for a permanent change of station (PCS) remain to deploy with their unit under STOP LOSS/STOP MOVE. There should be no negotiations unless there are extenuating circumstances. Ensure that all operational deletions submitted to the battalion S1 (Adjutant) go through the proper channels to the first general officer in the chain of command.

Tip 3: Select the Rear Detachment Commander/First Sergeant.

This will be most difficult because the Soldiers selected *must* be competent leaders responsible for making sound decisions while the unit or battalion deploys. The leaders left behind should be stellar performers because they determine the success or failure of the rear detachment. Leadership in the 264th CSB's rear detachment was successful in guiding and directing Soldiers on a daily basis as the necessary mission in the rear continued. The rear detachment continues administrative actions and represents the unit in the Family Readiness Group. These rear detachment leaders are the ears, eyes and voices for families to know and understand what's going on with deployed Soldiers at all times.

Tip 4: Don't Underestimate Inventories.

Unfortunately, time may not be on the unit's side with inventories. The order to deploy to an unknown location may come within two weeks, for example. The 264th had a couple of months to prepare and deploy so leaders conducted a vigorous military decision making process (MDMP). The battalion staff ensured that all subordinate units conducted proper predeployment inventories and identified the rear detachment commander early in the process. Identifying the rear detachment commander early in the predeployment phase gives the commander or first sergeant ample time to conduct inventories of all equipment to standard.

Leaders must separate all deploying equipment from daily operations as soon as possible so that all major items not on hand can be requested through the proper channels, such as the S4 (Logistics Officer) or property book officer. Conduct this inventory just like a change of command inventory to be successful. Ensure that the rear detachment personnel conduct monthly cyclic and sensitive item inventories when the unit or battalion deploys forward to the battle. Time will be short - so don't delay or inventories may impact mission requirements.

Tip 5: Take the Lead on the Family Readiness Group.

The rear detachment commander or the first sergeant in charge should take the lead on the Family Readiness Group. Families need a leader who will establish and maintain a family support bond worthy of trust and respect. Many things will and can go wrong for the unit and the leadership without such a support group. The 264th had a keen sense of responsibility about informing family members of deployed Soldiers at all times. The 264th held meetings and disbursed unit newsletters to the family members on a monthly basis.

From my experience, a Family Readiness Group can become a combat multiplier for unit success. Going through the installation agencies such as Army Community Services (ACS) is another plus for the Family Readiness Group. The 264th held a town hall meeting with all family members before deployment. They received briefings on the threat level, the country of Afghanistan, chaplain support channels and, most importantly, their financial entitlements.

Tip 6: Conduct Daily In-Progress Reviews.

As a staff, daily in-progress reviews (IPRs) will be critical for the staff, commanders and other key leadership before deployment. As an adjutant, I conducted daily IPRs and coordination meetings with the other staff members and outside agencies before the battalion leadership meetings. Company commanders should come to this meeting with all internal and external issues for the staff to resolve. The 264th resolved significant issues before deploying. The 264th conducted two mandatory meetings: one in the morning and one that afternoon. Also, establishing critical timelines for movement will be significant for the staff functions. The priorities of efforts for the units to execute will come from this timeline. I recommend sending an issue that cannot be resolved at the unit level up the chain of command as a request for information (RFI). Do not hesitate to resolve issues before deployment.

Tip 7: Establish Equipment Priorities.

Control and monitor usage of deploying equipment to avoid readiness issues with equipment, a 5,000-gallon fuel tanker for example, because Soldiers continue using the equipment before deployment. The staff will requisition all major items not on hand to maintain unit readiness. Maintaining the Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TC ACCIS) is the key to a successful deployment. Proper maintenance of the data base will make the deployment relatively easier and will prevent a crisis in the future.

Ultimately, unit movement officers should routinely maintain and update their units' Automated Unit Equipment Lists (AUEs) to prevent "frustrated cargo" when time for deployment. Load all critical equipment first on the aircraft, ship, truck or train for deployment operations. The 264th used the TC ACCIS, and this planning system paid big dividends for the predeployment and redeployment phases of the operation. Ensure the organization's

AUEL and deployment equipment listing are updated on a quarterly or monthly basis as required by the installation transportation office.

Tip 8: Deploy All Equipment.

I want to emphasize the importance of deploying all your required equipment. Take everything you need or think you need because whatever you left behind will not be at your disposal for use once the unit deploys. Conduct thorough precombat checks/precombat inspections (PCC/PCI) with all subordinate leaders such as platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. The 264th conducted deliberate checks and balances to ensure accuracy of PCC/PCI.

As leaders, checking behind subordinate leaders after they have completed the task may seem like micro-management, but in reality it's taking care of business. You will find that what you wanted done may be done differently - so double check. Also, set aside all containers and equipment necessary for the mission because you may be told that budget constraints make procurement of certain items or equipment difficult in the future.

Tip 9: Maintain Administrative Actions.

This will be another critical consideration for unit leadership. Upon deployment notification, unit leaders should complete all administrative changes in the organization. Ensure all personnel - deploying or not deploying - have close-out NCO Evaluation Reports and Officer Evaluation Reports before the chain of command deploys. This will prevent frustration when a unit has deployed forward and does not have signatures on these important documents. As an adjutant, I believe the 264th performed this task exceptionally well. I made a personnel tracking chart for the leaders to review, and we reviewed that chart on a daily basis during our battalion IPR meeting.

As an adjutant, start and stop all deployed personnel entitlements as required. Commanders will need to review their unit commander's financial report (UCFR) on a monthly basis, even when deployed or not deployed. Also, ensure the unit deploys with the Soldiers' original promotion packets because the battalion's command sergeant major will still conduct promotion boards when possible. Lastly, write performance awards early in the deployment to prevent delay when it's time to redeploy back to home station.

Tip 10: Conduct After Action Reviews by Phases.

The Army conducts after action reviews (AARs) well. Conduct AARs at each stage or phase of the operations. The 264th conducted AARs during the following phases: predeployment, movement to area of operations, deployment, redeployment and reconstitution. From my point of view, I believe our battalion performed exceptionally well during our nine-month deployment. Our leaders' willingness to adapt to current operations and to care for the welfare of families and mission every day ensured success.

CPT Timothy E. Matthews is currently assigned as the Service Detachment Commander, 3d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He has a bachelor of science degree in accounting from Tuskegee (Alabama) University. CPT Matthews enlisted in the Army in 1993 as a specialist and was accepted into Officer Candidate School as a staff sergeant and commissioned in 1999. He is a graduate of the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, Quartermaster Officer Basic Course and Aerial Delivery Materiel Officers Course at Fort Lee, Virginia; and also the 82d Airborne Division Jumpmaster Course, US Air Force Airlift Load Planners and Cargo Preparation Courses, and Support Operations Course (Phase II) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His previous assignments at Fort Bragg include Rigger Platoon Leader, 623d Quartermaster Company (Aerial Equipment Repair and Supply), Executive Officer, 259th Field Service Company (Modular), and Battalion Adjutant, 264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne), as well as Task Force Adjutant/Battle Captain, Logistics Task Force 264, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, and S3 (Operations Officer), 264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne) at Fort Bragg.

Quartermaster Commentary

Joint and Expeditionary

Fuel Logistics in Northern Iraq

CPT Jamie L. Krump

Today's Army is revamping to meet the design of a Joint and Expeditionary Force, a lighter force that is more quickly deployable. Within the next few years, Army Transformation will yield a force that can be tailored to combat any enemy force worldwide. The effectiveness of this revolutionary concept was displayed, and its fundamentals reinforced, when the 173d Airborne Brigade, Southern European Task Force (SETAF), and Task Force 1-63 Heavy Reaction Company (HRC) and Medium Reaction Company (MRC) from the 1st Infantry Division deployed completely by air into northern Iraq in Spring 2003 for *Operation Iraqi Freedom*. This successful deployment supported the concept of "joint and expeditionary" before this was commonplace. This deployment confirmed the ability to deploy and sustain both light and heavy assets in an austere, isolated environment for an extended time.

In March 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted to deny the use of Turkey's borders to United States troops to provide a northern axis for the march toward Baghdad, Iraq. This denied the passage of the 4th Infantry Division into northern Iraq via Turkey and forced the United States to develop an alternate plan to place significant combat forces in the north. The solution was to air drop the 173d Airborne Brigade just 30 miles south of the Turkish border. Fifteen C-17 aircraft dropped 1,000 paratroopers and their equipment 26 Mar 03 near Bashur Airfield, Iraq, as a show of force in order to stabilize the region and deny the option of northern routes for retreat by Saddam Hussein's regime. In the next 96 hours, 48 C-17s air-landed 2,200 troops and 400 pieces of rolling stock at Bashur Kirkuk Airfield to complete the 173d insertion. The 100 percent aerial deployment of this brigade was complete on 30 Mar 03. Within days, conditions were ready for Task Force 1-63 HRC and MRC to land at the airfield.

In itself, this mission was a first because a light airborne brigade augmented with heavy mechanized assets was inserted by air into northern Iraq while under the operational control of Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N). The heavy forces consisted of the HRC and the MRC. The HRC and the MRC equated to a battalion with more than 200 personnel, 5 M181 tanks, 5 M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicles, 10 M113 armored personnel carriers, 4 M1064 mortar carriers, 1 M88 tank recovery vehicle, a scout platoon, a Military Police platoon, and a combat service support force enhancement module (CSSFEM). These heavy forces were critical to back up the light infantry operations in northern Iraq.

All sustainment for the forces on the airfield came by delivery from C-17 and C-130 aircraft. Soldiers built up 10 days of supply (DOS) in almost every class of supply relatively quickly, with the exception of bulk fuel. To bring in the heavy assets, Quartermasters needed to meet the conditions set at 22,000 gallons of fuel on the ground. Quartermasters initially established a 30,000-gallon fuel system supply point (FSSP) with one 20,000-gallon collapsible fabric tank and one 10,000-gallon collapsible fuel tank. This provided the storage capacity, but not the fuel. Eventually, this FSSP grew for fuel storage of 80,000 gallons that proved quite a challenge to empty and move.

Local Fuel Purchase

Local purchase of diesel fuel was the first effort at getting the required fuel because all Army vehicles could operate on diesel fuel or JP8 fuel. This was not a big issue because converting from JP8 to diesel does not require any filter changes. However, returning to the use of JP8 is hard because all fuel filters then need changing. We coordinated with the 173d contracting officer for the purchase of 22,000

gallons of diesel fuel. We assumed that since we were in Iraq, fuel should be somewhat easy to come by. However, this was not at all the case in northern Iraq.

Northern Iraq had been cut off from resupply for many years, and the only way to get fuel was from southern Iraq and Turkey. A gas station in northern Iraq consisted of a man sitting by a fuel pump that did not work, with five-gallon cans of fuel. The 173d contracting officer initially contracted for 15,000 liters of diesel fuel to see how well the process worked. We waited a few days for delivery and never received the fuel. Finally, contractors did drive north with a couple of hundred gallons in drums loaded in the back of a nonmilitary pickup truck. Obviously, this purchasing system was not going to work.

The next method we tried was to fill up the FSSP collapsible fabric fuel tanks by using C-17s and C-130s. This proved a poor system for many reasons. First, the airplanes never seemed to stay on the ground long enough to issue large quantities of fuel. Because of the size of the airfield at Bashur and the threat to the aircraft, the planes were not scheduled to spend more than 45 minutes on the ground. Also, all flights were at night. Fuel operations from an airplane require more time during the hours of darkness. Finally, we never really had an accurate aircraft schedule of when the “bladder” and “wet-wing birds” were due with fuel deliveries, which made it hard to have fuelers on standby.

Only One Way

This left us with only one way to get enough fuel on the ground in order to call forward the HRC and the MRC. We had to establish ground lines of communication (LOC). We were cut off from forces in southern Iraq, so a northern ground LOC was necessary. Through outstanding negotiations by the Army Forces-Turkey (ARFOR-T), the Turks agreed to allow fuel flow across the border of Turkey into northern Iraq. We had to send escorts to the Turkish border to pick up the Turkish tankers as they crossed into Iraq. These escorts were critical to ensure that the fuel arrived at the right place. The first convoy from northern Iraq made sure that we had the fuel assets on the ground to call forward the HRC and



Supply Support Activity and the US Air Force Ramp Area in Kirkuk, Iraq

the MRC. We were finally going to get the heavy forces on the ground to support the 173d.

Just as we were getting fuel systems in place to solidly support the 173d, we were told to take over the forecast and management of all supplies in northern Iraq. The supply and services officer, 201st Forward Support Battalion, 173d Airborne Brigade assumed the mission. While we were providing a daily Logistics Status Report (LOGSTAR) to the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC), we were not forecasting fuel for the other US units in northern Iraq.

We began to include the forecasts for the Air Force on Bashur Airfield, JSOTF-N in Irbil, and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in Mosul. This proved a very difficult task, but one quickly mastered. We established a reporting chain from these elements that allowed a proper forecast for all units in northern Iraq. However, forecasting proved to be a constant challenge. There was a constant influx of units from all branches of the service into the region following the siege of Baghdad. Since missions were constantly changing and units were rapidly advancing, we had no accurate way of forecasting their arrivals. Each day a new unit would show up and request fuel support.

Concurrently, the city of Kirkuk, Iraq, became destabilized. The combat forces departed Bashur in order to stabilize Kirkuk and seize the city’s airfield. While the 173d headed south, the logistics hub

remained at Bashur with all the support personnel. Fortunately, it only took a couple of weeks to open the airfield in Kirkuk because the separation of the combat forces from the logistical hub was a huge challenge. Fifty civilian trucks had to be contracted to support the movement of the supplies and troops from Bashur to Kirkuk.

Overwhelming Diversity

No matter how many trucks we contracted or how many workers we hired, we simply did not have the assets or the manpower to receive, break down and distribute the quantity of supplies required. During the culmination of support, we were supporting more than 7,000 Soldiers in four locations spread over an area spanning hundreds of kilometers. Not only were the numbers great in quantity, but also the diversity was overwhelming. The forward support company (FSC) was supporting heavy mechanized units, aviation assets, special operations groups, the US Air Force, the US Marines and anyone else who passed through the northern half of the theater in Iraq.

Once the ground LOC from Turkey opened, we had to receive the trucks with Class I (rations) and the fuel tankers at the Harbur Gate on the border of Turkey and Iraq, escort all trucks to Bashur Airfield, on to Mosul for the MEU, then to Irbil for JSOTF-N, finally ending up in Kirkuk. This required extensive coordination and forecasting to prevent fuel tankers from being on the ground too long without being emptied. The supply support activity (SSA) also had to break down all Class I trucks for redistribution to the various other forward operating bases.

To lessen the manpower drainage, we created “the mother of all distribution plans.” This plan broke down the commodities by unit loads on trucks. The 200th Materiel Management Center (MMC) in Turkey forwarded us the bumper number and driver listing for each truck and the corresponding unit for which the truck was loaded, according to our distribution plan. We would simply send unit requirements by location, such as Mosul and Irbil; and the personnel in Turkey would verify the appropriate pallet configuration on individual trucks. When our escorts reached the border, they would merely call out the listed names and bumper numbers

and then drop trucks off to each unit at separate locations on their way to back to Kirkuk. This procedure stopped the depletion of resources in the SSA and allowed us to operate much more efficiently.

Logistics in northern Iraq was complicated in Spring 2003 and the Joint and Expeditionary Force during *Operation Iraqi Freedom* was a new concept to all of us, but we worked “outside the box” and thrived. Initial forces in northern Iraq were successful for one reason: teamwork. There were no Air Force, Special Operations Forces, Marine or specific Army units, strictly speaking. We were all one allied team doing what was necessary for mission success in an austere, isolated environment. If a unit needed food, fuel or equipment, we did what we had to do to support each other, regardless of uniform or insignia.

Tremendous Distances

Various units separated by tremendous distances pulled together to provide each other with supplies that the normal supply channels could not seem to provide. While at times it seemed we could barely support our own units with fuel, for example, everyone still gave all they had to keep the other units functioning. We were forced by our circumstances to become a joint team. In the end, we were very successful.

CPT Jamie L. Krump is a recent graduate of the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course at Fort Lee, Virginia. She served as the Support Operations Supply and Services Officer, Transportation Officer, and Mortuary Affairs Officer for the 201st Forward Support Battalion during its deployment to Iraq in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Previous assignments include Executive Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-145 Aviation Battalion; Water Platoon Leader and Executive Officer, Company A, 701st Main Support Battalion, as well as Battalion S4 (Logistics); and Supply and Purchasing Officer, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Sarajevo, Bosnia. She has a bachelor's degree in English and sociology from Viterbo University in Wisconsin.

Air Drop Resupply During Operation Iraqi Freedom

CPT Burton Carlson III

During *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Special Operations Forces were able to conduct successful missions deep into hostile territory because of aerial delivery capability. Special Operations Forces operate in an environment where the enemy is constantly adapting to Army capabilities. Aerial delivery allows them to maneuver and negotiate their missions successfully. Constant planning precedes success. Special Operations Forces understand the need for aerial delivery during any conflict. During the planning phase, these units work with Quartermaster parachute riggers to ensure rigging the supplies they need to survive.

If the Army is adopting aerial delivery as a means of distribution, then the Army needs to understand how to properly plan and execute the use of aerial delivery. The Army can first learn by understanding how the Special Operations Forces use aerial delivery.

Special Operations Forces always maximize their ability to issue their supplies where they want and when they want. Part of their success results from their planning process. If a unit wants ammunition, food, water and medical supplies, for example, the unit needs to ensure proper packing of these supplies. The parachute riggers rig a special operations unit's equipment in a Containerized Delivery System (CDS), A-22 Cargo Bag with a G12 parachute. The weight limit on the CDS is 2,200 pounds. For small units and special operations teams, this is not a constraint. If the weight limit may be exceeded, another A-22 is rigged, equally distributing the load and equipment. For *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Special Operations Forces assist the parachute riggers rigging the CDS. Once the CDS is rigged, the CDS waits until the special operations unit needs it.

The next step is coordinating with the Air Force to pick up and deliver the supplies. The Army needs to request transportation for resupply. The request

moves through the S3/G3 (Operations) to staff the requirement and coordinate the use. The request for air transport comes from the S4/G4 (Logistics) channels. At the joint task force (JTF) level, the JTF validates the request, assigns priority and passes it on for execution. The procedure is the same for the Air Force except when the Air Force receives notification for an IMMEDIATE AIRLIFT REQUEST. Upon receiving an immediate notice for a request for resupply, the Air Force quickly identifies an aircraft for the mission. The request immediately passes through emergency channels outside normal distribution channels until received by the authority validating requests for airlift.

Special Operations Forces plan air drop missions to grid locations known by the Special Operations Forces. The aerial delivery mission operates with a routine. Every Soldier has a part in the operation to ensure mission accomplishment, according to FM 100-27 (USA/USAF Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift Operations, January 1985).

Army Needs Awareness

The Army needs to become aware of the challenges ahead for the success of aerial delivery as a means of distribution. An initial challenge is educating the rest of the Army about aerial delivery and its benefits. For example, if a forward operating base (FOB) was cut off from the FOB's supply routes on the main supply route (MSR) and no ground transportation resupply was in the vicinity, one option for the FOB is aerial delivery of small Logistics Packages (LOGPACs) on site. A C-130 aircraft would fly and deliver the supplies the unit needs to survive until the MSR reopens or until other adequate transportation arrives for the FOB.

The Army's second challenge is to place supplies in the hands of riggers and unit representatives on site to ensure that the right supplies get to the right

Soldiers. When a unit decides to use aerial delivery, the unit needs to have representation in the supply process to avoid excessive bureaucracy. The corps has the responsibility of getting supplies to the rigger company. The unit representative receives the authorization from the commander to sign and pick up supplies with the unit's Unit Identification Code (UIC). The unit representative has the authority to sign for ammunition, Meals, Ready To Eat, water and anything else needed during the fight. The representative can use other corps transportation assets to transport the supplies to the rigger company.

Army Needs To Train Personnel

The Army's third challenge is training qualified personnel. To use aerial delivery for distribution, the Army must begin to train Soldiers within all units how to use aerial delivery. The Army needs to send instructors from the Advanced Airborne School to teach air movement officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) throughout the Army. The school teaches officers and NCOs how to plan loads in aircraft for air movement. Subjects include how to plan loads of vehicles, 463L pallets and other pieces of equipment for air movement on any type of military aircraft. The school also teaches how to certify hazardous materials (HAZMAT), such as ammunition and fuel, for air movement.

Air movement training prepares Army units for aerial delivery distribution. The Air Force must identify what cargo is being loaded on its aircraft for safety of flight reasons. The using unit ensures that the proper paper work is filled out correctly. This includes the HAZMAT statement, the joint tactical airlift request and the certified load plans.

The Army Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG) is the liaison between the Army and Air Force. The Army organization assists units with the Air Force. The using unit and the A/DACG assist the Air Force joint airdrop inspectors identifying HAZMAT cargo. Then the Air Force loads the

Army's CDS on the aircraft, the CDS leaves the aircraft, and the ground unit uses the supplies to continue the fight.

Soldiers today fight an enemy who is unpredictable and quickly adaptable. Soldiers need a resupply distribution system as flexible as they are. Aerial delivery gives the Army this logistics factor to stay in the fight. The air distribution of supplies throughout the area of operation allows Soldiers to continue their mission when cut off from their MSR or FOB.

Parachuting CDS gives the Soldier the fighting chance to beat the enemy in any remote location. Aerial delivery is the chance for Quartermasters and supply company commanders to make the difference as the Army transitions for the future.

CPT Burton Carlson III was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Quartermaster Corps through the Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a graduate of the University of North Carolina at Wilmington with a bachelor of science degree in accounting and a bachelor of arts degree in history. His military education includes graduation from OCS, the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course, Airborne Course, Air Assault Course, Aerial Delivery Materiel Officers Course and the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. His military assignments include Supply Platoon Leader for the 249th Quartermaster Company and also the 18th Quartermaster Detachment, 530th Supply and Service Battalion, 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Platoon Leader/Executive Officer, Headquarters and Supply Company, Logistics Task Force 530, Baghram, Afghanistan, 1st COSCOM, Fort Bragg; Executive Officer, 647th Quartermaster Company (Rigger), 530th Supply and Service Battalion, 1st COSCOM, Fort Bragg; and Assistant S3 (Operations), 507th Corps Support Group, 1st COSCOM, Fort Bragg.

OPFOR Contemporary Operating Environment


CPT Peter J. Moore

The battlefield has changed and the Army is transforming just in time. Gone are the days of a predictable enemy who will allow US intelligence personnel to distribute a common template of threat doctrine. The Army now faces an incredible variety of potential threats. Enemies have become more adaptive and capable of exploiting any weakness they find. Several aspects of the contemporary operating environment (COE) challenge the Army to adapt to meet the threat adequately.

With changes in the threat, the Army needed to change the way Soldiers are training. Change has been implemented at the Army's three combat training centers (CTCs): National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA; Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA; and Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany. The units assigned to these Army training centers perform the duties of the opposing forces (OPFOR). The OPFOR at the training centers replicate what is occurring on today's battlefields during the global war on terrorism. The OPFOR itself had to change. Soldiers must know their enemy and know how their enemy fights.

Formerly, the OPFOR at the Army training centers were based on the Soviet threat. The OPFOR would keep up with the Soviet Union's doctrine. The Soviet doctrine at the beginning of the Cold War was to use nuclear weapons. The Soviets eventually changed their doctrine when they realized that nuclear war was a no-win situation. The Soviets still relied on nuclear weapons as a threat to the West and as a backup to their conventional military forces, but nuclear weapons were no longer a first choice.

The Soviet's basic doctrine was to overwhelm any enemy with sheer numbers. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its Warsaw Pact allies had spent years committed to the growth and development of the offensive capabilities of ground forces. The Soviets maintained a large general-purpose ground force from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains to reinforce USSR status as a



**Combat Maneuver Training Center,
Hohenfels, Germany**

“superpower,” to deter aggression, to carry out wartime missions, and to underwrite political objectives in the region. The Soviets maintained the capability to conduct large-scale offensive operations deep into territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. Analysts forecasted that the Warsaw Pact forces would remain the largest aggregate of military power in the world, and the Soviets would remain committed to the offensive as the preferred form of operations in wartime.

This Soviet doctrine was reproduced at the Army training centers with the OPFOR. The OPFOR had great numbers of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that would be used in conventional fighting. At the CMTC, even though it is only a battalion-sized element, the OPFOR replicated a brigade tactical group. The OPFOR at the NTC is even more robust. When conducting an offensive operation, the OPFOR would maneuver all available vehicles.

Not only would the OPFOR mirror the Soviet threat in terms of size but also how the Warsaw Pact

forces would maneuver. The elements were moved based on a linear battlefield. The training units knew which way the OPFOR was coming. At CMTC both the OPFOR and the rotational units would maneuver in the “box” in an east-west orientation. There was no element of surprise. The OPFOR tactics were also the same for each rotation. They would start out with the reconnaissance forces, followed by the lead elements, and finally the main effort would advance. This form of maneuver allowed very little flexibility.

The only difference between offensive missions for the OPFOR would be which motorized rifle battalion would be leading the assault and which would be going in the north or the south. Everything else was the same. In spite of a lack of innovative thinking, the OPFOR always won. The OPFOR knew the terrain better than the rotational unit, and this experience along with the overwhelming numbers led to an invincible OPFOR.

The old Soviet-style OPFOR has no place in the world anymore. The fall of the Soviet Union changed that. The common operating environment (COE) is what is happening on the battlefields of today. Since the CTCs’ OPFOR replicates the real battlefields, the CTC OPFOR needed to change as well. The unconquerable OPFOR gave no hope to units in CTC training. The rotational unit commanders had no motivation to try and win because they knew that no matter what they did they would lose. The COE allows each side the opportunity to fight and win. Therefore commanders feel the heat and the pressure of the battlefield.

The OPFOR no longer limits the enemy strategy to a linear battlefield. The CTC battlefields have become noncontiguous. The enemy can strike from any direction. The OPFOR operates from support zones, usually centered in and around cities and towns. This allows the OPFOR great flexibility. They live in the towns just as normal citizens. The training units are not able to identify who is the OPFOR and who is not. The OPFOR watch the training units, waiting for a good time to strike.

The support zones extend to the disruption zones. These zones allow the OPFOR more of an offensive capability. The OPFOR will know when and where



National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California

best to hit by using the information from observation of the rotational unit. The OPFOR will push out of the town, for example, accomplish the mission and then return to town.

With the COE, the OPFOR has different objectives than during the Cold War era. Before, the OPFOR main objective was to push everything it had in an attempt to completely destroy the enemy’s maneuver forces. There was nothing they looked forward to more than the full tank-on-tank battle. The new COE OPFOR does not focus on the destruction of maneuver forces. The OPFOR does not want to go head-to-head with the training units because the OPFOR knows they will lose. The CTC OPFOR do not have the vehicles, equipment and technological capabilities to keep up with the Army’s rotational units. There are alternatives to going head-to-head, however.

Today’s OPFOR try to cause politically unacceptable casualties. The OPFOR strategy is to cause a few casualties each day over an extended period of time so that the enemy’s population at home will demand the OPFOR withdraw. In Somalia, for example, very rarely did the enemy go force-to-force against the deployed US military forces; but the enemy did cause enough casualties that the US public demanded that the deployed troops come home.


Another objective of the OPFOR under the COE is to allow no sanctuary. The training units have to assume that the OPFOR is always watching them because most likely they are. The OPFOR will attack anytime and anywhere they choose. The OPFOR at all times is looking for opportunities to strike. If the

training units let down their guard, the OPFOR will take the advantage. This allows the OPFOR to control the tempo of the operation.

Formerly, the CTCs conducted combat training almost on a schedule. One day the unit faced an attack, then moved into the defense, defended for three days, and then another attack. Everything was scheduled beforehand to try to get the most training squeezed into the short rotation. Now the OPFOR has the flexibility to conduct missions when it wants.

The immense variety of environments in which Soldiers can find themselves requires an Army prepared to respond to incidents within the United States as well as operations in remote countries. The overwhelming certainty in any COE is that Soldiers and leaders must possess incredible flexibility to respond to any threat. Considering that the collapse of the Soviet Union was more than 10 years ago, the change in Army training strategy is long overdue.

For conducting tough, demanding and realistic training, the Army is the best in the world. The Army's tactical, technical and physical aspects of training the force are absolutely superb and the envy of nations worldwide. To succeed in the future, however, the Army must build on a solid training mindset and develop Soldiers' agility and adaptability by focusing on training events that require creative solutions and an ability to focus and concentrate on the important points at hand. Training events must challenge Soldiers to adapt to a thinking, flexible enemy. By developing training events that replicate an agile enemy, leaders



**Joint Readiness Training Center,
Fort Polk, Louisiana**

can train focused, confident Soldiers. The OPFOR at the CTCs replicate today's enemy during the ongoing global war on terrorism worldwide.

CPT Peter J. Moore is assigned to 8-101 Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, after completing the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course at Fort Lee, Virginia. He began his Army career in 1992 as a 31M (Multi Channel Communication Systems Operator) with assignments at Camp Carroll, Korea, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He was commissioned in 2000 after graduating with a bachelor of arts degree in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles. Under the branch detail program, his first assignment was 1-4 Infantry at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. His previous duty positions include Rifle Platoon Leader, Opposing Forces (OPFOR), Support Platoon Leader, and Company Executive, OPFOR.

(Continued from Page 13)

Quick Reaction Force - 264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne)

that these Soldiers and NCOs consistently exhibit the discipline and ability to adapt to constantly changing missions to enable the success and effectiveness of Logistics Task Force 264.

LT Bryan E. Swartz, Quartermaster, is serving as the Quick Reaction Force Platoon Leader and Executive Officer in a Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Logistics Task Force 264 (Airborne), Victory Annex, Iraq. His first assignment after completing Officer Candidate School and the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course was as a Platoon Leader, 623d Quartermaster Company (Aerial Equipment Repair and Supply), 264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne). He began his career with the military occupational specialty 11B (Infantryman), serving as a team leader in the 3d Battalion, 187th Regimental Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and as a squad leader in the 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division when he deployed to Afghanistan from August 2002 to January 2003.

(Continued from Inside Front Cover)

From The Quartermaster General

In closing, let us continue to pray for our fellow service members deployed around the globe and for their families at home. We pray for their safety and safe return.

While serving as the 48th Quartermaster General, Brigadier General Scott G. West was detailed as the Director for Logistics, C4, Combined/Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7) and Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-1) from July 2003 to July 2004. He became the Commanding General of the US Army Quartermaster Center and School (USAQMC&S), Fort Lee, Virginia, and The Quartermaster General of the Army on 16 May 03 after he had served as the USAQMC&S Deputy Commander since 31 Jul 02. Brigadier General West has held key leadership and staff positions, including positions in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2d Infantry Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Corps Support Command, 6th Infantry Division (Light) and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He served as the Division Parachute Officer, 82d Airborne Division, during Operation Just Cause and as the Executive Officer of the 407th Supply and Transport Battalion during Operation Desert Storm. Other assignments include Chief, Office of the Quartermaster General, Fort Lee, Virginia; Chief, Sustainment Division, Director for Logistics, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J4 (Logistics), the Pentagon, Washington, DC; and Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G4, US Army. His several command positions include the 706th Main Support Battalion, 6th Infantry Division, Fort Wainwright, Alaska; and the 46th Corps Support Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Also, he commanded the Joint Logistics Command in Joint Task Force Aguila during humanitarian assistance operations in Central America after Hurricane Mitch from 1998 to 1999.

(Continued from Page 5)

A New Direction for Warrant Officer Professional Development

CW5 James C. Tolbert is currently assigned to the Office of the Quartermaster General, US Army Quartermaster Center and School (USAQMC&S), Fort Lee, Virginia, as the Regimental Warrant Officer/ Quartermaster Warrant Officer Proponent. He has served in a variety of assignments worldwide. These include Battalion Supply Technician, 223d Aviation Battalion, Schwaebisch Hall, Germany; and Property Book Officer, 26th Signal Battalion, Heilbronn, Germany, where he deployed to Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield/Storm in December 1990. Also, he served as a Property Book Team Chief and later Chief, Asset Visibility Section, Division Materiel Management Center, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; Property Book Officer, US Army Central Command, Camp Doha, Kuwait; Instructor/Writer, USAQMC&S, Fort Lee, Virginia; and Personnel Career Management Officer assigned to the US Total Army Personnel Command (now Human Resources Command), Alexandria, Virginia. He has completed every level of the Warrant Officer Education System and holds a master's degree in logistics systems management from Colorado Technical University at Colorado Springs.

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

Quartermaster Army Motor Accidents - Take Control and Manage Risk

Michael L. Davis

Safety Specialist Assigned to the US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, VA

Army motor vehicle accidents, after accidents in privately owned vehicles, are the second leading cause of deaths and serious injuries of Quartermaster Soldiers, environmental problems and damage/destruction of important equipment. Let's look at some common accidents from the past three years and see what could have been done to avoid them. Remember, leaders and Soldiers need to understand the hazards facing them before they can control those hazards.

A Soldier without a proper license was driving in a convoy where the rate of speed was too great for the road conditions, and proper distance was not maintained between vehicles. One vehicle applied its brakes, started to skid and rear-ended another vehicle.

Leaders need to ensure not only that their drivers have up-to-date licenses, but also are trained to drive the vehicles they are assigned. Units need to ensure that drivers are trained to drive in adverse conditions and over difficult terrain. Drivers with valid licenses need to obey all posted speed limits, adjust speed for road conditions, maintain proper distance between vehicles, use safety belts whenever possible and be prepared to take evasive action whenever necessary.

A convoy of forklifts and other Army motor vehicles was moving along a road when it met another convoy of vehicles moving in the opposite direction. Both convoys refused to yield the right of way. As the vehicles of the first convoy moved to a point along the extreme right-hand shoulder of the road, the shoulder crumbled under the weight. One vehicle rolled down the eight-foot drop and came to rest on its side.

No leader was around to ensure that Soldiers in the convoys obeyed the rules of the road. The drivers did not obey the posted speed limit, were not prepared to take evasive action and did not adjust speed for road conditions. The driver of the forklift was not using a safety belt and was very fortunate to escape serious injury.

A driver who misjudged a wet road did not reduce speed to maintain distance between other vehicles in a convoy. The driver took a turn too fast for the wet conditions and rolled his Army vehicle. The driver was using his safety belt, which probably saved his life.

Here again, a Soldier was driving at a speed too fast for road conditions and not paying attention to poor weather conditions. An accident investigation found out leaders had not given a safety brief and had not reviewed hazards and rules of the road for convoy operations.

An Army driver was traveling too fast for road conditions caused by fog and rain. When the driver tried to make a turn in the dense fog, the Soldier made the turn too early and flipped the vehicle. The driver and passengers received major injuries.

The leader never provided a safety brief. Also, leadership never held unit training on driving in adverse conditions, over difficult terrain, in blackout drive.

A driver was using a night vision device that was not working properly and therefore was not maintaining proper distance between vehicles. The front vehicle splashed a large amount of water on the second vehicle, blinding the driver. The driver lost control and rear-ended the first vehicle.

Again, the leader did not provide a safety brief. Personnel were not trained to drive in adverse conditions, over difficult terrain, in blackout drive, using night vision devices. No proper distance between vehicles was maintained.

A driver was preparing to conduct a refuel operation with a heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMMT). No ground guides were used, and the driver failed to make a proper turn. The driver struck another HEMMT. No injuries occurred and no fuel was spilled. However, the operation was delayed until additional operational vehicles could be found.

No preoperational safety brief was given about the hazards of conducting a refuel operation. Unit ground guides were not provided. The confined space for HEMMT movement should have caused the leaders to realize the need for ground guides.

An Army driver saw that another driver had not secured equipment. The second driver alerted the first driver and they stopped on the roadside. Neither warned the other convoy vehicles of their stop. Both drivers were struck by other convoy vehicles. One driver was killed, and the other was seriously injured.

Leaders should have ensured that their drivers understood the rules for emergency stops. Drivers also should have known how to use traffic control signs, signals, devices and markings.

A driver entered a curve too fast and rolled his tanker down an embankment. Large amounts of fuel spilled onto the ground.

The tanker driver was wearing a safety belt, which probably saved his life. The fuel for an operation was lost, and the spillage also caused the Army an environmental problem.

A driver tried to maneuver his tanker near an aircraft without using a ground guide. He failed. He not only damaged his vehicle but also the aircraft. Both the Army motor vehicle and the aircraft could not continue their missions until repaired.

Again, no ground guides were used and no safety briefing was given. Personnel were suffering from lack of sleep. No leader or unit considerations were given to these situations that increase the probability of accidents.

These types of accidents in vehicles are repeated day to day and year to year. Leaders must ensure that their drivers receive safety briefs and have valid, current licenses. Drivers must train to drive in adverse conditions, over difficult terrain, in blackout drive, and with night vision devices. Drivers must train to maintain proper distance between vehicles, maintain a correct speed for the road conditions and watch for changing weather conditions. Leaders must require the use of ground guides when necessary. Leaders must plan an operation with adequate driving time, rest stops and breaks, and enforced sleep plans.

In addition, leaders must provide an adequate number of drivers and alternate drivers, whenever possible. Leaders must require the use of safety belts whenever possible. Leaders must ensure that drivers are trained and prepared to take evasive action. The mechanical condition of vehicles and other equipment must be checked before starting a mission. Finally, leaders must ensure that drivers know the meaning of traffic control signs, signals, devices and markings, as well as emergency plans for stopping.

However, leader responsibility does not let individual drivers off the hook. Soldiers need to examine their own habits and look at ways to improve. Soldiers know when other Soldiers are irresponsible. They should report to their leaders when another Soldier is not performing to standard.



CAREER NEWS

Professional Development


The US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) has merged into the US Army Human Resources Command (HRC). The HRC combines the Active Component and Reserve Component personnel commands into one command. Quartermasters now access the content of the former PERSCOM online web site from the new HRC home page at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/>. For more information about Quartermaster Corps officer, warrant officer and noncommissioned officer issues, access the Office of the Quartermaster General web site at www.quartermaster.army.mil/. Access www.us.army.mil to set up a free E-mail account with Army Knowledge Online.

Structural and Personnel Changes in Quartermaster Officer Management

LTC Tracy Cleaver, Chief, Quartermaster Officer Personnel Management
Tracy.Cleaver@hoffman.army.mil, DSN 221-5266

The Quartermaster Branch at Human Resources Command (HRC) no longer has a standalone Future Readiness Officer. The Future Readiness Officer will “dual hat” as the Future Readiness Officer and the assignments officer for lieutenants (CPT Patti Fitzgerald). This position will manage all officers up to their arrival at the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (CLC3), regardless of whether they report as a captain or as a lieutenant. This “dual hat” officer will establish class dates for CLC3 and cut the requests for orders (RFOs) assigning Quartermasters to Fort Lee, VA.

Also, in the past, non-branch qualified (NBQ) captains and branch-qualified (BQ) captains have been managed by totally different assignment officers. Effective immediately, all captains will be managed by one assignment officer (CPT Jay Johnson). The following is the new branch organizational wiring diagram for Quartermaster officers at HRC. Please call or E-mail us with any questions.



Assignment Notification. Although the goal for both branch and the HRC is providing Soldiers with RFOs four to six months before a permanent change of station (PCS), the current operational requirement is not supporting that timeline. The reality is that most officers are getting 60 to 90 days of notice before their report dates. We fully understand the impact on officers and families, and we will continue to work hard at increasing notification time.

Captain (Promotable) Assignments. With modularity and Army Transformation initiatives, the requirements for majors in logistics are growing. Therefore, we have some captains who are promotable to be assigned to transforming Units of Action (UA) before attending Command and General Staff College (CGSC). We fully expect these officers to become branch-qualified before CGSC, just as a select few have in the past. We will ensure the officers selected have the required skills and experience necessary for success. For any questions, please feel free to call MAJ Werner at DSN 221-5267.

Thanks to all the officers of the Quartermaster Corps who continue “Supporting Victory” in assignments throughout the Army. Please remain flexible, and we at HRC will do everything in our power to provide you the quality support you have earned and deserve.

FY05 Assignment Process, FY06 LTC Battalion Command Board, and Contact Information

*LTC Timothy D. Brown, Lieutenant Colonel Assignments Officer
Timothy.Brown@hoffman.army.mil, DSN 221-5269*

FY05 Assignment Process

As the Army transforms during the ongoing global war on terrorism and the “Way Ahead” initiative, it is necessary to *transform* the assignment process here in the Officer Personnel Management Directorate, Human Resources Command (HRC), Alexandria, VA. Known as the Dynamic Distribution System, this new assignment process will provide the Army a *more flexible* distribution system that can adapt to the changing requirements as global operations continue. HRC will use four-month assignment cycles managed three times a year. However, assignment priorities may be readjusted at any time during a cycle to allow introduction of changing Army requirements into the cycle if needed.

Starting in January 2005, HRC will begin to work the next cycle of assignments with a report period of 1 May 05-30 Sep 05. The most significant change to the assignment process is the close management of permanent change of station (PCS) moves to look at Army needs, command priorities and an officer’s skills and experience. HRC will no longer depend on the year-month available (YMAV) date on an Officer Record Brief (ORB) to determine if the officer is available to move. ***Bottom Line: There must be a reason to move an officer!*** PCS moves will be initiated under these two distinct categories: *nondiscretionary or discretionary*.

Nondiscretionary moves include those moves that involve hard dates in an officer’s career. Some examples include a date of estimated return from overseas (DEROS) from an overseas assignment, a report date to a professional school, a graduation date from a school, a command selection, a professor of military science (PMS) selection, a joint tour completion, a sequential assignment report date, an estimated time on station (ETS) or retirement date.

Discretionary moves include those moves that are triggered by an assignment officer working to ensure a Quartermaster officer continues appropriate career development. Some examples include situations where an officer needs a new skill set (Joint or Army Staff), where an officer’s skills are no longer applicable to the current assignment, or where an officer is prepositioned for a career-enhancing position such as a command.

Moves driven by the individual needs of the officer are also included in this category to include the Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP), joint domicile, compassionate reassignments, and personal preference.

With the YMAV no longer the key indicator to generate a PCS move, the Dynamic Distribution System will identify “donor” and “receiving” units. Donor units are identified as units who are “over” their authorization and/or a lower priority account where HRC can “pull” and reassign officers. Receiving units are identified as units that are “under” their authorization and/or a higher priority account that HRC must fill to a certain percentage. If you are in a “donor” unit, you could be considered available for assignment (PCS) if you have at least 12 months time on station (TOS) as of this next reporting period.

After HRC determines the requirements based on the needs of the Army, we will notify you and your command as being a “donor” unit and your “availability” in the upcoming assignment period. HRC assignment officers will consider input from the command and the officer in deciding which officers will be reassigned. Please remember to keep in contact with your assignment officer and feel free to ask any questions you may have. Please feel free to call me if you have questions.

FY06 LTC Battalion Command Board

Results of the FY06 Combat Service Support Battalion Command Board should be officially released in January 2005. The actual slate should be released in April 2005 once the selected officers are notified by the major command (MACOM) commanders.

Your Contact Information

Mailing addresses, telephone numbers and E-mail addresses frequently change and become outdated. It is important that HRC have your contact information because assignment officers often send out mass E-mails. If you did not receive these mass E-mails, then I do not have your current E-mail address. Please send it to me so I can keep you in the information loop. First try to update through your personnel servicing company (PSC), but send updates to me if local personnel cannot update your ORB and personal contact information.

Please view and use the Quartermaster Homepage at www.Quartermaster.army.mil that provides valuable information to our Corps. Also, remember that the Quartermaster Branch uses **Army Knowledge Online (AKO)** E-mail as the official account to correspond with you. So, take the time and look at your AKO account or have AKO E-mail forwarded to your unit account.

My Mailing Address: Quartermaster Branch, Lieutenant Colonel Assignments Officer, ATTN: TAPC-OPG-Q, (LTC Tim Brown), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0416

My Telephone/FAX Numbers: Voice: DSN 221-5269 and Commercial (703) 325-5269. FAX: DSN 221-8025 and Commercial (703) 325-8025

First Dynamic Distribution System Assignment Cycle Completed

MAJ Darren L. Werner, Major Assignments Officer
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After making it through the first Dynamic Distribution System cycle, the assignment officers at Human Resources Command (HRC) are now moving forward with the February-May assignment cycle. The Army learned a lot from the new personnel distribution system that has proven effective in rebalancing the force to support the global war on terrorism and the “Way Ahead” initiative. During this first cycle, we identified a few areas that have impacted officers:

- Time between notification and permanent change of station (PCS) has been between 60 and 90 days.

- Officers who have been identified as “donors,” in some cases, have been on station for 12 to 18 months.
- Moving officers November through January impacts heavily on families with school-aged children.

We will work to improve the timing of report dates for officers and families over the next cycles and try to avoid moving officers with fewer than 24 months on station as much as possible. Please contact me with your questions, and we will ensure you are well informed of the projected requirements that will be filled in the upcoming Army assignment cycles.

February-May Assignment Cycle

HRC received requirements for officer assignments with a report date of 1 Feb 05 through 30 May 05 during November 2004. We are using the new Dynamic Distribution System. The assignments will be on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) web site as they are made available. I will also post the cycle assignments on my web site. Officers assigned to units that have been identified as “donors” will be contacted by E-mail. All officers can review the assignments available and identify preferences for future consideration.

DA Pamphlet 600-3 and Officer Personnel Management System III Review

Many officers have been asking about the release date of the new DA Pamphlet 600-3 (Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management). The original release was scheduled for August 2004. However, this document that governs branch qualification has been delayed indefinitely. The impact of not releasing the updated version is significant to many officers because the inclusion of brigade/group S4 (Logistics) as a branch-qualifying position was to be included in the update. Currently the Department of the Army staff is considering a supplemental change that will include the branch-qualifying additions. There is no timeline associated with this potential change. Also, HRC has been given the responsibility to review Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) III, considering Army Transformation and the joint and expeditionary mind-set. This review may significantly impact the current career development process. This unprecedented change will aid in binding the career development path of Army officers to the Transformed-Expeditionary Force that the Army is achieving.

Branch-Qualified Captains and the Two R's - Not the Three R's

CPT Herman “Jay” Johnson, Captain Assignments Officer

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Today, the vast majority of assignments for the branch-qualified captains will be in the US Army Recruiting Command and the Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC). Many officers have E-mailed me desiring specific Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) positions throughout the United States, but I expect VERY few - if any - positions from the US Army Cadet Command. ROTC positions are not the priority these days. It seems these jobs are now contracted or are moving to the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) community. Please do not bank on having many ROTC positions to choose from. After looking at a sample of the assignments that I should expect, it seems to me that the war on terrorism dictates that assigning Quartermaster officers to jobs associated with “building the bench” for future conflicts throughout the world. Branch-qualified captains from all branches will play their role in the war by serving in recruiting command assignments recruiting young men and women for future service and in AC/RC positions preparing US Army Reserve and Army National Guard units for their turn down range. Very few will work developing future officers in ROTC or at the US Army Military Academy at West Point, NY.

Release to Functional Area

Several officers have contacted me to ask for release to take an assignment in their functional area. I wish it were simple enough to release you right away and meet your desires immediately. However, HRC must first meet the Army requirements for the Quartermaster assignments worldwide. Many officers request to be released to their functional area. Please understand that not all of you will be able to work in your functional

area. Final numbers will depend on the number of valid assignments required for fill and the actual number of available officers to assign. Over the past two years, no Quartermaster officers have been released to work in their functional area.

Get Out the Word About Your Mission

We really need to get the word out about how great Quartermaster Soldiers are doing. To support this initiative, I ask all of you to E-mail me any photographs along with short stories. I'll work to get the photographs and write-ups posted to our HRC web page. Also, please consider putting together articles for the various Army journals to share your experiences.

Not 'Business as Usual' at Human Resources Command for Warrant Officers

CW3 Ross J. Wallage, Career Manager for Quartermaster Warrant Officers

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The personnel mission has not changed even in this time of the ongoing global war on terrorism concurrent with Army Transformation. The mission is to assign the right officer, to the right place, at the right time based on the needs of the Army, needs of the officer and needs of the officer's family. For me, E-mail is the best form of communication. I will always answer a question to the best of my ability as soon as possible. However, there are more than 900 Quartermaster warrant officers and only one career manager.

Each warrant officer must understand the importance of keeping personnel records up to date. You never know when a premiere assignment will pass you by because photographs in your file were not up-to-date or were nonexistent, for example.

Here at Human Resources Command (HRC), it is not business as usual. Assignment instructions 12 months out will be the exception not the rule, unless a warrant officer is on a short tour to Korea, Saudi Arabia or similar destinations. With support to the global war on terrorism and Army Transformation as number one priorities, assignment instructions will be issued at less than six months and can be less than that, depending on authorization changes. Expect short-notice moves to support Army Transformation, but stability after the moves. The new philosophy is that there must be a reason for a warrant officer to move.

However, HRC still has to keep assignments to Germany and Korea filled. It is a delicate balance, especially for the Quartermaster warrant officers with the military occupational specialty of 920A (Property Accounting Technician). The 920A specialty is the "shortest" of the four Quartermaster warrant officer specialties at 87 percent strength. The other three are 920B (Supply Systems Technician), 921A (Airdrop Systems Technician) and 922A (Food Service Technician).

Many Quartermaster warrant officers are assigned to Installation Management Agency (IMA) positions, but most no longer have valid authorizations. These IMA positions are being converted to be held by civilians. Warrant officers assigned to IMA positions will be moving shortly if they have not moved already.

Warrant officer retirements are at an all time high, but retirements are being approved – contrary to the rumors. If a warrant officer wishes to retire, there is a good chance it will be approved if no waivers are needed. Normally waivers are requested for a promotion or school Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO). If packets are submitted with a waiver, they will get sent back unless the waiver justification is extremely strong. Officers can research questions about their individual situations with an ADSO in AR 350-100 (Officer Active Duty Service Obligations).

Non-Promotables Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) News Flash!

*MSG Jennifer Love, Enlisted Personnel Management, Quartermaster Assignments Branch,
US Army Human Resources Command*

Jennifer.Love@hoffman.army.mil, DSN 221-5297

In the past, the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) Automated Reservation System only allowed scheduling of Soldiers for the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) based on individual characteristics of grade and date of rank. Since the beginning of the global war on terrorism, Army statistics show that more than 46 percent of the eligible population is unreachable because of worldwide deployments. Because readiness is the number one priority and NCOES training is a very key part of readiness, the Army has redesigned the BNCOC Automated Reservation System to allow scheduling Soldiers for training based upon availability. Unit Identification Codes (UICs) are either prioritized or excluded from attendance.

ALARACT Message 04-140, dated 9 Sep 04, authorizes Soldiers who have not appeared before a promotion board to voluntarily request NCOES attendance using Department of the Army (DA) Form 4187 (Personnel Action). The request must be submitted through their chain of command, lieutenant colonel or above, to Human Resources Command (HRC). Soldiers can FAX the DA Form 4187 to DSN 221-4590.

Message 04-140 also authorizes Soldiers who have been injured in *Operation Iraqi Freedom* and *Operation Enduring Freedom* and who are on a temporary profile to attend NCOES within the limits of their profiles. A Soldier must have a verification memorandum from the chain of command validating that the medical condition is a result of combat operations.

The BNCOC Automated Reservation System was implemented for the 4th Quarter, FY 04. The process will continue as an invaluable tool for minimizing scheduling conflicts caused by deployments. For more information about NCOES, contact MSG Jennifer Love, US Army Quartermaster Center and School Liaison, Quartermaster Branch, US Army Human Resources Command, at Jennifer.Love@hoffman.army.mil or DSN 221-5297 or log on to WWW.Quartermaster.Army.Mil/NCO.

The Quartermaster General's 'Hip-Pocket' Scholarships Deadline: January 30, 2005

BG Scott G. West, the 48th Quartermaster General, is authorized three scholarships to be awarded to outstanding Soldiers wishing to finish their college degree in the Green-to-Gold program. Commanders and their command sergeants major should screen and recommend their eligible Soldiers to the Chief, Office of the Quartermaster General (OQMG), for consideration. For information about eligibility for the Green-to-Gold program and the Hip-Pocket Scholarship memorandum of understanding, go to the Army Cadet Command web site at http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/scholarship_HPD2/green/index.asp. Direct your specific questions about Green-to-Gold to the Cadet Command's subject experts.

Packets for recommended Soldiers must be received at the US Army Quartermaster Center and School at Fort Lee, VA, no later than 30 Jan 05 for consideration. Mail application packets to this address: Quartermaster General Hip-Pocket Scholarships, ATTN: Chief, OQMG, 1201 22d Street, Fort Lee, VA 23801-1601.

Customer Support Representative For DLA's Contingency Support Team

MAJ William T. Klaus

If you don't know about the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) customer support representative (CSR) program and you're in the supply field, then you're missing out on a terrific resource for improving the flow of supplies to your unit. I found out just how important a CSR is while serving as a CSR for six months during *Operation Iraqi Freedom II*.

What is a CSR? A CSR is DLA's face on the ground to the warfighter. The CSRs act as ambassadors of sorts, making sure the units they support get the supplies ordered from DLA as well as other services that DLA manages. There are five CSRs in Iraq, one for each major subordinate command.

I was assigned to support the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF). I was located with IMEF's main supply base at Al Taqaddum near Fallujah and other assorted Army units in the area. As an Army officer supporting the Marines, I had to learn a whole new language. Familiar unit terms such as FSB (forward support battalion) or CSB (corps support battalion) were replaced with Marine terms such as FSSG (force service support group), CSSB (combat service support battalion) and MAW (Marine air wing). Even the maintenance reports were different. For example, an Army O26 report to the Marines is a Daily Process Report. Although I was supporting a different military service, I was still solving supply problems common to the Army. Those problems ranged from backorders, rejections, frozen stock and lost shipments, to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) initiatives and the Prime Vendor Program.

'I had passwords to 10 different automated systems while deployed.'

My primary tools during my tour were a laptop computer, an Internet connection and a telephone. To effectively do my job I required access to many web-based systems, most requiring a password. Systems such as WEB Visual Logistics Information Processing System (WEBVLIPS), Web-based Customer Accounts Tracking System (WEBCATS), Global Transportation Network (GTN), Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV), Standard Automated Materiel Management System (SAMMS) and the Department of Defense's Internet shopping site (EMALL) are just a few of the systems I used on a daily basis. I had passwords to 10 different automated systems while deployed.

A typical work day would begin by checking and answering my E-mail, attending maintenance meetings, answering customer questions and trying to resolve any issues that came up. I would also research any document number or National Stock Number (NSN) that was a problem for the unit. If I couldn't resolve a problem on my end, I would then contact the item manager for that NSN. Some frequent problems for units were requisitions not making it through the system, finding NSNs for items, long-estimated delivery dates for some backorders, and lost or delayed shipments. Sometimes getting supplies delivered in theater took longer than getting an item from the depot in the continental United States (CONUS) to Kuwait. My biggest frustration was when a unit needed a part, there were none on hand, and the part was not being manufactured anymore. Sometimes there were substitute repair parts, but many times there weren't. This was particularly common for older pieces of equipment.

Being a CSR also meant that I worked alone. I had no staff and the work I was given was my responsibility to complete. With DLA managing more than 90 percent of all items to deployed troops, I would sometimes be very busy. I was not, however, without support. DLA also has a DLA Contingency Support Team (DCST) to support the CSRs. The team consists of a forward commander, an operations officer, multiclass commodity

specialist, Class I (rations) commodity specialist, a DRMS operations officer and a Defense Energy Supply Center liaison officer. They were located at the Multi-National Force-Iraq headquarters in Baghdad. DLA also has a dedicated staff in CONUS and other overseas locations ready and willing to help. Many times I would contact the item managers or the emergency supply operations center to receive help resolving issues with repair parts and expediting requisitions. DLA maintains command and control of deployed DLA personnel. DLA personnel in theater are under tactical control of the supported command.

While in Iraq, I also maintained a close working relationship with the Army Materiel Command (AMC) which had a logistics support element at Al Taqaddum. In fact, that is where I lived. DLA arranged for AMC to provide me with living space, a vehicle and, most important, an Internet connection. Services ranged from tank and automotive, communications, fire control and armament to power and switch. AMC also had a supply logistics assistance representative who helped with supplies provided by AMC. It was a great advantage living and working in the same area, because many times we were able to help each other with supply and technical questions on equipment.

Any forward-deployed unit in Iraq that needs DLA support can check with its G4 (Logistics) or with its division materiel management center (DMMC). The G4 and DMMC probably already know of a CSR working in the deployed unit's area of operation. To get out the word at Al Taqaddum, I made business cards on plain paper. These came in handy as I met new customers and also saved me from having to write down my contact information for them.

How to Become a Customer Support Representative

If you want to become a CSR, you first must be assigned to the DLA. The DLA has 448 active duty members and 618 reservists from all branches of the military stationed all around the world. You should be in the rank of captain or major. You must be trained in two, one-week schools. One is Materiel Management Contingency Training (MMCT), and the other is Basic Contingency Operations Training (BCOT). MMCT consists of learning how to analyze logistical problems and how to interrogate automated supply information systems to identify, locate and track military supplies. BCOT training focuses on teamwork and basic combat skills. Mainly a review for military personnel, BCOT is required for two reasons: many civilians deployed overseas have not had this training previously in contingency operations, and various military services do not always teach the same skills.

Once trained as a CSR, a service member can be deployed almost anywhere. DLA has personnel in Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Uzbekistan and even with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Tours of duty can last from four to six months or longer. By becoming a CSR you will gain a better understanding of the wholesale system while providing logistics support up front on the battlefield.

MAJ William T. Klaus, US Army Reserve, is assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency and drills at the Defense Distribution Center in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. He has a bachelor of arts degree in anthropology from the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. He is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Support Operations Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School and the Command and General Staff Officer Course.

Quartermaster Commentary

Durable Property Accountability

CW5 Leslie M. Carroll

Recently, the Army G4 (Logistics) published a message to change the property accountability threshold from \$2,500 to \$5,000. The major point in the message was that property book officers can now drop formal accounting of some equipment costing less than \$5,000 and classify the equipment as durable property. This change aligned the Army with the other military services and also complied with Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64 dated 13 Aug 02. NOTE: Equipment that must stay on the property book is listed in paragraph 2-5 in AR 710-2 (Supply Policy Below the National Level).

As action officer for the Army G4 message, I have received hundreds of telephone calls asking for clarification. Most questions are related to information technology (IT) equipment (computers) costing less than \$5,000 and to the perceived weaknesses in Army accountability processes. Most callers assumed that if computers were no longer on the property book, they would come up “missing.” I do not believe this is true unless someone purposely steals the computers, which they would do even if the computers are on the property book. I would like to explain my reasoning.

I will begin with the definition of durable property. AR 735-5 (Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability) states that durable property is “property that is not consumed in use, does not require property book accountability, but because of its unique characteristics requires control when issued to the user.” That definition does not make clear which items are “durable.” I will give hand tools as an example.

The one durable item familiar to most Soldiers is a hand tool. Hand tools are considered durable because they are not used up by Soldier use, as are cleaning supplies, for example. Hand tools are not on the property book. They do require a signature when issued, whether from the tool room or the supply room. When hand tools break, they must be turned in for replacements. Soldiers who lose hand tools pay for the lost tools in order to enforce supply discipline. We must have supply discipline to save Army resources for deployments, training exercises and other mission requirements. Leaders require periodic inventories and the correct hand receipt procedures for the same reason. Hand tools are costly and Soldiers use millions of them. So, hand tools are durable because they do not get used up, unlike consumable supplies such as hand soap or motor oil, and also require some type of control when issued.

Now that a durable item has been defined, let’s return to the Army G4 message about formal accounting of equipment. Many recognized that an accountability threshold raised to \$5,000 meant that most computer equipment qualifies and can be dropped from hand receipts. Without property book accountability of computer equipment, some surmised that such newly classified durable IT property would “walk out the door” and be lost. Computer equipment is costly, and the Army cannot afford to lose any. Computer equipment consists of durable items, just like hand tools, and must be controlled. Just because an item is durable does not mean Army employees no longer need to sign for the property or care about its use.

I believe the real issue is the belief that if a property book officer does not have commanders and heads of activities sign a hand receipt, no one will be accountable for the computer equipment. Also, there is the belief that personnel will be more apt to steal equipment not on a hand receipt because no one will know it is missing.

How does the Army account for durable property if the property book officer does not put it on a hand receipt? The following is an excerpt from AR 735-5.

Durable property will be monitored by the commander or the head of the activity. Annually, the commander or the head of the activity will conduct a management review of all the on hand durable items to determine whether there are any indications of any missing items, and whether there are any indications of fraud, waste or abuse....The commander or the head of the activity will document that a management review of durable property was conducted, stating what the results were, and what corrective actions, if any, were taken. Documentation will be prepared in the form of a memorandum for record in duplicate. One copy will be retained at the unit or activity, and one copy provided to the next level of command.

The accountability of durable items is not readily apparent in the preceding statement from AR 735-5, so let's look at it from another perspective. How is the commander or head of the activity to conduct a management review? To determine if items are missing, there must be a list to show what has been issued. To determine indications of fraud, waste and abuse, equipment issues and turn-ins must be maintained. Therefore, to complete a management review as defined in AR 735-5, a record must be kept of issues and turn-ins of durable items.

If I were given this task, I would keep a journal listing what was issued, when it was issued and an individual's signature for every durable item in my journal. I am not saying that you have to do it my way; you can do it in any manner that you like. You can use DA Form 2062 (Hand Receipt/Annex Number) or computer spreadsheets. For me, my journal makes it easy to see what was issued (I'd have a page for each Soldier), what is now missing, and whether there are

any indications of fraud, waste or abuse without any fancy spreadsheets or data bases.

Let's look at a possible situation. SGT Clark was issued a laptop, 17-inch monitor, a computer mouse, a keyboard, an L-shaped desk and an office chair when he arrived. All items were in his cubicle at the time of issue. During the last year, he also signed for two different computer software packages (Microsoft Office 2003 and Windows XP) and two more keyboards. All IT durable items were issued and recorded on the supply sergeant's spreadsheet. While performing her annual durable management review, CPT Tory inventoried all of SGT Clark's equipment as well as the spreadsheet kept by the supply sergeant. She noticed that SGT Clark had used three keyboards during the year. CPT Tory investigates and finds out that SGT Clark had spilled coffee into two of the keyboards and shorted them out. CPT Tory counsels SGT Clark and decides that no fraud, waste or abuse was present. However, she tells SGT Clark that if he shorts out one more keyboard, he will be paying for a new one.

This situation demonstrates the actions required during a management review. It is more than just an inventory. It includes reviewing purchases, issues, turn-ins and maintenance records to ensure no fraud, waste or abuse. If SGT Clark in the previous example had not turned in the two keyboards he shorted out, that could be cause for further investigation.

SGT Clark didn't have to sign for the equipment in his cubicle. He is automatically responsible for that equipment - no signed document is required. With almost 100 computers in her company, CPT Tory asked the supply sergeant to keep track of who had what equipment. The unit's information management officer (IMO) also kept records of computers and software throughout the company as required by AR 25-1 (Army Information Management). CPT Tory ensured these controls were in place so that she could perform her management review and make certain of no fraud, waste or abuse of the company's computer equipment.

All durable property should be controlled in the same manner. Leaders must choose some method to

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Precision Cargo Air Drop – Coming to Your Servicing Theater

Albin R. Majewski

CPT Arthur A. Pack

Just a few years ago if you had spoken to personnel from units outside the Airborne and Light Infantry communities about precision air drop resupply, you would have received some mighty strange looks. Today, because of highly dispersed operations, the length of ground lines of communication (GLOC), the enemy's continuous attacks on convoys and increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Southwest Asia, the expanded use of cargo air drop resupply doesn't seem so far-fetched. The operational environment has caused the Army to rethink the way to sustain the warfighter and to accelerate delivery of a precision air drop capability, in support of *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.

Urgent Operational Need

Off-the-shelf technology called the Sherpa 900 system was the immediate answer to an urgent request from Multi-National Force-Iraq for extra-light air drops to Marines in forward operating bases. The Sherpa 900 gets its name not because of its 1,200-pound load weight, but because of its 900-square-foot RAM air parachute canopy that can be steered - unlike the standard round canopy. The Sherpa drops since last August typically have been Meals, Ready to Eat and bottled water delivered within 100 meters of the predetermined impact point in remote locations.

The Directorate of Combat Developments for Quartermaster (DCD-QM), US Army Combined Arms Support Command, has been playing an active role in securing advanced technology for precision air drop since approval of a mission needs statement

in 1997. However, the initiative gained visibility in October 2002 when the Deputy Commanding General, US Army Quartermaster Center and School, decided for DCD-QM to pursue precision air drop as an official Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). At the same time, the Army Natick Soldier Center was developing a linkage between the Air Force's Precision Air Drop System (PADS) and the Army's Precision Extended Glide Airdrop System (PEGASYS). Together, the Army and Air Force pursued an ACTD for their linked programs, named the Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS). The go-ahead for the JPADS ACTD came in August 2003.

What is an ACTD and why is it so important? ACTDs emphasize technology assessment and integration rather than technology development to solve important military problems. The ACTD's goals are to provide warfighters a prototype of a capability and to support the Soldiers evaluating that prototype. Warfighters evaluate technologies in real military exercises. Also, a key ACTD's objective is to provide an operational capability to the warfighter as an interim solution before procurement of a successful prototype.

The assessment of the Sherpa 900 system for extra-light precision air drop in Iraq became an interim solution while the JPADS ACTD's process worked toward the demonstration of a 10,000-pound total rigged weight capability and a 2,200-pound total rigged weight capability. The Sherpa 900 system's 1,200-

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Durable Property Accountability

manage the equipment. Durable property control is an obligation of all government employees. With these types of controls, Army IT equipment will not "walk out the door" despite property book officers no longer responsible for accountability of some durable property costing less than \$5,000.

CW5 Leslie M. Carroll is a Supply Action Officer with the Army G4 (Army Chief of Staff, Logistics) at the Pentagon. She previously served as the Property Book Officer, 2d Infantry Division, Republic of Korea. She has a bachelor of computer science degree from the University of Central Texas.

pound load weight met a more immediate need for combat operations.

In May 2004, the Army G3 (Operations) approved an Urgent Operational Needs Statement initiated by Multi-National Force-Iraq, requesting an extra-light precision air drop capability in the theater of operations during FY04. The system's users would be Marines – in particular the riggers from 1st Air Delivery Platoon that is part of Combat Service Support Battalion 7, 1st Force Service Support Group delivering supplies to Marine units throughout the vast western portion of Iraq's Al Anbar Province. After completing coordination, Marines from the Marine detachment in theater and from their home base at Camp Pendleton, CA, completed Sherpa 900 training at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ.

The Sherpa 900 system consists of a mission planner, central processing unit (CPU), parachute control unit (PCU) with built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance unit, and the 900-square-foot canopy. By contrast, the Army/Air Force JPADS with a 10,000-pound total rigged weight is considered the light version in the JPADS family of systems under development. The extra-light version of JPADS has a total rigged capability of 2,200 pounds. The Sherpa 900 is considered a 60 percent solution to what is to come. The final solution will be incorporated with the Air Force's PADS capability and then boosted to a total rigged weight of 2,200 pounds.

Battle Hand-Off During Operation Iraqi Freedom

After the Marines completed training in Arizona, two Sherpa 900 systems were packed and shipped into theater in Iraq. The two systems were accompanied by two Army officers, a combined team consisting of the materiel developer and the combat developer, who ensured a proper battle hand-off to the unit. While in theater, the team witnessed the first operational use of the Sherpa 900 system in support of *Operation Enduring Freedom* on 9 Aug 04. Both Sherpa 900s were dropped for a Marine forward operating base (FOB) called Camp Korean Village.

By late Autumn 2004, 9 of 11 air drops with Sherpa 900 systems had been successful. Drop number six failed after the GPS did not receive satellite

lock before exiting the aircraft. This resulted in an unguided flight to the ground. A problem on drop 11 caused the main canopy not to deploy. The cause of this canopy problem has not yet been determined, but the system has since been replaced. After completion of the required 10 extra-light air drops, DCD-QM anticipates that Multi-National Force-Iraq will request that Army G3 provide 18 more systems to complete its original Urgent Operational Needs Statement.

Modernizing Theater Distribution

Both the Army and the Air Force had been independently working their respective pieces of the JPADS program, but that came to a halt last August when the Air Staff directed incorporation of Air Force analysis and requirements into the Army documentation. On 28-29 Sep 04, DCD-QM hosted a Joint Requirements Working Group that brought all military services up to speed on both the JPADS program and documentation required the JPADS Extra Light and Light versions. Ultimately, the intent is to submit the 2,200-pound Extra Light requirement in 2d Quarter, FY05, followed by the 10,000-pound JPADS Light requirement as soon as its ACTD results are known.

The Air Force plays an important role on two fronts. First, the Air Force provides most JPADS aircraft delivery platforms, Secondly and most importantly, the Air Force brings its PADS capability that will provide near real-time wind information, further improving airdrop accuracy. The PADS today is a single, portable package of three major components on the PADS laptop computer. PADS will provide greater accuracy to ballistic high-altitude air drops and precision-guided, high-altitude air drop systems through algorithms and high-fidelity wind data.

Cargo air drop, and JPADS in particular, directly lead the way in supporting Modernization of Theater Distribution: one of the Army G4 (Logistics) four focus areas. Based upon the asymmetric battlefield, with long GLOCs and widely dispersed units, cargo air drop with a precision air drop capability is just what the combatant commander ordered. As one logistics operations officer with Multi-National Force-Iraq stated: "The Army is attempting to modernize its supply distribution process throughout Iraq and aerial delivery is certainly part of that. If we can use aerial

delivery to keep Soldiers and Marines off the roads, then that's a winner for everybody.”

Authors' Note: Future editions of the *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* will have articles on the Enhanced Container Delivery System (ECDS) and the Low Cost Air Drop System (LCADS) development efforts.

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CPT Arthur A. Pack is an Infantry/Acquisition Corps Officer who is the lead for cargo air drop initiatives in the Directorate of Combat Developments for Quartermaster, US Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia. His numerous leadership positions include Rifle and Anti-armor Platoon Leader, 504th Infantry Battalion, and Anti-armor Platoon Leader, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He has been a Company Commander with two training units at Fort Benning, Georgia, and with the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington.

LOGCAP and the Warfighter - Army Materiel Command Seeks 'on the ground' Perspectives

The Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) has an increasingly important role in Soldier sustainment operations around the world. Since the program's inception, the Army has relied upon LOGCAP to reduce the combat service support (CSS) footprint in contingency operations and to allow the tactical commander and troops access to high-quality sustainment services outside of organic CSS capabilities.

LOGCAP has no better source for feedback than the logistician in the field, the customer who demands LOGCAP reliability, quality and visibility in order to deliver the sustainment needed by the supported commanders and Soldiers. Online, the US Army Materiel Command (AMC) Lessons Learned Program was designed for just such feedback. Originally focused on *Operation Enduring Freedom* and *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, the web-based collection effort has amassed nearly 530 separate observations from varied sources, but mostly from the AMC community. The AMC Lessons Learned Program intends to collect observations and form action plans for issue resolution. To address the involvement of LOGCAP and battlefield contractors during the global war on terrorism and also to get a tactical and operational logistician's perspective on current issues, the AMC Lessons Learned Program is requesting input from the field.

To submit observations on LOGCAP and to view other lessons learned and observations from the field, access the AMC Lessons Learned database on the SIPRNET at <http://hqamc-web.army.smil.mil/AMCLL/SecurityMsg.aspx>. Those reaching the NIPRNET-based site can contribute observations by using the AMC unclassified submission tool at <http://www.amc.army.mil/G3> and by accessing the tool listed in the upper left corner of the page. Because of classification concerns when handling information on current operations, only SIPRNET users may view the database in its entirety.

Submitters are also free to comment on any number of logistics-oriented topics, either current contingency operations or support of the global war on terrorism. The AMC Lessons Learned Program seeks to collect information on ongoing activities that include AMC support to the newly-modularized Army warfighter through its Logistics Assistance Representatives, the RESET Program, the Command's Forward Repair Activities or any other related topic. For questions or additional information, contact Charles Baldwin at (703) 806-9341, DSN 656-9341 or E-mail to charles.baldwin@us.army.mil; Dave Muhlenkamp at (703) 806-9340, DSN 656-9340 or E-mail to david.muhlenkamp@us.army.mil; or Patricia Byrd at (703) 806-9335 or E-mail to patricia.byrd@hqamc.army.mil.



Photograph by Paul Sweeney, Fort Lee Public Affairs Office

Soldier Stakes Competition Before Combat

The Soldier Stakes Competition is a combat-training event that the 262d Quartermaster Battalion now conducts every quarter. LTC Micky J. Martin, Commander, developed the concept of such a competition at Fort Lee, VA, to help prepare AIT Soldiers for today's deployments. "It is all a matter of surviving on the battlefield," said LTC Martin. "You cannot support unless you can survive." Each company in the five-phase competition is represented by three squads each, and the drill sergeants serve as the squad leaders. The overall winner receives the Commander's Cup. Trophies go to the first, second and third place teams.

As stated in LTC Martin's 1st Quarter FY05 Training Guidance: *We continue to shift from the 'Quartermaster Soldierization Process' to 'Preparing Soldiers for Combat.' Safe, battle-focused, tough realistic training is the Battalion's number one priority. Changes which may seem small in our minds, such as the shift from a quarterly Drill and Ceremony Competition to a Quarterly Squad Stakes Competition, are integral in producing the correct mindset in our Soldiers. What we test our Soldiers on, is what we are telling them is important. I intend to tell our Soldiers that surviving on the battlefield, taking care of your battle-buddy, and closing with and destroying the enemy are the most important things.*

Army Culinary Team Wins International Gold

The 2004 US Army Culinary Arts Team (USACAT) took second place overall in the points total at the World Culinary Olympics in Erfurt, Germany, in November 2004, but dominated the medal count with 16 gold medals and 17 silver medals. Sanctioned by the German Chefs Association, the Culinary Olympics is held every four years. In 2004, 11 national military teams from Europe, South Africa and North America participated in the 7 days of events held in conjunction with the International Culinary Olympics that housed 32 national teams bringing 1,200 competitors. More than 40,000 attendees visited the competitions in 2004.

"These culinary professionals are warriors first and artists second," said CW3 David Longstaff, team manager. "Almost half of the USACAT has either recently returned from a deployment or will deploy in the next few months. The experience of meeting and competing with Soldiers from 10 other countries and gaining an understanding of how other armies train and cook is an experience that our Soldiers will take with them for the rest of their lives."

Deadline: January 31 for 2005 Regimental Honors Program

The Office of the Quartermaster General must receive nominations to the Hall of Fame, Distinguished Members of the Regiment and Distinguished Units of the Regiment by January 31 for Regimental honors in 2005. Send all nomination packets to the OQMG Regimental Officer, US Army Quartermaster Center and School, 1201 22d Street, Fort Lee, VA 23801-1601. For detailed information about nominating procedures, go online to the Quartermaster Home Page at www.Quartermaster.army.mil and access Quartermaster Corps, Regiment. Any materials received after 31 Jan 05 will be placed among candidate packets for review the following year. Normally, all awards will be presented during induction ceremonies during the annual Regimental Week activities in May at Fort Lee, VA.

**MG William K. Hunzeker Dies,
Known for Improving Logistics Quality**

Major General William K. Hunzeker, a 1995 inductee into the Quartermaster Hall of Fame, died 3 Oct 04. His funeral was 1 Dec 04 at Arlington National Cemetery. His retirement home was in Petersburg, VA, near Fort Lee, "Home of the Quartermaster Corps."

Hunzeker enlisted in the regular Army in 1946 and was discharged in 1947. He was commissioned a Quartermaster officer after graduating from the University of Pittsburgh with a bachelor of arts degree. He also held a master of education degree from Indiana University of Pennsylvania. His military schooling includes the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

His assignment before retirement was Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, US Army Europe. Hunzeker's other commands include the US Army Logistics Center (now the US Army Combined Arms Support Command) at Fort Lee; the US Army Quartermaster Center and School at Fort Lee; the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), US Army Europe; Sharpe Army Depot, Lathrop, CA; 43d Support Group, US Army Forces Command, Fort Carson, CO; 34th Supply and Service Battalion, An Khe Sub Area, Vietnam; and "D" Battery, 514 AAA Gun Battalion (90-mm), Boston, MA.

Hunzeker's significant contributions to the Army and the Quartermaster Corps are numerous. As an Assistant Professor of Military Science at Indiana State Teacher's College he played a key role in commissioning more than 200 Quartermaster officers. Many of these officers had successful careers, with one rising to the rank of lieutenant general. As the Commander of AAFES-Europe, he initiated many bold programs to improve the availability of goods and services for service personnel and dependents and boosted profits from \$18 million to \$50 million.

In his assignments as the Commander, US Army Quartermaster Center and School, and later the Army Logistics Center, he effectively used his education, experience and innovative thinking to improve the quality of logistics Soldiers and systems and their support of the Army. His awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal (Two Oak Leaf Clusters) and Army Commendation Medal (One Oak Leaf Cluster).

He is survived by his wife Emma and daughter, Susan Ann Hunzeker, both of Petersburg, VA; and his two sons, MG Kenneth William Hunzeker and Matthew James Hunzeker, both of Northern Virginia.



MG William K. Hunzeker

Fellowship Honors Quartermaster Killed in Iraq

An anonymous donor gave \$10,000 to the Florida Institute of Technology (FIT) to establish a permanent endowed fellowship in memory of MAJ Mathew Earl Schram, a Quartermaster killed in May 2003 northwest of Baghdad during a resupply mission. The FIT has a graduate center on the campus of the Army Logistics Management College (ALMC) at Fort Lee, VA. MAJ Schram, a 36-year-old native of Brookfield, WI, was a 2001 graduate of the ALMC Logistics Executive Development (LEDC)/FIT cooperative master's degree program. The fellowship provides tuition assistance to US military officers in the LEDC/FIT program who qualify based on merit and need. For more information about the fellowship, call the FIT graduate center at ALMC at (804) 765-4665 or send an E-mail to Robin.A.Stocks.FIT@lee.army.mil.

General MacArthur's Quartermaster, MG Bruce E. Kendall Dies at Age 91


Major General Bruce E. Kendall, who served as the Eighth Army Quartermaster for General Douglas MacArthur from 1946 to 1949, died 7 Oct 04 at age 91 in Hershey, PA. Inducted into the Quartermaster Hall of Fame in 1999, Kendall retired in 1970 after 37 years of service as a Quartermaster officer. During the latter part of his career, he served as Commanding General, US Army, Japan, and later, Deputy Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Kendall was graduated from the University of Arkansas in 1933 and was commissioned through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) as a second lieutenant with the Infantry-Reserve. For the next 7 1/2 years, he served with the Civilian Conservation Corps. At age 22, he was in World War II, serving in consecutive assignments at the Kansas City Quartermaster Depot, San Antonio General Depot, and Utah General Depot where he pioneered the use of electronic accounting machines and forklifts in depot operations. In 1945 he joined the staff of The Quartermaster General in Washington, DC, where he helped redesign the postwar depot system. Service as the Eighth Army Quartermaster for General MacArthur entailed support of the 1st Cavalry, 11th Airborne, 24th and 25th Divisions, all other Army, Air Force, Navy, US State Department civilian personnel; supervision of the Tokyo and Kobe Depots; establishment of 35 commissaries and a hydroponics farm; construction of three milk plants and housing for more than 20,000 dependents. No one contributed more to the occupation effort.

From 1954 to 1955 he was Quartermaster for the US Forces in Austria. He served as the Deputy Quartermaster, US Army Europe in Heidelberg, Germany, from 1956 to 1957. Kendall served in the Office of the Quartermaster General as Director of Administration (1960-61), Director of Supply (1961-62) and Deputy Quartermaster General (1963). He was Director of Supply at the newly created Defense Supply Agency (1965); Deputy Commander of the US Army in the Ryukyu Islands, Japan (1966-67); Commanding General of the US Army, Japan (1967-68); and Deputy Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (1968-70) before retiring 1 Aug 70.

His military education includes the Army Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College (Constructive Credit) and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. His awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal (with one Oak Leaf Cluster), Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Commendation Medal (with one Oak Leaf Cluster), American Defense Medal, American Campaign Medal, World War II Medal, Japan Occupation Medal, National Defense Medal (with one Oak Leaf Cluster), Reserve Medal; Foreign Decorations - 2nd Order of Sacred Treasure, Japan; Order of Civil Merit, Donbeag Medal, Korea.

He is survived by his wife, Mary E. Kendall of Hershey, Pennsylvania.



MG Bruce E. Kendall

Quartermaster Corps History Online

Access the web pages for the US Army Quartermaster Museum on the Quartermaster Home Page at www.Quartermaster.army.mil for historical information about the Corps, ranging from Hall of Fame inductees to the recent opening of a new gallery called "Treasures of the Quartermaster Museum" at Fort Lee, VA.

Directory - Points of Contact

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24-hour telephone answering service. No collect calls.

After weeks on the line, soldiers get cleaned up at a 264th Quartermaster Service Battalion shower point in France, March 1945



Illustration and Lineage by Keith Fukumitsu

264th Corps Support Battalion (Airborne) The Victory Battalion

Constituted 24 May 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 264th Quartermaster Service Battalion

Activated 29 May 1942 at Fort Dix, New Jersey

Battalion broken up 20 September 1943 and its elements reorganized and redesignated as follows:

- ***Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 264th Quartermaster Service Battalion***
- ***(Companies A, B, C, and D as the 3153d, 3154th 3155th, 3156th Quartermaster Service Companies, respectively – hereafter separate lineages)***

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 264th Quartermaster Service Battalion, inactivated 25 June 1946 in France

Redesignated 20 July 1966 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 264th Supply and Service Battalion, allotted to the Regular Army and activated in the Republic of Vietnam

Inactivated 1 September 1968 in the Republic of Vietnam

Redesignated 1 September 1993 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 264th Support Battalion, and activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina

WORLD WAR II

*** RHINELAND ***

VIETNAM

*** COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE II * COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE III ***

*** TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE * COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE IV ***

*** COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE V ***

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