


# Quartermaster

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN  
SPRING 1996  
SUPPORTING VICTORY

PB10-96-1



**FORCE**  
**XXI**



*Quartermaster instructor teaching students about supply distribution, Summer 1954*



This Force XXI symbol appears throughout the *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* to identify information that shows how combat service support soldiers are transforming America's Army to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. America's Army is a seamless team of active, Army National Guard and US Army Reserve soldiers, civilians and their families. Currently, the Army is redesigning its fighting forces and reengineering its sustaining base. In the Army's tradition of selfless service to our nation, the Quartermaster Corps is refining doctrine and leveraging information technologies to make the Army of the 21st Century a reality today.

# Quartermaster

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN



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**COVER AND ILLUSTRATIONS:** LTC Keith K. Fukumitsu, Quartermaster, created all the cover art for this edition. LTC Fukumitsu was formerly assigned as Chief of the Course Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, VA.

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# From The Quartermaster General



Major General Robert K. Guest

## Technology in the Vanguard of Training

Congratulations to all of you who make the deployment and sustainment of America's Army possible. Logisticians around the world are projecting America's Army in many different directions and are doing so in a first-class manner.

This edition of the *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* addresses history as far back as the Battle of Vicksburg, Mississippi, in 1863 and Task Force Smith in Korea in 1950 and as current—more appropriately futuristic—as Force XXI initiatives that are planned, but not yet executed. For today's Army missions, our historical perspectives allow us to recognize the need for Tactical Field Exchanges (See *Tactical Field Exchange Support* by Fred D. Choice Jr.) and the importance of an intermediate staging base to force projection logistics (See *Intermediate Staging Base Operations at the JRTC* by CPT Kent S. Marquardt.). Equally important in this *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* are our branch safety issues, career news about our ever-changing personnel system, and the well-articulated article by Regimental Command Sergeant Major Ricky Vernon on personal pride in the Corps from our beginnings in 1775 to today's Quartermaster Home Page on the worldwide computer Internet.

While much remains constant as we review historical perspectives in this edition, much is changing. Our Army relies more than ever on technological improvements and on automation such as the Army's future single automated supply system called the Standard Army Retail Supply System-Objective (SARSS-O). The current fielding plan for SARSS-O envisions Active Army, US Army Reserve and the Army National Guard units as fully automated within the next three years, and we are doing our part at the home of the Corps to keep these innovations at the forefront of our training program. A few months ago, I visited Fort Drum and was pleased to learn that their conversion to SARSS-O was indeed

progressing smoothly. On the day we departed, the Commander of the 10th Division Support Command turned the key on the financial package, and the 10th Mountain Division was on its way to better logistics automation. This is not to say that transition is not painful: it is. However, no unit that I have visited has ever wanted to go back to the old way of doing business. SARSS-O is here. It's good and it will help America's Army be even better than it is today.

I encourage each reader to reflect on the past, look at improvements made possible by the Army leadership, and move quickly into the 21st Century assured that our Army is stronger and dedicated to Supporting Victory wherever we may serve. Recognize that the turbulence associated with changes in the military's size and the introduction of "Generation X" soldiers who grew up in the 1970s and 1980s into our Force XXI Army are challenges that must be met in positive ways and then set aside while our thoughts concentrate on mission accomplishment.

Our smaller Army and, in particular, our smaller logistics capability must work smarter to help our combat and combat support soldiers accomplish their portion of the warfight. Quartermasters are doing this and should be proud of what they are accomplishing. Please continue in your magnificent endeavors to support America's Army!

*Major General Robert K. Guest, 43d US Army Quartermaster General, has held a wide variety of command and key staff positions. His previous assignments include Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, US Army Europe and Seventh Army; Commander, 3d Corps Support Command, Wiesbaden, Germany; Director of Logistics Management, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks; Commander, Division Support Command, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); Chief, Supply and Maintenance Policy Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; and Commander, 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion, 1st Infantry Division.*



Look for the Force XXI symbol throughout this *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* to alert you to information that shows how Quartermasters are making the Army of the 21st Century a reality today. Force XXI is the vision to redesign America's Army around information technologies.



## Command Sergeant Major Ricky A. Vernon

QUARTERMASTER! I say the word with PRIDE and want to start this edition with some trivia questions on Quartermaster history. Did you know the first uniform facings authorized for wear under General George Washington were BUFF colored? That the Quartermaster colors are BUFF and blue? That the Quartermasters celebrate their birthday on 16 June (1775) each year? That the Quartermaster song "The Fighting Quartermaster Corps" was written by E. W. Tyler Jr., Fred Waring and Pat Ballard and copyrighted in 1942? That until recently (1942) the Transportation Corps was QUARTERMASTER?

The first Quartermaster General was Major General Thomas Mifflin (1775) and the US Army Quartermaster Center and School's headquarters is named Mifflin Hall today. That the Quartermaster Corps was placed under the regimental system and became the Quartermaster Regiment on 13 June 1986? We have a long history of achievements, and we celebrate 10 years as a Regiment this year.

As with anything that makes you proud, you should know something about the source of this pride. I frequently talk to soldiers who show a lot of pride in their home state. When you ask a few questions about their state—such as When did it join the union? What is your state's flower, bird, tree or song?—the soldiers tend to waiver. It makes sense to learn about what is important to you, what you take pride in. QUARTERMASTER. Be proud.

One of the ways to learn about the Quartermaster Regiment and what Quartermasters are doing is to read your *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin*. In this day and age, you would think that we would be able to get a copy out to every Quartermaster soldier. Budget constraints will not allow us to do that, but you can communicate about your Corps by passing this copy along to as many Quartermasters as you can.

Just a word on Regimental affiliation. I have received numerous calls from soldiers trying to get Regimental affiliation. I know there are problems, but keep trying. The Quartermaster branch at the US Total Army Personnel Command is attempting to "top load" all Quartermaster career management fields into the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) database. I hope this effort succeeds.

Quartermasters now have their own Home Page on the World Wide Web computer Internet. You can access the Home Page by typing:

<http://quartermaster.army.mil/quartermaster>.

If you have a topic you would like me to write about in this column, send me your E-mail to the following addresses: [vernonr@lee-emh2.army.mil](mailto:vernonr@lee-emh2.army.mil) or [ProQm@aol.com](mailto:ProQm@aol.com).

*Command Sergeant Major Ricky A. Vernon is the Command Sergeant Major of the Quartermaster Regiment and of the US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, Virginia.*

## New Doctrine For Information Operations

A new doctrine manual on information operations will help commanders use information technologies in all operational environments. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command's Field Manual (FM) 100-6 (Information Operations) tells how the Army relates to the larger environment that the Department of Defense defines as information warfare. Information warfare is an integrated strategy that considers the vulnerabilities and opportunities that come with the increasing dependence by the US and potential adversaries on information and information systems.

The manual recognizes that the Army will not be in combat most of the time, more likely in peace operations or humanitarian missions. For these mis-

sions, information warfare cannot be used against the news media, commercial interests or businesses, or local and regional governments. In peacetime environments, however, the Army must be able to protect information systems, not from an adversary, but just from interference. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and joint communities are beginning to recognize this fact in emerging policy and doctrine. The new field manual discusses all the rapidly changing information technologies available to commanders, such as digitized communications, satellite communications, and position navigation. Doctrine in FM 100-6 supports FM 100-5 (Operations), the Army's capstone doctrine for all military operations, but updates FM 100-5 in many ways.

# Army Schools in the 21st Century

CPT Neal Daniels      CPT George A. Holland

CPT Mario A. Johnson      CPT Melissa K. Nelson

Force XXI is the Army's campaign to prepare for the 21st Century. The world is changing, the pace is quickening, and resources are diminishing. The Army must be proactive by balancing resources and streamlining systems to meet tomorrow's needs. The Army will be smaller. However, according to former Army Chief of Staff, General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan:

Smaller is not better, better is better. Today's focus...is to actively create an Army for the 21st Century rather than letting it evolve on its own.

A major thrust of Force XXI is bringing the institutional Army in line with the changing table of organization and equipment (TOE) Army, also called the operational Army. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) heads the institutional Army. The institutional Army is reinventing the way it does business because TRADOC's customer base—the TOE Army or the operational Army—is restructuring to become more effective and efficient.

In TRADOC, one concurrent Force XXI initiative is streamlining the Army's education system. The new educational concept for soldiers in the 21st Century is called the Total Army School System (TASS). The TASS will replace active Army, Army National Guard and US Army Reserve teaching institutions at more than 900 locations. As envisioned for Force XXI, the TASS will instruct all components. General (Retired) Frederick M. Franks Jr., former TRADOC Commander, defined the TASS as:

a future school system which leverages the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) infrastructure for more efficient institutional training that promotes accreditation, instructor certification, standards and regional efficiencies. . . .

With today's centralized Army school system, primary courses such as the Basic and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Courses (BNCOC and

ANCOC) are held at one location, depending on the branch. For example, all Quartermaster and Ordnance courses are held at their branch's respective homes, Fort Lee, VA, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Other courses such as Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms and Service Staff School, and the Officer Candidate School are held at one location by bringing many branches together. For examples, Command and General Staff College and the Combined Arms and Service Staff School are held at Fort Leavenworth, KS, and the active Army's branch-immaterial Officer Candidate School is held at Fort Benning, GA.

As part of TRADOC's overall Force XXI mission to "be the architect of America's Army for the future," the TASS is changing this centralized organization of Army schools. TRADOC organized the TASS under a regional school concept. The TASS has seven regions, and each region has six brigades. The concept is similar to a civilian university with separate schools and departments. An Army region will be equivalent to a university, a brigade to a school within the university and a battalion to a department within the school. Each region has an alphabetic name. The following list gives the states within the continental US included in each region, A through G:

**Region A:** Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Connecticut.

**Region B:** Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia and Delaware.

**Region C:** Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Florida.

**Region D:** Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky and Mississippi.

**Region E:** Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan.

**Region F:** Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska and Iowa.

**Region G:** Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Washington.

For now, soldiers outside the continental US will continue their education at their proponent schools.

Each region is self-contained and can execute any school required. The TASS brigades will execute the training for each region. Each region contains a leadership brigade, officer training brigade, combat arms brigade, combat support brigade, combat service support brigade and a health services brigade. All the TASS battalions and brigades will be either US Army Reserve or Army National Guard and operate under a training division subordinate to a US Army Reserve Command. The following is a list of the TASS battalions by type and numbers of battalions:

### The Total Army School System Battalions

5	Air Defense Artillery	7	Health Services
7	Adjutant General's Corps/Finance	7	Infantry
7	Armor	7	Military Intelligence
7	Aviation	7	Military Police
7	Combined Arms and Service Staff School	7	NCO Academy
7	Command and General Staff College	7	Officer Candidate School
2	Chaplain	7	Ordnance
7	Chemical	7	Quartermaster
7	Drill Sergeant School	7	Signal
7	Engineer	7	Transportation
7	Field Artillery		



Each region has a regional coordinating element (RCE). The RCE is an executive agent responsible for quality assurance feedback to the major commands. The RCEs' primary purpose is to manage areas such as the rates to fill training seats, students who do not show up, students who are sent back to their home stations after arrival for a school, and completions/failures. RCEs also verify corrective actions on accreditation issues, provide ammunition management for the region, and assist in various administrative functions. RCEs link the Army's AC and RC and also assess individual training readiness.

Region C was the first to stand up in October 1994. The 3283d US Army Reserve Forces School became the 3283d Combat Service Support Brigade with Quartermaster, Transportation, Ordnance, and Adjutant General battalions. The other six regions will stand up during FY96.

According to the operational concept, the TASS is a composite school system where any soldier, AC or RC, can attend any school. TRADOC will retain sole accreditation authority for all schools. With one TRADOC standard, all soldiers, whether active or reserve, will receive the same training. This will make integration of the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard into military operations easier when the RC mobilizes. All schools, except for basic training, advanced individual training, and Officer Basic Courses, regardless of region or brigade, will use the standard Total Army Training System Courses.

All AC and RC soldiers will have the opportunity to attend schools in their regions together. All officers, AC and RC, must attend a resident Officer Basic Course. Under the TASS, course instruction may include a mixture of computer disk read-only memory (CD-ROM) courses, correspondence courses, video monitoring, and classroom instruction. Some students, AC and RC soldiers, will attend classroom

---

instruction on weekends and two weeks of specialized training within their military occupational specialty.

This follows another tenet of TRADOC's educational vision for the 21st Century:

... conduct training and leader development instruction, from the schoolhouse ... linked to soldiers and units in the operating force at distant locations. A system in which the separations between the three pillars of professional development—institutional training, operational assignments and self-development—are blended by increased information connectivity. A system based on the focus and rigor of commonly understood tasks, conditions, standards and a prevalent and enduring belief that meeting and sustaining training standards is essential to training excellence.

Potentially, a future Quartermaster NCO stationed at Fort Carson, CO, might attend the BNCOC at a TASS in that region instead of Fort Lee, VA. The soldier could then save on temporary duty costs by taking classes on weekends, through CD-ROM, correspondence and video monitoring.

The proponent schools' new role under the TASS will involve accreditation and certification of TASS instructors. School commandants will be directly involved, creating another link from the AC to the RC.

Today's shrinking force structure and limited resources are forcing the Army to manage assets more efficiently. Gone are the days when the key NCO is away from a unit for months at a time to attend a military school. The TASS intends to allow NCOs to attend the necessary schools without hampering their units' missions. The dollar is what ultimately backs all training. The TASS concept aims to ensure quality training in an economical manner.

*The authors are Quartermaster graduates of the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course 95-11/12 at Fort Lee, Virginia.*

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## ***Reserve Component Education System: What Does the Future Hold?***

***CPT Richard P. Bean Jr.   CPT David P. Chambers   CPT Catherine M. Marshall  
CPT Otis Spencer Jr.   CPT Shannon N. Williams***

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Officers in the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard play an essential role in Force XXI, the Army of the 21st Century. With the time and financial constraints on training Reserve Component (RC) officers, their military education must encompass both technical and tactical aspects. The challenge that training developers face is integrating both the technical and tactical components of the battlefield into two weeks of resident training for RC officers. This article will briefly discuss the evolution of the RC education system and then outline a proposal to modify the RC Advanced Course. This proposed program of instruction will fulfill the educational needs of an RC multifunctional logistician on the modern battlefield.

Young company grade officers attending the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC) at the Army Logistics Management Col-

lege (ALMC), Fort Lee, VA, often hear: "The Army is changing and you are a vital part of it." True, CLOAC students are a vital part of the changing Army. However, the concept of a changing Army is not new. Today's changes are refined continuations of a process that began over 20 years ago at the end of the Vietnam war in Southeast Asia.

Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan, continued to build on a process that General (Retired) Creighton W. Abrams began when General Abrams was Chief of Staff of the Army in 1974. The end of the Vietnam war brought a change in foreign and domestic policies. General Abrams shifted the military position from one of manpower to national security. President Richard M. Nixon saw the need to sustain operations on two and a half fronts. President Nixon accomplished this goal by downsizing the Army to 16 divi-

sions. This concept closely parallels the words echoed through the halls of ALMC today: "2 fronts and 10 divisions."

As General Abrams began to search out where to cut the Army, he realized a correlation in career fields between the civilian world and the military occupational specialties in combat service support (CSS) operations. Some RC officers and soldiers actually were practicing similar wartime tasks on a daily basis. He also realized that President Lyndon B. Johnson was able to sustain operations in Vietnam before President Nixon's term of office because the Army activated and constituted several CSS units for the war mission. This military action prevented an extensive call-up of the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard. When President Nixon made the decision to downsize the active Army, General Abrams deactivated several CSS units and realigned others.

General Abrams' thought process followed two avenues. The first was that the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard would receive initial training from the active Army in specialties that had civilian applications. The second was that downsizing would force the Commander in Chief to call up CSS units when required to sustain an operation. This ended the President's ability to commit a substantial number of forces without Congressional approval.

By the end of FY97, the US Army Reserve will consist primarily of combat support (CS) and CSS and a few Aviation units. The US Army Reserve will remain under the control of Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA.

Most US Army Reserve units are corps and theater level assets. Within the total force structure, US Army Reserve units are affiliated with Active Component (AC) units. They are "called up" by specialty to complement or assist their AC units. An example of a specialized unit call-up is the 14th Quartermaster Detachment from Greensburg, PA. These RC soldiers are in the water detachment whose barracks were hit by a SCUD missile during *Operation Desert Shield/Storm* in the early 1990s.

Unlike the US Army Reserve, which primarily contains the CS and CSS units, the Army National Guard consists of combat units. A majority of the units are organized into enhanced brigades. Previously referred to as "roundout brigades," this organizational concept began at the end of the Vietnam era. The enhanced brigades are affiliated with an active division to include light, heavy or mechanized. These brigades have a dedicated forward support battalion aligned under the division support commander during war. The enhanced brigades train

with their dedicated divisions and rely on their divisions to evaluate RC training. For example, during the Brigade Command Training Program, the 116th Armored Cavalry Regiment from Boise, ID, participates with the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). In the event of a Presidential call-up, Army National Guard units must be federalized. Therefore, these units cease to be under the control of the governor of a state. The governors use the Army National Guard, when not federalized, for support within each state as determined by each state governor.

### **Current Configuration**

Under the current configuration, reserve officers receive their advanced course education through correspondence courses and two weeks of resident schooling at their branch school. The exception is Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) logisticians (captains) who must attend CLOAC. Other US Army Reserve and Army National Guard officers attend CLOAC if their unit has such funds for training and if the officer can take the time off from a civilian job. However, the number of AGR captains who attend CLOAC is very small. The RC Advanced Course fulfills the requirement to branch-qualify an RC captain. The correspondence RC Advanced Course, however, does not fulfill the training required to award the RC officer the functional area 90A skill identifier.

For an RC officer to receive the functional area 90A skill identifier, the RC officer must complete one of two additional courses of instruction. The first viable option is the RC Multifunctional Combat Service Support Operations Course. Primarily to units on site, this course is taught through two weeks of instruction by AGR officers assigned to ALMC.

The primary focus of the RC Multifunctional Combat Service Support Operations Course is educating field grade officers to fill branch-qualifying positions at corps and theater level units. The course is attended by both officers and noncommissioned officers. Some soldiers attend for retirement points only and are not paid.

The second viable option to gain the 90A skill identifier is attending the two-week Support Operations Course (SOC). Again, the emphasis is on training field grade officers to become battalion executive officers, support operations officers or battalion operations officers. The SOC is taught in two phases. Phase I is completed through correspondence course work, and Phase II is conducted as a resident course at Fort Lee.



In regard to command, an officer with the functional area 90A skill identifier has more opportuni-

ties than the pure Quartermaster, Transportation or Ordnance officer. The RC requires that commanders hold, as a primary or secondary skill identifier, either a branch-specific or multifunctional skill identifier before assuming command. Given that 90A brigade command opportunities will be expanding to 65 percent of available commands in the next few years, the RC officers receive the training required for the 90A skill identifier. The challenge that faces the RC officer today is how to get the education and skills required to lead a multifunctional organization despite the almost insurmountable time and money constraints.

Realizing the interaction that RC and AC officers will have on the battlefield, they should train together whenever possible. The Army could benefit by training RC and CLOAC students together. Currently, the AC officers in CLOAC and the RC officers train independently of each other. The program of instruction for the RC Advanced Course could be modified to incorporate a three-day capstone exercise with CLOAC students in the AC.

The following proposals for changing officer advanced course instruction would better train the RC multifunctional logistician for the Force XXI battlefield:

- Develop a three-day capstone exercise for Phase III of CLOAC. The CLOAC students would apply the six tactical logistics functions and prepare a logistics estimate up to the division rear. (See the chart on *Phase Three Modification Active Component*.)
- The Army National Guard officers would join the CLOAC students because of the role of the



enhanced brigade and its forward support battalion.

- The US Army Reserve officers would apply the six tactical logistics functions from the division rear through the corps and into the theater.
- The RC officers would attend their respective branch schools for 11 days instead of 14 days. For the last three days, all RC and AC advanced course officers would come together at Fort Lee, VA, for the capstone exercise. (See chart on *Phase Three Modification Reserve Component*.)

The Army would gain numerous tangible and intangible benefits by incorporating these changes into CLOAC and the RC advanced course. The tangibles include training as the Army actually fights the modern war, working together as logistics staff planners, and understanding the importance of communications and the urgency of resupply operations on the battlefield. The intangibles include a professional understanding of the total Army, an awareness of the personal and professional sacrifices both AC and RC officers make, and an appreciation for friendships that develop. Also, given today's global situation and the Army's missions in operations other than war, RC and AC classmates of today may very well work together again in the future anywhere in the world. As former Chief of Staff of the Army General (Retired) Creighton W. Abrams said 20-plus years ago: "Greater dependence necessitates closer integration."

*The authors are Quartermaster graduates of the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course 95-11/12 at Fort Lee, Virginia.*

# Staging Area Operations in Hungary: Operation Joint Endeavor

CPT Jordan S. Chroman

## Picture a frozen landscape in a foreign land.

In a fairly remote area lies a small military post with a minimal infrastructure. Although not a completely austere site, this is not an area designed to support thousands of personnel and tons of equipment—not a textbook staging base.

In reality this area is an active MIG air base in Taszar, Hungary. (A MIG is a Russian-built fighter plane.) Here lies the focal point for the deployment of US forces into the Balkan Theater in support of *Operation Joint Endeavor*, peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. The linchpin for this deployment is "Task Force 29" from the 29th Support Group, 21st Theater Area Army Command. Normally based in and around Kaiserslautern, Germany, and now stationed at Taszar Air Base, Hungary, the 29th Support Group is responsible for the reception, storage and onward movement of US forces into the area of operations.

The 29th Support Group operates numerous logistics activities in this theater. At the intermediate staging base (ISB), Taszar Air Base, the 28th Support Group operates the following:

- The reception station that inprocesses all personnel into the theater.
- The life support area that houses thousands of transient troops moving from bases in Germany and the US into the Balkan theater.

- The container handling area that accepts, stores and readies for deployment all containers shipped into this theater.
- Three separate railheads.
- An airhead.
- Numerous direct support supply and maintenance activities that provide necessary goods and services to both transient deploying units and tenant units of the Taszar area.
- The Task Force 29 staging area, the key to deployment.

The Task Force 29 forward staging area for *Operation Joint Endeavor* is located on a far strip of aircraft runway at the ISB. The staging area receives vehicles and equipment via air, rail and ground transportation. As deploying units and equipment from Task Force Eagle arrive in the Taszar area, their vehicles and equipment are immediately taken to the staging area. Vehicles are then staged and prepared for onward movement. Direct support supply and maintenance operations are conducted. Units are

armed, fueled, fixed and in all ways readied for movement to forward areas.

About 24 hours before departure, units are alerted and moved from the life support area to the staging area. Upon arrival, units receive their first "Convoy Commander's Briefing" at 0800. At this time, the number of vehicles, personnel and equipment deploying as well as convoy departure times are verified. Any remaining equipment and supply shortages also are identified. In addition, personnel from Task Force 29 address the following topics:

- A current intelligence update is given.
- The Personnel Accounting System (PAS), an automated personnel tracking system, is explained.
- The "Convoy Commander's Checklist" is handed out.
- Requests for maintenance support are identified.
- Medical support to include the refilling of Combat Lifesaver Bags is available.
- Ammunition issue times are verified.
- Highway operations are briefed.
- Convoy communications and call-signs are distributed.
- Highway traffic regulations and procedures are explained.
- Force protection procedures are briefed.

After the initial briefing, each convoy commander is assigned a lane commander from the 29th Support Group. The lane commander acts as the liaison between the convoy commander and the resources of the ISB. The lane commander verifies that convoys comply with all established deployment standards, assists the convoy commander in filling all identified shortages, and ensures the convoy marshals at the starting point in a timely manner and departs on time.

### **Ready To Deploy**

At 1600, the day before deployment, units receive their second "Convoy Commander's Briefing." Personnel receive a final intelligence update, and commanders turn in their completed "Commander's Validation Worksheet." This worksheet verifies that all areas necessary for deployment are rated as "Green" and that the convoy is ready to deploy. The commander certifies that the following areas are all right:

- March credits with convoy serial numbers are in order.

- All PAS requirements are met.
- All vehicles are clearly stenciled with implementation force markings.
- Combat life saver supplies are on hand.
- Required field sanitation equipment and supplies are present.
- All maintenance requirements are met.
- All supplies are on hand, such as rations, water, fuel and ammunition.

After this final certification, vehicles and equipment are marshaled in the marshaling area. Drivers return to the life support area for a minimum of six hours of sleep before departing on their convoy. Two hours before departure, soldiers arrive at the marshaling area for the last time, conduct complete preventive maintenance checks and services, ensure that equipment is ready to go, and receive a final safety briefing from the convoy commander. A final PAS accounts for all deploying soldiers.

At the appropriate time, units leave the marshaling area and cross the start point for forward destinations in Hungary, Croatia and Bosnia. Once the convoy crosses the starting point, the unit enters the "Onward Movement" phase of deployment orchestrated by the theater transportation and highway managers.

Some units arrive at the ISB and depart within 24 hours. Others may wait for several days before they deploy. The bottom line: logistics soldiers from the 29th Support Group make all resources available to ensure readiness for units deploying to forward areas. As of 21 Jan 96, the soldiers from Task Force 29 had pushed over 3,965 vehicles in over 232 convoys out of the ISB: a record-breaking accomplishment critical to the deployment of all elements of Task Force Eagle and to the success of *Operation Joint Endeavor*.

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# Tactical Field Exchange Support

*Fred D. Choice Jr.*

Tactical Field Exchange (TFE) is the official military term for "post exchange (PX) in the field." This type of logistics support gained prominence during the Persian Gulf war in the early 1990s and continues to increase in importance as each major contingency deployment unfolds. Military operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia validated the need for this quality of life support to deployed soldiers, as did the most recent training exercises Roving Sands and Bright Star.

The very nature of war and operations other than war (OOTW), often demand that soldiers deploy on short notice to remote areas, under varying tactical environments and stressful living conditions, for extensive periods of time. While personal sacrifices and inconveniences are a way of life for soldiers, the Army leadership continues to place greater significance on quality of life issues. TFE support is an important component. During deployment, the accessibility to a TFE facility can have a very positive impact on a soldier's readiness and willingness to perform the mission. A direct correlation exists between quality of life, soldier morale and combat effectiveness. The ability to purchase snacks, soft drinks, tobacco products, and personal care and entertainment items helps ensure soldiers that their leaders are concerned for their personal welfare and that their contributions to the mission are appreciated.

Recognizing the value of this logistics support to soldiers, the US Army Quartermaster Center and School developed an operational concept to document the required capabilities of a TFE. The concept was closely coordinated with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and staffed worldwide. Field comments and recommendations were incorporated. The concept is now being processed for approval.

Location on the battlefield greatly determines the level of TFE support a soldier receives. Soldiers in a fast-moving combat environment will have a more restrictive selection of merchandise than those in an OOTW environment. The quantity and type of merchandise changes in inverse proportion to the



intensity of the tactical environment. For example, soft drinks may not be high priority TFE items in an intense tactical environment due to their weight and cube, but soft drinks will become a high priority commodity in a nontactical or OOTW environment.

While the lack of TFE support is not considered a war-stopper, this quality of life support is an essential segment of logistics that requires detailed planning—key to all successful military operations. Whether planning for an actual contingency deployment or a field training exercise, TFE considerations should be included. Annual war planning conferences hosted by the commanders in chief provide excellent opportunities for




**A soldier selects merchandise from one of several Tactical Field Exchanges now in Bosnia.**

documenting known and anticipated TFE requirements. Exchange support to coalition forces, as authorized by AR 60-20 (Army and Air Force Exchange Service Operating Policies), should be considered during the planning phase of a contingency operation or exercise. This ensures that the total support force is taken into account and that special provisions are put into place when applicable, for example, the rationing of highly desirable items such as cigarettes. The operational concept suggests that contingency-oriented units should develop and maintain a TFE support plan as a way of being immediately responsive to rapid deployment. Plans for securing operating facilities and utilities, transporting merchandise and equipment, and establishing priorities for lift are crucial to successful TFE operations.

The initial establishment of an exchange facility in an operational area is usually accomplished with the use of military personnel. Once the theater is stabilized, or the mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T) otherwise allow, AAFES civilian personnel may be brought into the theater to operate a Direct Operation Exchange-Tactical (DOX-T). The difference between a TFE and a DOX-T is the type of personnel staffing the operation. In a TFE, military personnel from or attached to the supported unit operate the facility for AAFES. In a DOX-T, AAFES civilians operate the facility directly. The use of civilians in the theater is based primarily on the availability of volunteers and the tactical situation. Therefore, placing total reliance on civilians to operate exchange facilities throughout the operational area is unrealistic and impractical.

### **Flexibility Built In**

The TFE support structure has a built-in flexibility that can be tailored to the needs of the command. There are three basic structures for exchange support that can be used either singularly or collectively, depending upon METT-T. A static facility (TFE or DOX-T) that provides area support may be the method of choice for supporting soldiers. However, certain tactical considerations may dictate establishing a mobile TFE (PX on wheels) to support remote units on a periodic schedule. In a third and very effective method of support, the unit commander establishes an AAFES Imprest Fund Activity (AIFA), which the commander operates for unit personnel and staffs with unit soldiers. This method provides a degree of convenience and accessibility otherwise unavailable under other support structures. The downside of this method is that this support requires the use of one or more unit soldiers, which takes soldiers away from pri-



**Operated in the unit area by unit soldiers, Army and Air Force Exchange Service Imprest Fund Activities are popular in Bosnia.**

mary duties. The negative consequence of using unit soldiers can be minimized by establishing operating hours that are in the best interest of the unit as whole.

The mobile TFE has a significant characteristic that underscores its flexibility. Conceptually, mobile TFE visits to remote units could be synchronized with the field services company's shower, laundry and clothing repair operations, doctrinally provided to soldiers on a weekly basis. Adopting this arrangement would allow soldiers to take care of their personal hygiene, clothes-cleaning and repair needs and also their shopping at the same time and location. Coordination between the field services company, the TFE, transportation agencies and the supported unit(s) is the key to achieving this integrated support arrangement.

### **Essential Component**

While developing the Force Provider operational concept in 1993, a TFE outlet was recognized as an essential component of this containerized, modular field facility designed to give frontline soldiers a brief respite. Today, Force Provider includes approximately 640 square feet of space designated exclusively for TFE operations. Six Force Provider modules, each capable of housing 550 soldiers, are currently deployed in Bosnia. Each includes a TFE facility. There are about six additional exchange outlets in Bosnia, and several are AIFA operations at the unit level.

Success in operating TFE facilities, in part, depends on trained operators. Headquarters, AAFES,

using local installation AAFES facilities, will provide on-site training to soldiers of deploying units. Training topics may include merchandising, ordering procedures, inventory procedures, finance requirements, cash register operations, storage and security of highly pilferable items, and other subjects as required by the units. The training can be tailored to the command's needs. Soldiers with this training would serve as TFE officers, TFE assistants and AIFA managers. Field training exercises and simulations provide excellent opportunities for TFE-trained soldiers to demonstrate and hone their skills in TFE support. Experience has shown that overall aptitude is a better predictor of success than choosing soldiers with a particular military occupational specialty to operate the TFE.

### **Critical Issue**

Staffing exchange facilities with military personnel becomes a critical issue when the METT-T renders the use of AAFES civilians impractical or impossible. This current era of Army downsizing, unprecedented in modern times, has created an intense competition for scarce military personnel spaces. Ideally, the METT-T will always allow AAFES civilians to staff exchange facilities. However, the likelihood of this is remote. Therefore, the Army must

seek a personnel solution to provide efficient support and bridge the gap before civilian-run exchange facilities become possible during some Army operations.

Conceptually, the Quartermaster supply company could assume the responsibility of exchange support as an additional unit mission. Selected unit personnel could be trained and made available for deployment according to established timetables. US Army Reserve units may be the appropriate source of soldiers for this mission. This procedure is a likely solution to the TFE staffing problem.

Providing TFE support to authorized patrons is in step with the Army leadership's many initiatives for improving the quality of life for soldiers. Headquarters, AAFES, the source of TFE merchandise and equipment, and the US Army Quartermaster Center and School, the proponent for TFE doctrine, are totally committed to this mission.

*Fred D. Choice Jr. is a retired Quartermaster Officer currently serving as a Supply Management Specialist with the US Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia. In addition to the Tactical Field Exchange concept, he has written operational concepts on Army Field Feeding, Airdrop Operations, Shower and Laundry Support, and Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment on the Battlefield.*

## **Culinary Arts Competition**

The US Army Center of Excellence, Subsistence, US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, VA, conducted the 21st annual US Army Culinary Arts Competition with 20 teams 4-14 Mar 96. In the six top installations, US Army Hawaii became the 1996 Installation of the Year and also came in first place in the Chef of the Year and Junior Chef competitions. US Army Hawaii scored second place in the field competition, earning silver medals for the team. In the static competition, US Army Hawaii earned one gold, three silver and eight bronze medals.

Fort Bragg, NC, took second place in the overall installation category and fifth place in the field competition. Fort Bragg earned two gold, five silver and one bronze medal in the static competition. Fort Stewart, GA earned third overall and fourth in the field. Their team's Junior Chef ranked third in that category. Individual competitors earned four gold, four silver and one bronze medal for the Fort Stewart team.

Fort Sill, OK, placed fourth overall and ninth in the field. Their medals included 1 gold, 6 silver and 11 bronze. The US Army Korea team was fifth in the installation competition and their Chef of the Year placed third. The US Army Korea team earned two gold, two silver and four bronze medals. Fort Hood, TX, received a trophy for placing first in the field competition. The team earned two gold, two silver and seven bronze medals.

Other installations participating in the worldwide 1996 culinary competition earned medals as follows (in order of merit):

Fort Drum, NY: 5 bronze

Military District of Washington: 7 bronze

Fort Campbell, KY: 3 gold, 3 silver, 5 bronze

US Army Panama: 1 gold, 2 bronze

Fort Huachuca, AZ: 1 silver, 4 bronze

Fort Lewis, WA: 8 silver, 4 bronze

Fort Carson, CO: 2 silver, 5 bronze

US Army Alaska: 1 gold, 3 silver, 2 bronze

Fort Polk, LA: 1 silver, 1 bronze

Fort Lee, VA: 1 silver, 1 bronze

Fort Benning, GA: 1 bronze

Fort Gordon, GA: 1 bronze

# Intermediate Staging Base Operations at the JRTC

CPT Kent S. Marquardt

On 31 Aug 95, the 142d Corps Support Battalion (CSB) deployed to Alexandria, Republic of Cortina, to establish and operate an intermediate staging base (ISB) in support of Task Force 1/6 Infantry Division (Light) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA. As a part of Joint Task Force Cortina and the 21st Infantry Division (Light), Task Force 1/6 had the mission of defeating enemy forces in Cortina, protecting US interests and demonstrating support for the Cortinian government's internal defense and development. The 142d CSB operated the ISB for the Alaskan task force from 31 August to 12 September and assisted with getting soldiers used to the climate, with preparations for combat, and with deployment into the combat area of operations by providing life support, supply and services, fuel, maintenance, transportation and medical support.


Because force projection is a main focus of today's military operations, a key aspect of force projection logistics is ISB operations. This is especially true for the Army's special operations, light, airborne and air assault forces. An ISB is necessary to accept strategic airlift and debarking forces and equipment within tactical striking distance of the combat area and to assist these forces with preparation for combat operations. Other ISB missions may include holding these forces or accepting them back until the proper time for insertion, transloading these forces to tactical airlift assets or moving these forces by ground into the combat operations area.

After the insertion of combat forces, an ISB can be used as a jumping-off point for follow-on forces, as a supply base or as a place to transload supplies for delivery forward by Containerized Delivery System, combat offload, slingload or ground transport. Proper operation of an ISB should be a critical Mission Essential Task List (METL) task for most CSBs, especially CSBs targeted to support light units. Depending upon the size of the striking force, whether a battalion, brigade, division or corps, almost any CSB could be task-organized and assigned the mission of running an ISB. Therefore, it is impor-


tant that CSBs recognize and train the tasks required with ISB operations.

The operation of the Alexandria ISB at the JRTC enables CSBs, in support of brigade-sized task forces, to train today's logistics requirements with realistic demands and distances. The most important part of the ISB's mission for a CSB is to relieve the combat commander of most life support and logistics tasks while in the ISB. This enables the commander, his staff and soldiers to focus fully on the upcoming combat operation. Essential to this key element of the ISB's mission are several CSB METL tasks: Alert/Marshal/Deploy, Establish CSB Area of Operations, Relocate CSB, Plan Logistics Operations, and Provide Logistics Support (not in the CSB's Mission Training Plan).

The JRTC ISB's operations offer unique opportunities to CSBs that are not often available, except in real-world contingency operations. The scenario, the role players and the support mission at the JRTC's ISB are all as realistic as Army missions today.



## 142D CSB TASK ORGANIZATION



### LEGEND

A/DACG—Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group	DET—Detachment	MT—Motor Transport
AMB—Ambulance	FLD—Field	SVC—Service
CBT—Combat	GND—Ground	PLT—Platoon
CO—Company	MED—Medical	TC—Transportation Company
CSB—Corps Support Battalion	MP—Military Police	TMC—Troop Medical Clinic
	MST—Mechanics Support Team	

The 142d CSB's training objectives for JRTC Rotation 95-10 included the following:

- Perform combat service support planning.
- Alert/marshal/deploy.
- Provide ISB life support functions enabling the task force to concentrate on combat operations.
- Provide shower, laundry, clothing renovation.
- Provide limited maintenance support (maintenance support team) (direct support backup).
- Provide transportation support at the ISB, backup support to the main support battalion (MSB) (exercise support group).
- Work with a CSG (917th CSG, US Army Reserve).
- Validate the battalion tactical standing operating procedure.
- Provide transportation support to the task force, in the form of a light truck platoon attached to the forward support battalion (FSB).
- Task-organize in accordance with support mission requirements.

**NOTE: For task organization, several Reserve Component units are listed by the US Army Forces Command with each JRTC rotation. The author indicated these units in each of his diagrams.**

The weather was a significant factor for the Arctic Light Task Force because of the extremely hot weather at Fort Polk. Temperatures were in the high 90s, with 90 percent humidity and evening rain showers (not the usual weather for the soldiers from Alaska). The task force deployed earlier than usual (about D-8) to conduct acclimation operations at nearby training areas.

The threat to the ISB was limited to Level I, but the only play was a car bomb at the front gate. Roving security around the perimeter of the Warrior Compound was sufficient to deter any threat from outside.

**In brief, the 142d CSB's mission:** deploy from the tactical assembly area, NET 310800S(LOCAL) AUG 95, attach to the 917th CSB, establish operations at the ISB, Alexandria, Republic of Cortina, no later than 311200S(LOCAL) AUG 95, to provide logistics support to Task Force 1/6 Infantry Division (Arctic Light) on an area basis. On order, relocate from ISB to corps support areas (CSAs) and establish base cluster operations. Be prepared to defend against Level I Threat while continuing to support the task force.

The operation was divided into five phases:

- Phase I—Alert/marshal/deploy to the ISB.
- Phase II—Establish the ISB.
- Phase III—Provide logistics support at the ISB and backup to the light task force (917th CSG (-))
- Phase IV—Relocate to CSA.
- Phase V—Redeploy/reconstitute.

**NOTE: For the rest of this article, the author will focus on Phases II and III in the form of an after action review with lessons learned by the 142d CSB at the JRTC.**

The 142d CSB deployed to Alexandria, Republic of Cortina, established and operated the ISB. Due to the battalion commander's departure on emergency leave, the battalion executive officer's appointment as rear detachment officer in charge and the support operations officer on leave until after the exercise, I was the acting battalion commander for the operation. Our headquarters element provided command and control of attached units, established a liaison with the supported unit (Task Force 1/6), tracked the enemy/operational situation, and provided commodity management within the ISB and

for backup support to the 917th Logistics Task Force at North Fort Polk. The support battalion assigned a liaison officer (LO) to the task force headquarters. The LO proved invaluable by staying abreast of late-breaking requirements. An aggressive captain armed with a PRC-127 radio and stationed in the task force headquarters was very effective in ensuring that crises were averted and the task force's desires were quickly fulfilled.


The 142d CSB operated a field feeding site for hot meals two times a day, serving more than 27,000 hot meals in eight days. The operation required 26 cooks, 20 soldiers assigned to food service duty (provided by the task force), 6 Mobile Kitchen Trailers (MKTs) and 4 Kitchens, Company-Level Field Feeding (KCLFFs) to provide a ration cycle of T-M-T (T-Rations; Meals, Ready to Eat; T-Rations).

The ration cycle drawn from Fort Polk's Troop Support Subsistence Activity was 2-4-1-2-2-3. The four-day cycle draw for Labor Day weekend was a big challenge because that draw required four stake and platform trailers and two 6,000-pound variable reach forklifts to upload/download for 24 hours. This was significant because of a shortage of operators and no preparation to conduct 24-hour materials handling equipment support. Also, the food service sergeant was able to respond to the task force's request for continuous availability of beverages, soup and sandwiches because of ongoing training at Camps Livingston and Beauregard.

For recreation, the task force had a big screen television in a corner of the dining tent. This television showed nightly movies and opening season football

games. Soldiers were provided popcorn and other snacks to make their stay at the ISB as comfortable as possible. We coordinated for a post exchange van onsite to provide limited Class VI (personal demand items) support. Because temperatures were extremely hot for the soldiers from Alaska, we provided generous amounts of cold drinking water from four water trailers filled with ice. Also, a flavored beverage was prepared and on hand at the dining facility to keep the soldiers hydrated 24 hours a day.

Class II (general supplies) support was minimal. The 142d CSB provided emergency hazardous waste spill kits. Other Class II support was management of the hand receipt of more than 3,000 cots to subordinate units in the task force. Significant challenges were hand receipts, accountability and damages, especially when trying to turn in cots during a deployment sequence. Units began to turn in cots on D-1, with intense management by the task force's command sergeant major and the 142d CSB's S4. All equipment was accounted for. This was only the second time a JRTC task force reported zero cost in dam-



ages and full accountability, primarily because of these factors:

- The commitment of the task force's chain of command, beginning with the task force commander, to 100 percent accountability.
- An echeloned plan, organized by the task force's command sergeant major, where units turned in all equipment issued by the ISB before reporting to the ready line for deployment.
- A dedicated supply element from our unit that maintained excellent relations with our Corinthian hosts.
- A rear detachment element from the task force that ensured all hand receipts were cleared. This element did not deploy out of the ISB until after D+2.

### **Vehicles Must Convoy**

Retail Class III (petroleum, oils and lubricants) support for ground vehicles and food service (M2 burners) included diesel fuel (DF2) and motor gasoline (MOGAS). Since the task force draws prepositioned vehicles from North Fort Polk and brings equipment by rail from home station to Fort Polk, vehicles must convoy from Fort Polk to occupy the ISB and administratively move 50 miles to the ISB. Therefore, there is a requirement for the ISB to top off the vehicles again before deploying into combat. This left us with the dilemma of topping off more than 700 vehicles with three tank and pump units (TPUs) as our only retail fuel capability. We put together a fuel support team headed by a sergeant first class with the military occupational specialty 77F (Petroleum Supply Specialist). His team conducted 24-hour fueling operations for 3 straight days. The 917th CSG provided bulk refueling of the TPUs with 5,000-gallon tankers.

Soldiers appreciated our 229th Field Service Company for the more than 15,000 showers and the 24,000 pieces of clothing washed. Their effort greatly improved the morale of the hot, sweaty soldiers preparing for combat operations.

The 546th Maintenance Company (Nondivisional, Direct Support) stationed a contact team at the ISB that provided everything from emergency backup maintenance and forklift support to repair of more than 60 assault packs for the 4/9 Infantry Battalion's air assault operation. The service and recovery section completed several recovery missions along the main supply route (MSR).

The 603d Transportation Company (Light/Medium) provided transportation support throughout the exercise for more than 7,000 soldiers and repeatedly responded to unforeseen requirements. From


hauling soldiers and equipment to providing transportation support in the combat area as a part of the task force, the company was able to train on most of its METL tasks. The 603d Transportation Company completed more than 100 truck missions with more than 18,000 accident-free miles.

Several other units were attached to the 142d CSB during the operations of the ISB. The 139th Medical Detachment (US Army Reserve) and the 565th Medical Company (Ground Ambulance) provided medical support for the task force while in the ISB by operating an aid station. They treated more than 200 soldiers for various ailments, and the ambulances evacuated several personnel. The 1860th Medical Detachment (Combat Stress) (US Army Reserve) provided mental health support to the task force. This unit coordinated with the task force surgeon, counseled more than 20 soldiers and taught task force leaders how to recognize and deal with combat stress and battle fatigue. The 423d Military Police Company (US Army Reserve) provided a platoon under operational control of the task force to assist in security of the main entrance to the ISB and to establish traffic control points along the MSR for the tactical road movement. The Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group was also under operational control of the task force and assisted the task force in its joint inspection with the US Air Force. After the joint inspection, the task force inserted 27 sorties (each sortie representing one C-130 aircraft load) into the forward landing zone (dirt airstrip) by C-130 aircraft. The remainder of the task force deployed into the combat zone by tactical ground convoy.

### **Most Realistic**

Although this was the sixth rotation in the last two years for elements of the 142d CSB, it was by far the most realistic and productive. Most of the unit's go-to-war METL tasks were exercised. Operating as a rear CSB, it is very likely that the battalion would have to operate an ISB as part of a combat contingency. The 142d CSB's 95-10 rotation at the JRTC validates that the battalion is ready to conduct this important combat support mission.


*CPT Kent S. Marquardt was acting Battalion Commander of the 142d Corps Support Battalion during support of Task Force 1/6 Infantry Division (Light) for Rotation 95-10 at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. Formerly the Logistics Operations Officer for the Operations Group, JRTC, he is currently the S4 for the Warrior Brigade, JRTC and Fort Polk.*





## **Headlines Tell the Story**

*Ground troops, fresh from mountain maneuvers in Japan, sailed on transports from a Japanese port to the South Korean war area. This crossing to Korea marked the first time in military history that a US division moved directly from a peacetime garrison by water and air for a landing in a combat zone.*



*Task Force Smith bazooka gunners attempt to stop North Korean T-34/85 tanks.*

# Task Force Smith

*'What we carried was all we had.'*

*LTC Keith K. Fukumitsu*

On July 5, 1950, the morning dawned rainy and windswept in the bleak hills of Korea between Suwan and Osan. Atop three of those hills that straddled the road between the two towns, 406 soldiers of Companies B and C of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division were arrayed in a mile-long position astride the main road and railway connecting Seoul and Pusan. They had spent a miserable, rain-soaked night in the hills, after previously arriving on a hasty night flight from Japan followed by four days of truck and train travel from Pusan. As the soldiers roused, some opened their C-Rations while others attempted to dry out themselves and their equipment. They soon found their radios inoperative because of the rain. Some of their equipment, most notably their ammunition, was still stacked by the side of the road at the bottom of the hills. About a mile to their rear, similarly wet and miserable soldiers in Battery A of the 52d Artillery Battalion were supporting with six 105-millimeter (mm) howitzers.

Under the command of LTC Charles "Brad" Smith, these US Army units, dubbed "Task Force Smith," represented the farthest forward US ground combat force on the Korean Peninsula. To their rear, the rest of the 24th Infantry Division was hurriedly organizing a defensive line to stop the North Korean attack. Aside from the 105-mm artillery, the commander had two of his four 75-mm recoilless rifles that few of his soldiers knew how to use, six obsolete 2.36-inch "bazooka" rocket launchers (none of the newer, more effective 3.5-inch launchers in the Army inventory had been issued to Far East units), and two mortar platoons armed with four 60-mm and two 4.2-inch mortars. Because of weight constraints on the C-54 aircraft, the rest of the 4.2-inch mortar platoon was left behind for later shipment. Somewhere to the northwest, in the direction of Seoul was the North Korean People's Army.

The North Korean People's Army was on a roll. The North Korean People's Army had invaded the

Republic of Korea in South Korea only 11 days earlier and overwhelmed the ill-equipped Republic of Korea armed forces. The North Korean People's Army steamrolled into Seoul, driving refugees and regrouping Republic of Korea Army units before it, clogging roads and throwing the countryside into a panic.

Their invasion caught General Douglas MacArthur and his Far East Command and Eighth Army by surprise, despite recent intelligence reports that North Korea was planning for an attack on the Republic of Korea. General MacArthur had disregarded the reports, saying he did not believe war with North Korea was imminent. In fact, both the Far East Command analysis and the US National Security Council analysis did not include Korea as one of the US Far East interests. Earlier, in 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had declared Korea "a military liability" and directed withdrawal of all US troops by June 1950. By June 1949, the only US military presence in Korea was the 472-man US Korean Military Advisory Group. The Far East Command was responsible only

for support to the US Korean Military Advisory Group.



The Republic of Korea Army of 1950 was a 64,600-man force advised by the US Korean Military Advisory Group and equipped with US surplus equipment, mostly small arms and light artillery. No tanks, heavy artillery, aircraft or ships were allocated the Republic of Korea by the US because of the Republic of Korea military's "peaceful purpose." A US Korean Military Advisory Group advisor observed: "It (Republic of Korea Army) could have been the American Army of 1775." Also, the Far East Command assessed Korea as "not tank country."

In contrast, the North Korean People's Army had over 130,000 soldiers and 3,000 Soviet advisors with the Soviets providing a full array of heavy weapons, aircraft and, notably, the formidable T-34/85, arguably the best tank to come out of World War II. On the morning of July 5, 1950, the North Korean People's Army was a proven, battle-trying combat force.

## ***'No More Task Force Smiths!'*** **Lack of preparedness is the logistician's enemy.**

General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army's 24th Infantry Division from Fort Wood, Japan, to Pusan, Korea, after President Harry S. Truman committed US ground forces to stop the North Korean invasion of South Korea. The July 1, 1950, operations order provided for a delaying force to go to Pusan, Korea, by air immediately. Named for its commander, LTC Charles B. "Brad" Smith, Task Force Smith was assembled June 30 and then trucked to C-54 aircraft at nearby Itazuke Air Base for flight beginning at 0845 on July 1. This initial commitment of US ground troops in the Korean War consisted of two understrength rifle companies, half a battalion headquarters company, half of a communications platoon, a 75-mm recoilless rifle platoon with two guns, and two 4.2-inch mortars. Also, the two rifle companies had six 2.36-inch bazooka teams and four 60-mm mortars. Each man carried 120 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition and two days of C-Rations.

Only five years after the end of World War II, less than one-sixth of Task Force Smith had combat experience. After the 406 men arrived at Pusan, Task Force Smith was trucked through cheering crowds to the train station for its trip north. This send-off in South Korea boosted the already high morale of the soldiers who thought that the North Koreans would stop in the face of the "invincible" US Army. LTC Smith chose an excellent infantry position three miles north of Osan to set up a road block for the first engagement on the morning of July 5, but he did not have the firepower to stop the Soviet-made T-34/85 tanks. General MacArthur had called this small, ill-equipped unit an "arrogant display of strength." Like everyone else, the general thought that the mere presence of US troops would "chill the enemy commander into taking precautionary and time-consuming" actions.



**Task Force Smith at Osan, 5 July 1950**

On the US side, the nation's military was still in the throes of the post-World War II drawdown, going from a force of 12 million to a congressionally mandated force strength of 1,070,000 from 1945 to 1947. The Far East Command's US Army Command, Eighth Army, had four divisions—1st Cavalry, 7th Infantry, 24th Infantry and 25th Infantry—totaling 50,000 soldiers. These divisions were all based in Japan on constabulary duty as occupation forces. Though this looked good on paper, these units were manned with poorly trained draftees and a cadre that put little emphasis on training or readiness during what one observer called the “unabashed sloth” of occupation duty. Of these soldiers, only one in six had seen combat duty in World War II. In fact, by June 1950, unit strengths for combat units had fallen to 48.8 percent, and combat service support units had sunk to 25.9 percent. For combat service support units, this meant an increasing dependence on local civilian labor and facilities for routine combat service support activities and total unpreparedness for wartime mobilization.

Postwar budget cuts had severely shrunk the key logistics capabilities of the other services too. The US Air Force maintained only two dozen C-54 aircraft in Japan. At the time of Task Force Smith's deployment, several were undergoing maintenance and only six were available. The US Navy's sealift was also a victim of budget cuts that left the 24th Division “scrounging” for ships in which to deploy. The rest of the 1/21 Infantry, for example, had to commandeered civilian freighters and some US Navy LSTs (landing ships, tank) that were on loan to the Japanese Self Defense Force in order to sail to Korea to link up with Task Force Smith. As one commander put it: “It was a hell of a way to go to war.”

In *The Korean War*, author Max Hastings writes that General MacArthur's “absolute lack of attention to the combat training of the divisions in Japan can be explained by his conviction that they would not be called upon to fight.” The general's staff also had a condescending attitude toward what General MacArthur called “a barefoot Asian army.” Ordered to counter the North Korean invasion, General

MacArthur thought sending the 24th Infantry Division—as, in his words, an “arrogant display of strength”—would suffice to intimidate and ultimately stop their advance.

General MacArthur ordered the 24th Infantry Division to mobilize and prepare to move to Korea. Its mission was to secure the port of Pusan and insert a delaying force by air north of the port. The 1/21 Infantry was the designated delaying force and was hastily loaded on six C-54 transport aircraft. Only enough aircraft were available to load out two Infantry companies and some selected equipment. The rest of the battalion, Companies A and D, along with other heavy equipment and weapons, were left behind in Japan to follow-on by sealift. The rest of the division with its organic tank battalion would also deploy by sea.

Task Force Smith landed at Pusan on July 1-2 and began a three-day journey by truck and train to its battle position. The roads were clogged with refugees and retreating Republic of Korea units, and the road surfaces were churned to a quagmire by the rain and traffic. Troops slept in sidings and school houses along the way. Some became sick from drinking from local water supplies. As they neared the front, the civilian drivers refused to proceed, and the soldiers drove the trucks the rest of the way. When they arrived at the position on July 4 in the darkness and rain, the Republic of Korea Army unit that was supposed to link up with Task Force Smith was not there. Supplies were offloaded but not all moved uphill into the battle positions.

While Task Force Smith was moving into position, Pusan was struggling to transform itself into a major supply base. At the southeastern corner of the Korean Peninsula, Pusan was 185 miles southeast of Task Force Smith and 275 road miles away, separated by two mountain ranges. The Pusan Logistics Command was still organizing, finding the port facilities underdeveloped and the rail and motor transport systems in a state of confusion. Many

**Postwar  
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capabilities.**

of the networks had been damaged by air strikes from both sides. There was no centralized system of asset management, and no one was quite sure of supplies on hand. By July 5, 7,600 tons of Class V (ammunition), and 3,200 tons of general supplies had been offloaded, but there was still no coherent system to move the supplies forward.

Back at the Far East Command, the staff was acting as the combat service support staff, trying to mobilize the available forces without a theater logistics plan. The staff had neither identified a communications zone (COMMZ) nor organized support architecture. There was no plan to synchronize the deployment of combat service support units with the combat units. Because of the perceived superiority of the US forces, no preparations had been made for the retrograde, resupply or reinforcement of Task Force Smith.

The soldiers of Task Force Smith were minimally supplied, also based on the anticipation of their mission as a short “police action.” They had been issued two days’ C-Rations and about the same amount of ammunition (120 rounds per man). According to LTC Smith, “What we carried was all we had.” There were no barrier materials or mines available. Many of their 2.36-inch rockets were deteriorated and old, as were the mortar rounds.

At 0700 on July 5, 1950, the North Korean People’s Army attacked Task Force Smith with a lead element of eight T-34/85 tanks. The tanks moved through an initial barrage of A/52 Artillery unfazed. The 75-mm recoilless rifle gunners engaged the tanks, but did not score a single kill despite many hits. Task Force Smith bazooka gunners also fired many rounds at the tanks, likewise with little effect. One gunner fired over 20 rockets at the tanks at close range without managing to inflict any serious damage. A 105-mm howitzer, firing in direct fire mode, managed to knock out one tank. By 0900, more than 30 tanks had driven through Task Force Smith’s position, cutting the single communications line between the task force and A/52 Artillery. At 1100, two regiments of North Korean People’s Army infantry assaulted Task Force Smith. With LTC Smith’s radios inoperative as a result of the rain, he had to use runners between his elements.

Faced with being overrun and caught between the North Korean troops and tanks in the rear, LTC Smith ordered a phased withdrawal beginning with Company C on the right flank. Company B, holding the left flank position and straddling the main road through which the tank attack came, saw the withdrawal of Company C and began to fall back on its

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own. The withdrawal turned into a rout with soldiers stumbling through the rice paddies and abandoning weapons and equipment. Of the 406 Task Force Smith soldiers who started the battle, only 185 could be mustered a week later after reaching friendly lines.

Task Force Smith's mission was doomed to failure for many reasons, but foremost was the failure by General MacArthur's Far East Command and Eighth Army to anticipate the threat. Given the proximity of communist and Soviet influences in the theater of operations, leaders should have had contingency plans in case hostilities erupted. These plans should have also contained logistics support to include prepositioned reserve equipment. Anticipating the threat also would have prompted the staff to develop training that supported contingency plans instead of allowing the deterioration of both combat and combat service support forces.

On the plus side, the decision to secure Pusan was crucial to establishing a support base for reinforcing the Republic of Korea Army and ultimately deploying heavy ground forces and attendant combat service support. Having "friendly" port of entry into the theater was better than forcing a lodgment on hostile shores.

After Task Force Smith was committed, no plan for its continuous support was evident. Given the state of training and readiness in Eighth Army, effective execution of a combat service support plan was questionable, even if such a plan had existed. This must have been obvious to the soldiers of Task Force Smith, after their experiences just before the battle. Their lack of training, frantic deployment and

**The mission  
was doomed  
for  
many reasons.**

poor outfitting, followed by their sporadic and haphazard movement into position could only have been viewed as harbingers of the future, hammered home by North Korean People's Army on the morning of July 5, 1950.

The events that unfolded on the Korean peninsula some 45 years ago offer a telling reminder of what happens when a force goes to war unprepared. Disaster lurks around every bend. There are lessons here especially pertinent to the logistics community.

The Army either learns from its history or runs the risk of repeating past mistakes on some future battlefield. This is what General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan meant when he said repeatedly throughout his tour as Army Chief of Staff: "No more Task Force Smiths."

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## **Quartermaster Museum Renovation**

From 29 January into May 1996, the US Army Quartermaster Museum, Fort Lee, VA, was closed to the public during the installation of a pre-action, dry pipe, fire suppression system. This much-needed system upgrade provides better protection of Quartermaster heritage on exhibit at the museum. A new ceiling was also installed as part of the gallery upgrade.

The museum staff continues redesign of the museum's main exhibits in order to provide a more comprehensive telling of the Quartermaster story. This redesign, along with construction scheduled to begin this year, are part of the overall museum expansion plans that currently call for a 3,400-square foot addition to house a Petroleum and Water Gallery. Future additions are being planned to accommodate an historical research center as well as more exhibit space. All funds for the expansion are being raised by the nonprofit Army Quartermaster Foundation.

# Defending the Farm

MAJ Conrad H. Bonner

Defense of a Quartermaster company requires intensive preparation, competent leaders and detailed implementation. During *Operation Restore Hope* in Somalia, our defensive plan was tested routinely. As Commander of the 102d Quartermaster Company (Petroleum), Fort Campbell, KY, I began our preparations six months before deployment to the African Coast in 1993. Our company began intensive training and familiarization with the company weapons (M16 with bayonet, M203, M60, M2 and 9MM), land navigation, individual fighting positions and vehicle maintenance, just to name a few.

## 100 Percent Qualification

We achieved 100 percent qualification on individual weapons and established upwards of 500 percent on crew-served weapons. Weapons training included night firing and assembly/disassembly, nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) firing and extensive training on individual weapon maintenance. We achieved high success in land navigation, learned the basics of constructing fighting positions and established and maintained a 97 percent operational readiness rate for our deployable equipment. Also, the battalion established and conducted lane training for convoy operations. This training would be critical to the unit's success and safety because the battalion would be on the road every day during the United Nations humanitarian mission.


The 102d Quartermaster Company (Petroleum) arrived in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 25 Aug 93. Within a couple of days, the company completely assumed the mission of providing the theater of 27 nations and more than 30,000 personnel with fuel and

water (10 million gallons of JP5, 600,000 gallons of MOGAS and 12 million gallons of water). (See "Petroleum Support for the Somalia Theater of Operations" by CPT Conrad H. Bonner, *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin*, Spring 1994.)

The conflict was beginning to escalate during our timeframe in Mogadishu. Our convoys and living areas were fired upon by snipers. Mortar attacks on the airfield, our tents and the fuel tank farm (126 each of 20,000-gallon collapsible fabric fuel tanks) occurred nightly. Sabotage attacks within the tank farm and fuel pipeline were often attempted.

On our first day on the road, we encountered a road block within 150 meters of the airfield's front gate. The road block included burning tires, with smoke blowing across and down the road to obscure visibility. Large rocks were stacked in and around the road, within the smoke, to deny access. This was accompanied by erratic sniper fire as we were negotiating the obstacles.

Within the first three weeks, we established our area defense posture. I assigned the executive officer and the operations officer the responsibility of inter-



nal and perimeter defense and convoy defense, respectively. Because of their efforts and the company's noncommissioned officers (NCOs), the company had no significant injuries or fatalities.

The internal and perimeter defense plans were the most pressing missions required at the time. We started by using our D7 bulldozer, 10,000-pound rough terrain forklift and small excavating equipment (SEE) vehicles to build large berms around and in between our living and working tents. The berms provided the basic protection from mortar shrapnel and stray sniper rounds. Next, we required point and area positions and safety bunkers.


Our area of operations was large. We were geographically dispersed over six to seven kilometers. We established point defensive positions with communications to the operations tent at five locations. Soldiers were equipped with night vision goggles. These positions provided the overwatch protection of the company, the tank farm, the four kilometers of Inland Petroleum Distribution System pipeline, and also access control and vehicle search before entering our area.

We established area protection at two locations: the pipeline and the tank farm. These consisted of two-soldier roving patrols.

The guard positions were our most important positions and our first line of defense. The guards confiscated many weapons, captured many individuals without a need to be in the area and prevented unauthorized access to the refuel points. This was occurring inside the United Nations perimeter of the airfield. Operational security went up immediately after establishing these positions, and an unknown number of potentially serious incidents were prevented.

Using the overwatch positions covering the tank farm, we were able to detect saboteurs. By communicating with the roving patrols, we successfully defeated the sabotage attacks on the collapsible fabric fuel tanks by firing on the saboteur. This type of protection was instrumental in providing continuous petroleum support for the theater.

Without the positions guarding and patrolling the pipeline, we would not have been able to defeat the late night efforts to establish roadblocks and to sabotage the pipeline. Very little fuel was lost during these pipeline attacks because of the diligence of the roving patrols and the company's quick repair of pipeline damage.



The  
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Also, we established several safety bunkers for anyone caught in the open during mortar attacks. While visiting our location, the Sergeant Major of the Army experienced firsthand the effectiveness of having these safety bunkers scattered throughout our area during a mortar attack.

An equally important mission was the safety of the soldiers and cargo during convoy operations. Our company was located 45 minutes from all support. Therefore, we were on the road two to four times daily.

We had to establish an efficient plan for our convoys. Our operations officer created our convoy standing operating procedure (SOP).

The minimum requirements to participate in any of our vehicle movements were three vehicles consisting of one 2 1/2-ton vehicle or larger, an escort vehicle with M60 or greater weapon, and a chase vehicle with similar weapons; communication between the escort vehicle and the chase vehicle; a combat medic with medical bag; two mechanics with a general mechanics tool box and Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR) kit; and a tow bar.

One hour before movement, the convoy would be staged outside the operations tent. Here the daily maintenance sheets were inspected along with the vehicles for free-moving tow hooks, fuel, water containers, Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs), qualified crews on the weapon systems and qualified drivers for the convoy vehicles. This was not the time to cut corners against requirements. The operations officer or NCO would give a quick briefing on the situation and review key issues.

The convoy commander would then have all convoy personnel go to our "mini" range and test-fire all weapons. Also, personnel received smoke grenades, riot gas and tear gas and any additional instructions. Just before movement, personnel tested the communication equipment and fixed their bayonets. Then the convoy was ready to roll out the gate.

By following these procedures, our unit was able to complete every convoy intact. Self-recovery and on-site maintenance prevented leaving vehicles which broke down in a hostile environment where vehicles would have been stripped, stolen or destroyed. Water and MREs were on hand when soldiers had to perform on-site maintenance, and the BDAR kits were a tremendous asset to ensure vehicle repairs were completed.

On many occasions, our convoy assisted in repairs and perimeter security for other vehicles that were attacked or wrecked until the damaged vehicles were evacuated by their units. We were able to immediately roll out and provide emergency assistance on several occasions because of the complete package our convoy provided.

While on the convoys, a simple procedure enabled us to repel attackers without seriously injuring them before they could damage or steal anything. This was accomplished by the fixed bayonets, a practice introduced by our battalion commander. This simple practice proved very effective.

Other units had problems because the attackers who dodged the gas attacks and jumped on board knew they would not be shot unless they attacked the troops. However, when faced by a charging soldier with bayonet, as on our convoys, attackers quickly understood the situation and jumped off the vehicles. It must be noted that soldiers must be extremely careful while using a fixed bayonet on a moving vehicle, but it was necessary at the time to take this risk.

Our convoys were so successful and popular that several units on the airfield chose to join our convoy rather than another hastily established convoy. These vehicles and personnel were welcomed as long as they abided by our convoy SOP. As it became apparent that this would become a habitual relationship, our operations officer coordinated with these units so that

our timelines would not be affected. The increased size of the convoys offered additional protection and benefits to everyone involved with the operation.

What really ensured the successful accomplishment of the entire mission before, during and after the deployment were the efforts of the NCOs. Their professionalism and dedication to protecting the soldiers, not only those of our company but all soldiers, resulted in the convoy redeploying each and every soldier attached or assigned to our unit alive and well to the states and their loved ones.

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## **Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course Soldiers Publish in *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin***

This spring edition features articles written by Quartermasters in the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC). As part of their branch-specific CLOAC requirements, Quartermaster officers contribute to their professional bulletin on a regular basis.

As always, the *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* first seeks information from the field. Your branch publication wants to hear how you reinforce the training base, introduce new concepts and learn from experiences in combat service support. Please refer to the last page in this edition for the simple guidelines on submitting text, photographs and graphics for publication.

# ***The Battle of Vicksburg: The Key to Victory***

*CPT William T. Welch*

The Civil War divided our nation, Americans fighting Americans, brother against brother. The war lasted four long years before the Confederate surrender at Appomattox, VA. Many historians say that a key battle fought westward was the turning point in the war: the Battle of Vicksburg. President Abraham Lincoln had declared "Vicksburg is the key...the war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket."

On bluffs 250 feet high, the city of Vicksburg, MI, overlooks the Mississippi River on the Louisiana-Mississippi state boundary. The river was a key supply route for the Confederate forces in the West. These forces at Vicksburg, commanded by Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemperton, obtained soldiers and supplies from Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and the Mississippi Yazoo Delta district. Vicksburg was one of the war's great fortified strongholds. On the high bluffs, Confederate forces positioned artillery batteries ready to challenge the passage of Union ships. Gaining control of Vicksburg and the Mississippi River would open a major supply artery for the Union forces. The Union Navy accepted the Vicksburg challenge.

## ***Naval Attempt***

The Union command decided upon a naval attempt because of the natural terrain obstacles that surround Vicksburg. Ground forces would have a difficult time maneuvering through these obstacles. Captain David Farragut received the mission. Farragut had been very successful moving northward on the Mississippi River, taking New Orleans and Baton Rouge, LA, and Natchez, MS. Vicksburg's bluffs proved too much for Farragut and his fleet. Farragut's gun boats could not elevate their guns high enough to challenge the Confederate artillery batteries. Farragut had to withdraw to New Orleans, and Union leaders in Washington went back to the drawing board.

Strategists in Washington had no choice but to use ground forces and Major General Ulysses S. Grant to lead the attack on Vicksburg. Grant and his troops were in Corinth, TN. On 2 November 1862, they began moving south to Holly Springs, MS. Grant chose this route because the Mississippi Central Railroad originated in Grand Junction, IN. This railroad would serve as the logistics artery for the Union advance into Mississippi. On 13 November, Grant's main force of 37,000 troops arrived at Holly Springs and immediately began establishing an advance sup-

ply base. Meanwhile, the rest of Grant's troops, led by Major General William Sherman, waited in Memphis, TN.

In early December, Grant sent orders to Sherman to begin preparing for a move down the river. Grant was keeping Pemperton occupied with the threat of an overland advance. On 20 December, Sherman left Memphis with the help of a Naval flotilla commanded by Admiral David Porter. Sherman organized his forces into three divisions with the intent of assaulting Vicksburg on the east side of the river from the north. Meanwhile, Grant was diverting Pemperton's attention from Sherman's movement. The Confederate forces did not fall for the diversion and launched an attack on Grant's logistics support.

## ***Forrest and Van Dorn Raids***

Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest and Major General Earl Van Dorn conducted a series of raids that successfully destroyed Grant's line of communications and supply base. On 20 December, Forrest wrecked an important rail junction at Jackson, TN, breaking telegraph communications. Ironically, this was also the day Grant had received orders from Major General Henry Halleck, the commander of all ground forces, to order Major General John A. McClernand forward to participate in the operations against Vicksburg. Because of this raid, Grant was slow in reaching McClernand. This delay, in turn, caused McClernand to miss Sherman at Memphis.

On the very same day, Van Dorn surprised weakened Union forces and destroyed part of the Mississippi Central Railroad. He also captured a half-million dollar stockpile of supplies that Grant had accumulated to support his continued advance. Grant's operations came to a screeching halt.

## ***Wild Goose Chase***

To make matters worse, McClernand, whom Grant had just ordered to move forward to join Sherman, wanted the Vicksburg expedition at the start. Upon linking up with Sherman, and being the senior of the two Union generals, he took command. McClernand decided to move north on the Mississippi River to the Arkansas River to assault the Port of Arkansas. That Port was taken on 11 January 1863. This was far from Grant's objective. Grant immediately sent a message to Halleck calling McClernand's diversion a "wild goose chase." A

divided command now existed and now lay in the lap of Halleck in Washington.

On 12 January, Halleck settled the issue when he telegraphed Grant: "You are hereby authorized to relieve General McClernand from command of the expedition against Vicksburg. Giving it to the next in rank or taking it yourself." Realizing that relieving McClernand and putting Sherman in command would send political ripples all the way back to Washington, Grant chose to personally take command. Upon McClernand and Sherman's return, he quietly deactivated McClernand's Army of the Mississippi and reorganized his forces into four corps. The corps commanders were McClernand, Sherman, Major General James McPherson and Major General Stephen Hurlbut.

At this point, Grant was right where he had started two months earlier. He traveled down the west side of the river, stopping northwest of Vicksburg. Grant tried four unsuccessful efforts to reach Vicksburg: two attempts to bypass the city to the south and two to cross the Yazoo Delta to the north.

The two attempts to bypass to the south involved digging canals through the waterways and rivers on the west side. Breaking levees and lack of engineer equipment caused these attempts to fail. The two attempts to cross the Yazoo Delta at first seemed promising, but the Confederate forces must have expected such attempts. Trees were cut to fall across the water and clog the waterways for the gunboats and ironclads. The date was March 1863 and Grant was still at square one.

Failure was nothing new to Grant. Since 1854, with his resignation of his commission followed by several projects he attempted as a civilian, he seemed always to fall short of success. Yet, through these failures, Grant seemed to emerge as a confident, respected leader who now enjoyed increasing support from President Lincoln and Halleck.

Grant thought he should withdraw to the north and attack along the Mississippi Central Railroad—his original intention. However, this strategy would appear as an admission of defeat, something Grant could not afford after his four failed attempts. Grant decided to march his troops south overland on the west side. He would run gunboats and transports at night past the bluffs to assist in crossing the river and then attack Vicksburg from the south.

Grant and Pemperton's forces were about equal in size, about 50,000 each. This was not the force ratio Grant wanted to face. Grant organized his corps into three assaulting corps and one corps to protect his rear area. McClernand, Sherman and McPherson would lead the assaulting forces. Hurlbut would be the "stay-behind" commander. Grant started his campaign by sending McClernand south to Hard Times along the west bank to establish and repair a roadway for follow-on forces. Two weeks later Admiral Porter sailed eight gunships and eight transports past the bluffs, losing only one transport. Meanwhile, Grant was thinning Pemperton's forces on the Vicksburg perimeter through diversions.

One diversion, commanded by Major General Frederick Steele, was to move a division north of Vicksburg to destroy supply stations and take livestock that Confederate forces needed. More importantly, Steele was to gain Pemperton's attention to the north, spread his forces, and conceal Union movement to Hard Times. Steele was successful and rejoined Sherman to participate in the campaign. Hurlbut conducted the second diversion. He was to launch a pattern of cavalry raids to strain Pemperton's already thin defenses. The biggest success of this campaign was that of Colonel Benjamin Grierson. His raid, from the Tennessee-Mississippi border to Baton Rouge, with only 1,000 soldiers drew a division from the defenses at Vicksburg. Sherman had the third diversion. He was to draw forces away from Vicksburg to Haynes Bluff. For this, he loaded 10 regiments worth of troops on transports and instructed every man to "look as numerous as possible." Sherman then moved the transports within view of the Confederate forces at Haynes Bluff, moved them out of sight, reboarded and repeated the process three times. This gave the appearance of 30 regiments instead of 10. This diversion resulted in the Haynes Bluff commander wiring an urgent message to Pemperton: "The enemy are in front of me in force such as has never been seen before at Vicksburg. Send me reinforcements." Meanwhile, Sherman was moving out to join Grant south of Vicksburg to report a mission complete.

Grant, with McClernand, was at Hard Times and ready to cross the river. Grand Gulf was to their front with Confederate forces. Porter's gunboats had little effect. Grant was beginning to think his plan had

'... look as numerous as possible'

failed, but luck was on his side. An escaped slave gave Grant information about a good road at Bruinsburg. Grant moved his forces further south. On 1 May, he was finally on the east side. Grant began establishing a supply base while waiting for Sherman and his forces.

Grant was getting supplies from Memphis. This line of supply was too long, and Union forces had to get past the bluffs. Grant knew if he waited for supplies, Vicksburg would have time to be reinforced. Pemperton would also expect Grant to move north and attack from the south. Grant decided not to wait for supplies, to move to Jackson and to attack Vicksburg from the rear. The Union leaders in Washington did not support this "carry-what-you-can" plan and sent a message to Grant to wait for resupply coordination from Baton Rouge. This message arrived too late. Grant was in the execution phase.

### **Sherman Joins Grant**

Sherman joined Grant on 7 May, the same day Grant would begin his movement to Jackson. He moved his forces through Rocky Springs to Raymond. McClernand was ordered to move directly north to Auburn. Grant wanted Pemperton to think his next target was Champion's Hill. McPherson and Sherman arrived at Raymond on 12 May after a quick battle that resulted in Confederate forces retreating to Jackson. McClernand joined up with Grant at Raymond. Grant ordered McPherson to move to Clinton to destroy the railroad to prevent reinforcements and resupply, then move eastward to Jackson. Sherman was to attack Jackson from Raymond and McClernand was to stay in Raymond and protect the rear and reinforce McPherson or Sherman.

Jackson, MS, had 6,000 Confederate troops to Grant's 25,000 Union troops. Jackson was taken easily. General Joe Johnston, the commander at Jackson, retreated his forces north to Canton. Grant's decision to continue his advance without supplies was the key to this victory. Had the Union forces waited for resupply, Confederate forces would have grown to 15,000 troops with another 9,000 close behind. Grant was now in position to take the key he initially came to take: Vicksburg.

Johnston sent word to Pemperton to join him at Clinton. Together, the Confederates would attack Grant from the rear. At the same time, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States, ordered Pemperton to hold Vicksburg at all costs. Pemperton followed Davis' order and decided to meet Grant at

Champion's Hill. At the end of one of the bloodiest battles of the Vicksburg Campaign, the Union prevailed. Grant continued his movement to Vicksburg.

At this point, the Confederate morale was very low while the Union's confidence was increasing. Union forces seemed invincible. Grant's success was having a definite impact.

When Grant reached Vicksburg in mid-May, he attempted two assaults that failed. The second assault on 22 May had worse results than the first on 17 May. Realizing his conventional attacks would not work, Grant decided to "settle down to regular siege operations." Pemperton could not get supplies in and no Confederate could get out. Grant knew Pemperton would not last long. Grant also received reinforcements to increase Union numbers to 70,000 to Pemperton's 30,000 Confederates.

In early July, Pemperton began negotiations with Grant for the conditions of surrender. On 4 July 1863, the Confederates surrendered. Grant sent a message to Washington that the campaign was over, the Mississippi was open all the way to the Gulf, and the Confederacy was split.

### **Hard Lessons**

Grant had learned some hard lessons at the start of the operation from the raids on his supply base by Forrest and Van Dorn. He knew the importance of supplies and the sustainment of his troops. However, Grant's decision to cut off his supply line and live off the land gave him the advantage he needed to stay one step ahead of the Confederate forces. Also, Pemperton and Grant studied at West Point together, so Grant had to do the unexpected. Logistics, or the lack of logistics, was the difference between taking the key and being locked out.

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# Who Has Time for Forklift Training?

Michael L. Davis

**The soldier had just been licensed for all types of forklifts in the unit. While helping move supplies, the soldier forgot or (as stated in the accident report) was not aware the forklift turned from the rear and not the front. As the operator turned the forklift, the ground guide's foot was run over and broken. After this accident, the unit decided on mandatory safety briefings for all forklift operators, on more training for operators of the different forklifts, and on supervision by unit leaders during high-risk operations. The unit's leadership decided these three measures would reduce the accident risks with forklifts.**

This unit is on the path to success for forklift accident prevention. Most accidents are preventable, with a little effort in training and enforcement of the standards. These are common Army misconceptions: forklift operation is easy, can be learned quickly, and does not require practice. These misconceptions lead to forklift accidents.

The Quartermaster Branch Safety Office has been collecting accident information for the past 11 fiscal years (FY85–95) on forklift accidents. Data include all recordable military and Army civilian employee reports available from the US Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, AL. Also, hundreds of officers and enlisted personnel were interviewed. The results were informative and surprising.

Accidents for FY85–95 totaled 1,005, with 17 fatalities and 16 permanent total/partial disabilities, more than \$5.6 million in personal injury costs and more than \$2.8 million in damages to equipment and other property. Equipment damage costs are recorded only when damage exceeds \$2,000. Injury costs are recorded if the individual loses 24 hours of time because of the accident. (Note: In FY87 most Army civilian employee accidents began to be reported to the Department of Labor instead of the US Army Safety Center. This resulted in a major decline of Army civilian employee accident information. Also, the re-

portable dollar value of an accident was raised, again reducing the number of accidents reportable to the US Army Safety Center.)


What became clear from the forklift safety study was the magnitude of the lack of training of Army military and civilian operators and a lack of enforcement of standards by unit supervisors. Operator accidents account for 68 percent of all types of forklift accidents. A review of the 1,005 forklift accidents identified the following as the most common types:

- Operator/Material Handling—an accident involving the forklift and personnel during the loading, unloading or hauling of material. Equipment damage and personal injury most likely to occur.
- Operator/Misjudged Clearance—accident occurring when the forklift operator misjudges distance or clearance requirements and hits another object. Equipment damage most likely to occur.
- Operator/Load Dropped—accident occurring when the load of a forklift falls during loading, unloading or hauling. Equipment damage and personal injury most likely to occur.
- Maintenance—repair or adjustment of equipment, preventive maintenance checks and services, assembly, installing, replacing or cleaning involving a forklift. Individual injury most likely to occur.
- Exit/Enter Vehicle—simple physical action of entering or exiting the forklift. Usually caused by haste and not following the three-point contact rule.
- Operator/Human Locomotion—accident involving an operating forklift hitting an individual not directly working with the forklift. Individual injury most likely to occur.
- Towing/Hauling—movement of a vehicle by another vehicle with either vehicle being a forklift. Individual injury most likely to occur.
- Operator/Too Fast For Road Conditions—accident occurring when the operator is driving too fast for surface conditions. Equipment damage and personal injury most likely to occur.
- Operator/Improper Physical Action—physical action taken by the driver that causes injury to the driver.
- Operator/Equipment Failure—failure of equipment directly causing an accident. Equipment damage mostly likely to occur.

Here is a list of procedures that unit leaders must enforce:

- Permit only licensed operators on forklifts.
- Require ground guides and require ground guides to use signals because noise levels around forklifts are high and voice communications often cannot be heard.
- Do not allow forklifts to travel with forks elevated more than four inches above the ground. Require forks to rest on the ground when the forklift is parked.
- Do not allow forklift operators to bump or push stacks to straighten or move the stacks.
- Make sure operators secure and anchor bridge plates and ramps to prevent slipping.
- Require operators to stop the engine and set the brake before getting off the forklift.
- Make sure personnel in the area stand only where they cannot be struck by the load or the forklift. Also, make sure personnel in the area are away from the mast while the forklift is operating.
- Do not allow operators to use the forklift to elevate personnel unless authorized by the supervisor. Require operators to use a safety pallet when lifting is authorized. Personnel being lifted will face away from the mast and remain clear of the hoisting mechanism.
- Do not allow personnel to counterbalance a load on the forklift by riding the load.
- Require the correct size of forklift for the load capacity.
- Require operators to stop the engine and set the brake if problems develop during moving, loading or unloading.
- Require the operators to inspect the load to be moved. Do not allow operators to move unstable unsecured loads.
- Do not allow ground personnel to manhandle

## Forklift Accident Costs by Percentage



heavy items onto the forks, and require ground personnel to ask for help with loading problems.


Leaders must continually remind ground personnel that they will lose every time in an "argument" with a forklift.

**A soldier and a civilian were attempting to move a 300-pound pallet of rubber floor mats to a new location. The civilian was the forklift operator. The operator attempted to pick up the pallet, but it tipped forward each time. The soldier, who was acting as the ground guide, decided to physically push the pallet forward while the forklift picked it up. The pallet fell forward on top of the soldier, resting on his leg and foot. The pallet was removed by seven personnel after responding to the soldier's screams.**

After operator/material handling errors, the second leading cause of personal injury and equipment damage is misjudgment of clearance requirements. If an operator has doubts about clearance, the operator should stop the forklift and check.

A third cause of forklift accidents is dropping loads. To overcome this danger area, operators must not use improperly loaded forklifts or forklifts in unsafe mechanical condition, inspect all loads and

## Forklift Accidents by Types



not overload, not move an unstable load, avoid moving loose materials, and not move an unsafe load from an unblocked truck or trailer. Operators must ask their supervisors if unsure about procedure. Also, to prevent this type of accident, personnel near the forklift must not stand under the load being hoisted, lowered or carried.

Maintenance is the fourth major cause of injuries. Personnel error, such as the following, causes most maintenance accidents:

**A soldier was removing batteries from several forklifts. During the operation, he rubbed his eyes without removing his gloves. Flushing his eyes did not help. The soldier had to go to the hospital for treatment for chemical burns to his eyes.**

Speed too fast for the road conditions is a major problem for the military and one of the leading causes of deaths in forklift accidents. Operators need to always use their seat belts, reduce speed when driving down or up grades, and remember at all times not to cut corners when operating forklifts.

**A driver was operating a 4,000-pound forklift on a loading dock. The driver made a 90-degree turn while backing up at too great a speed from**

**the ramp to the loading dock. He was unable to properly straighten the steering wheel of the forklift on the ramp and lost control. The forklift started to go off the ramp. The driver attempted to jump off the forklift. His foot was caught in the battery compartment. He was pinned down and crushed to death by the overhead protective safety guard of the forklift.**


**A forklift driver was traveling at a high rate of speed. The driver was inexperienced and ignored the speed. He tried**

**to negotiate a dip in the road but lost control because of excessive speed. The forklift overturned, pinning the operator's leg under the forklift. The forklift and the pinned driver then slid approximately 20 feet before stopping. The forklift had only \$1,000 dollars worth of damage, but medical costs exceeded \$32,000 for the driver.**

Leaders and safety go hand in hand. Forklifts are designed to perform specific functions under specified conditions with **trained personnel**. When leaders do not enforce standards, human errors enter the forklift operations and potential safety hazards occur. These problems are compounded when inexperienced, unsupervised, untrained or partly trained personnel become operators for forklifts. Only thorough training, practice on the equipment, following correct procedures and standards, and leader involvement will prevent accidents, minimize damage and improve forklift safety.

Protecting the force means taking care of both personnel and equipment. The loss of either reduces the Army's ability to perform mission requirements.

*Michael L. Davis, Quartermaster Branch Safety Office, Office of the Quartermaster General, Fort Lee, Virginia.*



# PROFESSIONAL READINGS

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The Professional Readings section of the *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* encourages the professional development of all Quartermasters. Titles are selected from the Quartermaster School Professional Reading List and the current Department of the Army Contemporary Military Reading List, as well as other notable sources. Short reviews from the field are always welcome. **The following book reviews are excerpts from reports by recent graduates of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course at Fort Lee, VA.**

## ***Clear and Present Danger***

*Tom Clancy, Putnam: New York, 1989.*

The author has written these seven best-selling novels: *The Hunt For Red October*, *Red Storm Rising*, *Patriot Games*, *The Cardinal of the Kremlin*, *The Sum of All Fears*, *Without Remorse*, and *Clear and Present Danger*. Three novels—*The Hunt For Red October*, *Patriot Games* and *Clear and Present Danger*—became hit movies.

Clancy bases *Clear and Present Danger* on the assassination of three American officials in Columbia and the covert US response. Through the character of Jack Ryan, the author presents a story of how US political power is misused for corrupt personal and political gains in the name of national security. Clancy reveals Ryan's character as the story unfolds. Ryan is forced to decide whether to go along with a Presidential scandal or expose it to the nation. Clancy digs into Ryan's soul and asks the question of what duty, honor and truth mean to men when placed in desperate situations. Clancy's fiction brings up the basic ethics that all officers in the military should have. Duty, honor and truth are what this novel is about, and I believe those values are what we as Army officers are about. — *LT John A. VanHook*

## ***All Quiet on the Western Front***

*Erich M. Remarque, Putnam: London, 1929.*

The author, a native German, was drafted into the German army when he was 18 to fight in World War I on the Western front. Wounded many times, he was finally discharged after a serious injury. As a front-line soldier in World War I, he felt the effects of war and saw the ramifications on his country and the German citizens.

Death totals and financial costs are easily tabulated, but the author writes of the hidden costs of war on people, friendships and communities. Remarque uses his firsthand experiences to allow the reader to "feel" the war as he did in the infantry. It has been in question whether or not *All Quiet on the Western Front* is "propaganda" for the anti-German government cause. Remarque does criticize German supremacy ideas and the Kaiser in almost every chapter.

By the end of Remarque's novel, all seven of his young schoolmates who volunteered for World War I are killed along with all of their ideals, innocence and dreams. The author portrays the general decay of moral values caused by the war. As the novel progresses, the moral decline causes the characters to become immune to immoral acts. This book is an example of what an army and military leadership should not do to troops. Information dissemination and honesty should be foremost in a command structure. The senseless lying of the German leadership to the soldiers not only undermined morale, but removed the soldiers' will to fight. — *LT Jon P. Beale*

## ***Military Incompetence, Why the American Military Doesn't Win***

*Richard A. Gabriel, Hill and Wang: New York, 1985.*

At the time of publication, the author had been an officer either on active or reserve duty for more than 20 years, including 3 years of active service in Vietnam. He is currently a political science professor at a small New England college. He has studied military history for more than 15 years and published at least 15 other books oriented toward an inspection of the US military. Gabriel's thesis is that the American military suffers from a number of flaws that prevent efficiency. The main reason for this inefficiency is the weakness of the officer corps. The author reviews five major military operations from 1970 to 1985 to illustrate flaws and includes interviews with personnel involved in the military operations he examines. Other flaws include

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general military incompetence, the size of the officer corps, turbulence, officers as entrepreneurs, amateurism, bureaucracy, and a lack of combat readiness. In each of five chapters, he discusses one of five military operations. He methodically covers the concepts of the operations, what actually happened and why things went wrong. The five examples he chose were the raid on Sontay Prison, the *Mayaguez* incident, the Iran rescue mission, death in Beirut (specifically the Marines at the international airport), and Grenada.

If there is one weakness in the author's thesis, it is that he is guilty of compartmentalizing, a criticism he levels at those involved with planning the five military operations he describes. He points out flaws in each of the operations, but rarely does he link the flaws of each operation together, which would greatly strengthen his book.

The book applies to today's Army, because the author writes of the US military's very recent past. The problems evident during the 15-year span that the author describes are still present in the 10 years since the book's first printing. While Gabriel's suggestions for reform are thought-provoking and could possibly be effective reform measures, I doubt seriously that such measures will be implemented because of their controversial nature — *LT Dana L. Tucker*

### ***Morale: A Study of Men and Courage***

*John Baynes, Praeger: New York, 1967.*

John Baynes was a career British Army officer who has written four books on military history. He served as the executive officer of the 2d Scottish Rifle Regiment, whose World War I experience provided material for this book. He believes that the maintenance of morale is the single most important factor in war. The author makes the case that many times tactics are overemphasized. Since tactical maneuvers depend largely on the actions of soldiers, the foremost objective should be to keep the soldiers concerned enough to carry out the plans. He maintains that a brilliant tactical plan can end in ruin if morale is bad, and a bad plan can be made to work if morale is good. He sustains his thesis throughout the book with a thorough analysis of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in France where his 2d Scottish Rifles faced incredible odds.

Applying his five components of morale, the author spends a great deal of time evaluating the impacts of religion and values on morale. The values he attributes to the sustainment of high morale are a sense of duty, kindness and unselfishness. His final analysis of ethics and impact on morale could be narrowed down to loving one's neighbor and doing one's duty.

Morale comes from many different sources, as the author has clearly demonstrated. Without a sense of community, strong leadership, discipline, a sense of duty and strong support, soldiers simply cannot sustain high morale. Morale at its highest allows a fighting soldier to accept his fate, even if that fate is death. This acceptance allows the soldier to fight and win on the battlefield. Morale is an unchanging quality. What does change, though, are the methods of applying the principles that instill morale. What formerly motivated soldiers may not motivate the modern soldier. Soldiers of today are much more educated and more used to comforts than soldiers of yesteryear. Therefore, the modern military leader must make more of an effort in maintaining morale. — *LT Corey A. Baute*

### ***About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior***

*COL (Ret.) David H. Hackworth and Julie Sherman, Simon and Schuster: New York, 1989.*

COL Hackworth grew up in a love affair with the Army. By lying about his age, the author joined the World War II effort at age 15. By the time he got out of training, though, the war had ended. After duty with the occupation forces in Europe, "Hack" got his chance to fight in the Korean War. There, after several heroic efforts, he received a battlefield commission at age 20. He commanded several units throughout his career. He was promoted to colonel during the Vietnam war. It was during this time that his love for the Army turned sour.

Hackworth believes that the Army lost all credibility by moving to a "zero defects" institution. He explains how this move and the inflated Officer Evaluation Report (OER) ruined the system. Throughout, he also shares his political beliefs and how he thinks the US lost in Vietnam.

The author believes the OER system calls on all officers to inflate their accomplishments, hide their mistakes, and move out of important combat leadership roles for the purposes of furthering their careers. By inflating their accomplishments, Hackworth asserts that officers give up some of their moral fiber. The process calls into question the morality of the officers by not accepting the figures which are more realistic. To keep their careers on track, it is impossible for officers to make mistakes on paper. If no mistakes are ever

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reported, problems cannot be evaluated and fixed for others in the same position. The author was most worried, however, that combat “studs” stayed out of combat leadership roles because they were afraid to fail in battle, thus ruining their careers. This, in turn, left the combat leadership to incompetent personnel who rotated through the units in Vietnam as quickly as possible.

The author seems to have a strong sense of ethics, but the ethics are definitely his own. There are situations within his book that involve stealing, gambling, rape and murder. In some situations, Hackworth was highly judgmental toward people who went against his beliefs. However, he was always willing to stretch his ethics when it came to him or one of his units. Although I did not always trust the author’s judgment because he seemed self-righteous, I think the points he makes about the OER system are valid. — *LT Kurtis Teel*

### ***Snake Eater: Tales of the U.S. Army Special Forces in the Vietnam War***

*Don Bendell, Dell Publishing, Co., Inc.: New York, 1994.*

The author based this book on his personal experiences as an Army captain in the Special Forces. He served on an A-Team in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969 with the Montagnards at A-Team Camp 242, Dak Pek. Montagnards were ethnic minorities in Vietnam, according to the author, who had been oppressed by their government. The US government promised the Montagnards support in their struggle for autonomy in exchange for their services in the Vietnam war.

With firsthand accounts in Vietnam, the author tries to make his point that the Special Forces are critical to the US Army, even though not large in numbers and not as highly visible as other soldiers. In fact, he says that they are the best-trained, most elite warriors in the US Army. However, most soldiers in this book are portrayed as either superhuman and/or crazy. For example, one officer was a large American Indian whom Bendell felt was one of the fiercest Special Forces leaders alive. The author describes walking down a street with “Happy Jack” when a Vietnamese man pestered them about buying a bird. “Happy Jack” finally bought all of the birds. When the Vietnamese man handed the cages to “Happy Jack,” he pulled out each bird and bit its head off.

As the author and main character of his book, Captain Bendell would be a great role model for any soldier serious about being in the Special Forces. However, I feel that his leadership style would be neither helpful nor applicable to most other branches of the Army. This book deals with combat soldiers and tactics, as opposed to logistics professionals and tactics. The author explains the type of personnel and leadership necessary in the Special Forces. Very descriptive, he brings his characters to life. His book serves as a reminder of unsung heroes of the Special Forces in Vietnam. — *LT Britt A. Rippeth*

### ***She Went to War***

*Peter Copeland, Presidio Press: Novato, CA, 1992.*

The author writes the story as told by MAJ Rhonda Cornum who was taken as a prisoner during the Persian Gulf war in the early 1990s. The author’s only condition before writing this Army officer’s story was that the book be absolutely accurate. If MAJ Cornum could not remember something, the book would omit it rather than invent it. The book is dedicated to those who gave their lives trying to rescue a fellow aviator.

The author’s thesis is that servicemen and women bond, not as two individual sexes, but as a part of military strength. The story clearly describes the common goal of unity that takes place during wartime. It is a personal look at a woman—a wife and mother—who become a hero and set a mark for women in the military. To convince the reader, MAJ Cornum describes the growing relationship between herself and a fellow US Army prisoner who was an enlisted male. Her account is significant testimony about whether or not women should be in combat. Her view of war from one woman’s perspective is filled with strong pride and inspiration. Her story is filled with interesting anecdotes about living conditions in the desert and the hardship of family separation. MAJ Cornum’s fears and concerns are recounted, but she does not whine or complain. Problems and difficulties were seen as challenges. MAJ Cornum’s ethics and values had significant impact on her success before and during the Persian Gulf war.

Her story is not told by sequential events. Instead, her life before the war is woven throughout the book in a fast-paced manner. Her account is an inspirational one of going to war as a soldier, wife and mother. The number of women in the military are growing, and publications about women in military service are a great need. — *LT Andree G. Sales*



# LogPro: Supply Intern Program

Linda A. Young

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics is establishing a new office with the goal of better managing civilian logisticians to ensure the availability of well-trained and experienced employees equipped with the right skills to support a Force XXI Army. This office, called the Logistics Management Proponency Office (LogPro), manages civilian career topics including:

- **Strengthening career advancement and development opportunities** for civilians working for the Department of the Army. The office will use cutting-edge tools, standardized criteria, and will be the Army's resident source of vital information for use by both the Activity Career Program Managers and civilian careerists.
- **Tracking the Total Army civilian population** in a way that parallels the Active Army system. Eventually each careerist will have a one page "record-brief" with vital information about professional history and career assignments.
- **Reengineering the Supply and Maintenance Intern Programs** to continue the many new and exciting changes in the way interns train. The program continues as two years of formal classroom instruction, correspondence courses and on-the-job training. One major change is the initial schooling each intern will attend. The Supply and Maintenance management interns will follow the path set by Transportation management interns who successfully use the Transportation Officer Basic Course (OBC) as the cornerstone of civilian intern training. The Transportation OBC is located at Fort Eustis, VA. The future Maintenance management training will be at the home of Ordnance, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. For Supply management, the interns will attend the US Army



Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, VA. The OBC covers a wide realm of areas including leadership skills, unit and staff operations, tactics, common soldier skills, and communications skills. Although originally developed for military officers, these OBCs are excellent training for civilians and provide

a perspective of the military that many civilians rarely get.

After the OBC, interns are sent to several Army Logistics Management College courses at Fort Lee, including the Integrated Item Manager's Course, the Logistics Management Development Course and the Defense Distribution Management Course. Interns also attend the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System Course at Fort Jackson, SC, and the Provisioning Course at the US Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. These courses, combined with the OBC, are considered *Phase I* of an intern's career.

*Phase II* training will include several on-the-job experiences. For example, the interns will be assigned to a retail location to work at various levels including the division support command, the corps support command and the Materiel Management Center. They also will spend several weeks with a logistics assistance representative and work in a joint training assignment with another service or the Defense Logistics Agency. The interns' final training will involve various assignments in wholesale supply management learning about National Inventory Control Point processes, weapons system management and specialized technical training in the functional area of their future assignments.

*Linda A. Young, an Instructor at the US Army Logistics Management College, Fort Lee, Virginia, is currently on assignment with Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.*



# TOTAL FORCE

## *Duty With the Reserve Component*

*MAJ Scott T. Glass*

Serving in assistance positions with the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard is more of a possibility for Quartermaster soldiers now and in the future than a short time ago.

### *Reality Says . . .*

**Fact One:** At the time of this writing, the US Army totals about 490,000 soldiers. This is down from the approximately 780,000 in the late 1980s, a decline of about 38 percent.

**Fact Two:** The Army National Guard and US Army Reserve now maintain significant parts of the total force's combat service support (CSS) capability. In the 367,000-soldier Army National Guard, about 50 percent are CSS. With any decrease in the active force structure, the CSS responsibilities of the Reserve Component (RC) are likely to increase.

**Fact Three:** Quartermaster officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are serving tours assisting RC units with readiness and training. Just under 600 Quartermasters serve in RC assistance duties. This is a dramatic rise over several years ago and is subject to more growth.

### *They Are Out There. . .*

The following chart illustrates the distribution of nearly 600 Quartermasters assisting the RC:

Officers:	34 — CPTs	
	38 — MAJs	
	12 — LTCs	
	<hr/>	84 Total Officers
Warrant Officers:	7 — 920A (Property Accounting Technician)	
	6 — 920B (Supply Systems Technician)	
	2 — 922A (Food Service Technician)	
	<hr/>	15 Total Warrant Officers
NCOs:	492 — 77 and 92 Career Management Fields	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>591</b>	<b>Officers/Warrant Officers/NCOs Assisting the RC</b>

## **And Where They Can Serve . . .**

Types of positions and the RC units being assisted vary greatly. Quartermasters serve with Readiness Groups, Resident Trainer Detachments, and Resident Training Teams. Other, more specialized positions also exist.

**Readiness Groups.** Readiness Groups assist US Army Reserve and Army National Guard units within a geographical area. There are 20 Readiness Groups just within the First Army's area of concern, stretching generally from Florida to Maine to Wisconsin to Alabama. The number and specialty of Quartermaster soldiers in a Readiness Group reflects the type and missions of units the Readiness Group assists. For example, Readiness Group-Atlanta (Georgia) assists over 250 units throughout its assigned area, generally within the state of Georgia. It is authorized two Quartermaster officers and two NCOs.

**Resident Trainer Detachments.** Currently, 15 Army National Guard brigades are designated as "enhanced brigades." Each has a Resident Trainer Detachment or is slated to receive one. One or two Quartermaster personnel work with each Resident Trainer Detachment. Resident Trainer Detachment teams work out of the brigade support battalion headquarters and assist subordinate units with training plans and readiness. Battalion Resident Trainer Detachments do not, as a general rule, have a mission to support more than one battalion. In certain circumstances dictated by distance from the battalion headquarters, one or two Resident Trainer Detachment team members may locate with a subordinate company.

**Resident Training Team.** The Resident Training Team is a smaller organization than the Resident Trainer Detachment but with a similar mission. An important difference between the Resident Training Teams and Resident Trainer Detachments is that the Resident Training Teams assist more than one battalion. Resident Training Teams usually assist battalions with specialized or multifunctional missions. The 1200th Quartermaster Battalion, a water purification unit with the Alabama National Guard, is an example of a unit with an assisting Resident Training Team. The Resident Training Team has three Quartermaster officers and three 77W (Water Treatment Specialist) NCOs to assist the 1200th Quartermaster Battalion as well as other water and supply units in the state.

Exercise Divisions, Readiness Training Brigades, service on a reserve Army-level staff and adviser positions with specific units or headquarters are more examples of assistance positions.

## **One of the Possibilities . . .**

My personal experience was two years with the 148th Support Battalion Resident Trainer Detachment in the 48th Infantry Brigade (Separate), Georgia Army National Guard. The 48th is one of the enhanced brigades. The specific position was Senior Quartermaster Trainer. Although duties and responsibilities vary between assisting organizations and units assisted, some experiences from those two years might be helpful to anyone serving in or considering RC duty.

It certainly was a busy two years. During that time, the battalion mobilized for more than 30 days to execute flood relief operations in south Georgia in 1994. After the flood relief mission ended, the unit conducted its two-week annual training period. Command post exercises, logistics field training exercises, staff drills, and other "extra" training events dotted the training schedule. This was in addition to one drill per month of at least two days and the yearly two-week annual training period, all focused on an upcoming National Training Center rotation at Fort Irwin, CA, in May-June 1996.

## **Successful CSS**

Each of these events and operations required detailed planning, intensive preparation, specific training and flexible execution. Assisting with each one formed the heart of the battalion's Resident Trainer Detachment mission: help the support battalion prepare for executing successful CSS operations.

The Senior Quartermaster Trainer's duties included, but were not limited to (1) assisting the commander of the battalion's supply and transport (S&T) company with training assessment and policy, (2) providing the same assistance to the battalion staff, (3) helping plan quality training events for the S&T company sections and the key battalion staff, (4) helping craft training programs for low-density support military occupational specialties (MOSs) such as mortuary affairs, water purification, ammunition handling and food service, (5) coordinating assistance from the active Army's direct training affiliation (DTA) battalion. (In this particular instance, it was the 24th Forward Support Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA), (6) helping identify and coordinate local training area sites in the vicinity of unit hometowns to avoid time consumed by long distance moves to the nearest Army installation to train, and (7) promoting establishment of habitual training/support relationships the support battalion was likely to exercise in wartime.

Following these rules may help if you are now serving in, headed for, or considering RC duty:

- DEVOTE QUALITY TIME TO ANTICIPATING SITUATIONS BEFORE THEY BECOME PROBLEMS. Problems waste time. Use your experience to help the RC see and avoid or plan around them. The RC already has limited training time, less than 40 days per year. It can afford to waste none of its time.
- INTEGRATE SUPPORT UNITS INTO RC TRAINING PLANS, EVENTS AND OPERATIONS. It is surprising the number of units, both AC and RC, that do not routinely exercise wartime support relationships. Make it routine in the unit you assist. These relationships take a long time to develop and refine. Remember, if the unit is mobilized, sufficient time may be lacking to address this critical area. If integration is not happening, recommend ways to get it going and sustain it.
- REMEMBER WHO THE COMMANDER IS AND NEVER FORGET WHO IS NOT THE COMMANDER. All RC units have chains of command that must be respected and supported. If RC soldiers habitually look to you for direct guidance and you are giving it, then something is broken somewhere. Do not expect a favorable situation to develop if you do not support the chain of command as part of your assistance mission. Remember, you will need the RC chain of command's support to be effective.
- KEEP WHO YOU SUPPORT WELL INFORMED. Ensure that the commander and staff you are assisting know the details of assistance work you have underway. Be certain that they approve of the scope, target audience and goal of your assistance projects.
- REMEMBER THAT THE BEST SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM MIGHT NOT BE YOURS. Be prepared to accept the concept that RC soldiers you deal with are just as competent as you think you are. Be content to contribute to overall success instead of making yourself responsible for the whole picture. Your suggestions and recommendations for improvements might not be accepted. However, if they are listened to and considered, that is in and of itself a major assistance landmark.
- KEEP A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR COUNTERPART. My counterpart was the S&T company commander. Dur-

ing my company command, an officer of equal rank looking at all parts of my company operations and giving me observations and advice would have been, at best, awkward for me. Be aware that it might be awkward for your RC counterpart and act accordingly. Build a good two-way communication system and use it. Earn and keep your counterpart's trust. In time, your comments will be eagerly solicited.

- WORK CLOSELY WITH THE ASSISTED UNIT S3. Policy required that the Resident Trainer Detachment work out of the RC battalion headquarters. It made sense to operate out of the same office as the battalion S3. Working next to the full-time trainers in the S3 was a cornerstone of every successful plan and operation.
- DO NOT TRY TO FOOL ANYBODY: THEY WILL FIND OUT. Soldiers in AC/RC assignments are often pleasantly surprised to discover that many RC soldiers are just as competent and motivated as their AC counterparts. Do not give advice and information you are unsure of just to prove you know more than they do. If it turns out be faulty, you can damage your credibility in a business where credibility is everything.
- USE THE WORD "WE" AND MEAN IT WHEN YOU SAY IT. Success of the AC/RC mission is rooted in teamwork and mutual respect. If you operate in the "we versus they" mode, success will come hard, if at all.
- REMEMBER THAT EACH DAY BRINGS THE NEXT WAR 24 HOURS CLOSER. If another conflict similar to the scale of *Desert Shield/Storm* occurs, the wide-scale commitment of major RC units can hardly be avoided. It will happen and it is only a matter of time before it does. See what needs to be done and recommend it. In the same breath, tell the RC unit what you will do to assist.

### **The Challenge**

For me, service with the RC was an extremely challenging and professionally rewarding experience. I would not characterize the duties as easy. Instead, nearly every day brought a new challenge to use my abilities to assist the unit. It is a job where AC to RC Quartermasters can have an enormous positive im-

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pact on a unit's readiness and logistics warfighting capability.

RC duty is an excellent opportunity to exercise your skills and experience. If selected for or receive consideration for RC duty, think it over carefully. To

win the next conflict, the Army needs Quartermasters fluent in RC units and operations. In the next large-scale conflict, the RC will have a significant role. Do you have the skills and experience necessary for helping forge that winning team?

*MAJ Scott T. Glass is the S3 of the 22d Area Support Group, Vicenza, Italy. He formerly was the Senior Quartermaster Trainer with the Resident Trainer Detachment, 48th Infantry Brigade, Fort Stewart, Georgia; Commander, Headquarters and Service Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and also was Battalion S2/3. His other assignments include Maintenance Company Executive Officer and 201st Forward Support Battalion S2/3, 1st Infantry Division; Assistant Plans/Operations Officer, G4, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Saudi Arabia; and Division Support Command S1, 82d Airborne Division. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic and Quartermaster Officer Advanced Courses, the Mortar Platoon Officer's Course, Parachute Rigger and Jumpmaster Schools. He has a bachelor of arts degree in geography from the University of Georgia and a master of arts degree in human resources development from Webster University in Missouri.*

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### **Video Teletraining for the RC**

The US Army Quartermaster Center and School (USAQMC&S) now has a video Teletraining Network (TNET) site at the NCO Academy, Fort Lee, VA. Part of the Army's TNET system, this site will use two-way video and two-way audio to TNET locations throughout the country. This concept provides innovative possibilities for long-distance training, particularly for the US Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. Reserve Component (RC) commanders are encouraged to contact the RC representative at the USAQMC&S to explore ways to use TNET. Contact the Quartermaster Total Force Integration Officer at Fort Lee at DSN 687-3574 or (804) 734-3574.

### **Update of TATSC/RC3 for Annual Training 1996 and 1997**

The update of 92A10 and 92A30 Total Army Training System Courseware (TATSC)/Reserve Component Configured Courseware (RC3) for annual training 1996 is complete. These training materials include Systems Change Package (SCP) 5 to the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS). The update of TATSC/RC3 will be sent to each Reserve Component (RC) school teaching 92A (Automated Logistical Specialist), Phase II, this summer and also to each regional support command. The ULLS training documentation will be distributed on 3.5-inch disk or CD-ROM with a read/print capability. The ULLS-G End User's Manual is now on-line and interactive within the system. The manual is no longer distributed in hard copy, but can be reproduced locally. The

RC schools conducting 92A training will receive the necessary software and hard copy documents based on their 1996 annual training RC3 material requests.

Each RC school should have appropriate computer equipment available for every student at each 92A training site. The ULLS-G training software consists of twenty-five 3.5-inch disks and twenty-one 5.25-inch disks or one CD-ROM. If using the CD-ROM, the training data must be copied to two 3.5-inch disks and twenty-one 5.25-inch disks. Hardware requirements for ULLS will change again for annual training in 1997. For further information, contact MAJ Joseph Lojek at DSN 687-4676 or (804) 734-4676.

### **Important Videos on Small Arms**

Especially important to training Quartermasters in the Reserve Component, the Logistics Training Department now has completed two television videotapes (TVTs) on the organizational maintenance of small arms. These TVTs cover cycle of function, troubleshooting, malfunctions, and a step-by-step disassembly of five weapon systems. Part I (TVT 10-109 PIN 71041 DA) is a 40-minute video on these three weapons: MK-19 40-millimeter (mm) machine gun, 9mm pistol and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). Part II (TVT 10-111 PIN 71059 DA) is a 22-minute video on these two weapons: M16A2 Rifle and the M60 Machine Gun. Check Audiovisual Support Centers for these videotapes. The USAQMC&S also plans a Part III videotape for the M2 50-caliber Machine Gun.



# CAREER NEWS

## **Quartermaster Functional Review**

The 1996 Quartermaster Functional Review (FR) focused on key personnel issues important to the long-term success of the Quartermaster Corps and equally important to the success of a downsized, digitized Army. The Functional Review is a process to identify personnel issues, concerns and initiatives and then to work the issues to resolution. The Quartermaster Functional Review was presented to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) on 22 Feb 96.

Often, as with the current Functional Review, several potential issues were resolved before presentation. Two new issues were added. The only issue dropped from the 1996 Functional Review was the Officer Branch Detail Program because significant downsizing reduced the need for more combat arms lieutenants in the force structure. Two new issues were added: the additional skill identifier (ASI) approval process and the frequency of the Training Requirements Arbitration Panel (TRAP).

Other key issues, initiatives and concerns included military occupational specialty (MOS) 77F (Petroleum Supply Specialist) readiness, accessions and predominant MOS test impact; colonel selection rates; warrant officer accessions; 92G (Subsistence) officer initiative; MOS 92A (Automated Logistical Specialist) training; and Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) attendance.

These are not the only personnel proponency issues of concern to The Quartermaster General, but these are the personnel issues brought to DCSPER's attention for 1996 by the US Army Quartermaster Center and School (USAQMC&S). **Issues** are items that the USAQMC&S requested the DCSPER to work to completion. **Concerns** are items that the USAQMC&S will continue to work, but wanted to bring to the DCSPER's attention. **Initiatives** are items that have been resolved or the USAQMC&S believes will be resolved soon.

✓ **Enlisted MOS 77F (Petroleum Supply Specialist)—Issue:** There are several facets to this issue: the inability of the US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) to access the needed quantity of trainable soldiers, the impact of pregnancy on MOS 77F soldiers, and the increase in accession problems by the failure of a 1989-approved predominant MOS test in Europe and at Fort Hood, TX. This predominant MOS test significantly contributed to an increase in force structure of over 2,000 soldiers during the next 2 years. This increase, coupled with the addition of petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) units into the force structure and the low enlistment bonus for this MOS, have blocked USAREC attempts to fill requirements. Also, the most current JOINS recruiting tape provided USAREC for this MOS is not being distributed to the field. This MOS sells well to female soldiers. However, according to The Surgeon General, pregnant 77F soldiers must be removed from contact with fuel for up to 13 months. Also a problem within this MOS is that most active duty soldiers, when accessed, need additional ASI H7 (HEMTT/5-ton Truck) training at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has not resourced Fort Leonard Wood more than 860 slots per year, while current requirements are for 1,890 additionally trained soldiers.

**Recommendations:** The DCSPER approves an increase in enlistment bonus from \$2,000 to \$8,000. The DCSPER initiates a study that addresses the pregnancy issue for soldiers with MOS 77F. The TRADOC addresses the resource shortfalls for the H7 ASI at Fort Leonard Wood. The USAQMC&S works with USAREC to provide printed media that will help sell this MOS to soldiers.

**FR Results:** The DCSPER directed the Directorate of Military Personnel Management (DMPM) to respond to the comment that guidance counselors either are not using JOINS tapes for recruiting or are using out-of-date JOINS tapes when they do use Quartermaster recruiting tapes. Although there was no commitment to increase the bonus for MOS 77F, the DCSPER seemed open to methods to increase the success of the 77F accession mission. On the pregnancy readiness issue, the DCSPER questioned the representative from the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve on the impact to the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve. All said that the visibility of the impact of pregnancy is lost at the division and sometimes the brigade level. This too wraps into the accession issue, and the Quartermaster personnel proponent will pursue appropriate courses of action with US Army Total Personnel Command (PERSCOM) and USAREC.

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✓ **Quartermaster Colonel Selection Rates—Concern:** Selection for senior service college (SSC) and for colonel—4.2 percent and colonel 32.3 percent—were the second lowest in the Army in 1995. The Quartermaster Corps currently fills 110 joint and Army colonel positions. With a 22-year and 10-month pin-on projection and a 3- to 5-year colonel retention rate, the Quartermaster Corps loses about 18 colonels per year. The 1995 colonel selection board selected only 13 this year, and only 11 were selected for SSC (firm prerequisite for promotion to colonel). The Quartermaster Corps cannot fill projected colonel requirements if this continues. Contributing factors to these poor rates include type of commands (functional versus Functional Area 90) but may also include the model used to compute requirements.

*Recommendation:* The DCSPER reviews the model used by PERSCOM to develop floors for each branch to ensure that established floors are valid based on branch requirements.

**FR Results:** The DCSPER provided a separate and complex written response to this issue just before the FR took place. Colonel selection rates were not addressed in detail at the FR.

✓ **Warrant Officer Accessions—Initiatives:** The Quartermaster Corps has four warrant officer specialties: 920A (Property Accountability), 920B (Supply Systems), 921A (Airdrop), and 992A (Food Service). Both supply systems and food service specialties experience fluctuating or critical strength shortages. Although the Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS) recommended and the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) approved selection for appointment to warrant officer sooner in a soldier's career, experience is generally essential to success in the Quartermaster Corps. Although some warrant officer candidates are accessed at the 6- to 10-year range, the Corps' preference is accession closer to the 12-year ceiling. The Quartermaster General received the DCSPER's approval to extend the window of opportunity from 6-12 years to 6-14 years in shortage specialties. The 14-year accessions are working well and helping to improve the Quartermaster Corps. Three other warrant officer issues also are under evaluation at USAREC. One is establishing local screening boards for Warrant Officer Candidate School, as done currently with Officer Candidate School applicants. The second is the realignment of the USAREC Warrant Officer Selection Board from its current composition that includes only one Quartermaster warrant officer to a makeup that includes some 6 to 8 Quartermaster warrant officers. The Quartermaster Corps will address those concerns separately with USAREC and ask the DCSPER to encourage such a review.

*Recommendations:* The DCSPER continues support of the 6- to 14-year experience window for shortage MOSs. The DCSPER directs USAREC to study current board makeup and screening procedures.

**FR Results:** The DCSPER directed DMPM and USAREC to respond by the Functional Area Assessment on 29 Mar 96 on the feasibility of changes recommended to the accession board process. The Office of the Quartermaster General is working with USAREC on changes to the current board procedures.

✓ **Subsistence Management—Initiative:** Commissioned specialty 92G (Subsistence) will be phased out during FY96 and replaced with commissioned specialty 92A or either warrant officer specialty 922A or 920B. The USAQMC&S goal is providing customers with the best support possible. About 30 positions may be recoded from commissioned to warrant officer.

*Recommendation:* Action as noted.

**FR Results:** Noted by the DCSPER. No action required.

✓ **ASI Approval Process—Concern:** With impending digitization and technology changes that will affect a Force XXI Army, PERSCOM needs a fast ASI approval process to assign and track soldiers with specialized training. The need for this process was apparent when the Quartermaster Corps requested an ASI for a CSA-approved software and hardware system, the Standard Army Retail Supply System-Objective (SARSS-O). Soldiers with SARSS-O experience were making a permanent change of station to Direct Support Unit Standard Supply System/Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply System (DS4/SAILS) locations, and vice versa. Current regulatory procedures do not provide an expedient process for ASI approvals.

*Recommendation:* PERSCOM authorize use of ASI Y1 for New Equipment Trained (NET) personnel.

**FR Results:** The DCSPER directed PERSCOM to report on the ASI approval process with the goal of providing an easier method. This concern moved into a discussion on resourcing and training branch proponent offices. The DCSPER recognized the need for strong branch proponent offices, such as the Office of the Quartermaster General, and the need to develop a training program for them. The DCSPER recommended sending proponent personnel to the Force Integration Course at Fort Belvoir, VA. Also, PERSCOM is looking

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at developing an orientation/training program. As of 19 Mar 96, PERSCOM established a Proponent Integration Division to assist all branch pronencies with their personnel responsibilities.

✓ **Enlisted MOS 92A (Automated Logistical Specialist)—Initiative:** MOS 92A is a compilation of four enlisted MOSs (76C, 76P, 76V and 76X) consolidated in 1993. The consolidation has received a lot of critical attention from commanders in the field and, most recently, from the CSA. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) and the USAQMC&S recently reviewed this MOS at the request of the CSA. As a result of this evaluation, the DCSLOG and USAQMC&S recommended no change to this MOS at this time, thereby allowing the MOS to mature. However, the MOS needs improvements by adding supervisory training at the NCO and officer levels. Also, the MOS needs standardized training packages available to field users and an accelerated Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) tutorial to help bridge the gap in institutional and organizational training. The CSA asked the DCSLOG to evaluate this MOS during field visits and to evaluate how much money the Army spends on contracts for field training of the Prescribed Load List (PLL).

*Recommendation:* Action as noted.

**FR Results:** Noted by the DCSPER. No action requested or required.

✓ **Training Requirements Arbitration Panel (TRAP) Frequency—Concern:** This is a multi-echelon challenge requiring resolution through less frequent TRAP execution. The TRAP is currently adjusted six times per year. This change in structure causes a constant fluctuation in USAREC mission goals and makes it difficult for PERSCOM to be responsive to changes in the training base. The ripple effect causes excessive equipment and personnel turbulence in both PERSCOM and TRADOC. TRADOC schools must constantly adjust to a frequently moving target.

*Recommendation:* The DCSPER reviews the frequency of the TRAP with a goal of limiting them to four times per year versus six times per year.

**FR Results:** The DCSPER directed DMPM to report by the Functional Area Assessment on 29 Mar 96 the number of TRAPs to have per year. The Quartermaster General emphasized that when he had 1,600 soldiers and civilians to train 18,000 students each year, he could absorb fluctuations in input easier than he can now, with only 800 soldiers and civilians to train a mission of 23,000 students each year at the USAQMC&S.

✓ **BNCOC Attendance—Concern:** The number of soldiers programmed to attend BNCOC in two low-density MOSs is a significant concern. Low-density MOSs currently are programmed at the 120 to 130 percent level and have an average show rate of 84 percent for 92G (Food Service Specialist) and 67 percent for 92Y (Unit Supply Specialist). NCO training, particularly low-density training, is equally essential for Quartermaster NCOs and the units they support. PERSCOM manages Quartermaster soldiers going to BNCOC in great detail. PERSCOM's Quartermaster branch initiated PERSGRAM, a publication sent to NCOs enroute to their next unit. PERSGRAM has also been a great initiative to assist in getting Quartermaster soldiers to BNCOC.

*Recommendation:* Continue sending PERSGRAMs to selected soldiers.

**FR Results:** The DCSPER directed PERSCOM to research a change in policy to ensure that ANCO and BNCOC seats remain filled, to consider allowing field commanders to select suitable replacements for nonqualified soldiers.

## **Professional Development**

As the Army continues to draw down, we at the Quartermaster branch, US Army Total Personnel Command (PERSCOM), would like to update Quartermasters about some new changes, developments and trends in the assignment and professional development areas.

### **Promotion List Sequence**

*LTC Jeffrey R. Earley, Quartermaster Officer Assignments Branch Chief*

This is a frequent question: How is a sequence number determined for a promotion list? First, there is no correlation between the order of merit (or score) list and a promotion sequence number. Precedence or relative rank among commissioned officers on the active duty list is based on the following criteria:

- Current grade in which serving on active duty list.
- Current date of rank in which serving on active duty list.

- Date of rank of previous serving grade.
- Total active federal commissioned service.
- Date of appointment as a commissioned officer.
- Date of birth (age).
- Alphabetical listing.

Service academy graduates who are appointed as second lieutenants on their graduation date from the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY, will rank among themselves as second lieutenants in order of class standing. Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates who have the same second lieutenant date of rank as the United States Military Academy graduation date and who are placed on the active duty list will rank as second lieutenants below all service academy graduates with the same date of rank.

### **Married Army Couples Program**

*CPT Samuel L. Russell, Future Readiness Officer*

The Married Army Couples Program (MACP) is a topic of great interest at PERSCOM. Assignments officers always take this program into consideration when reassigning service members. The Army references that deal with MACP are AR 614-30 (Overseas Service), AR 614-100 (Officer Assignment Policies, Details and Transfers) and DA Pamphlet 600-8 (Management and Administrative Procedures). The MACP is designed for service members who desire continuous consideration for joint domicile assignments throughout their military careers. To enroll in the program, both service members must submit a DA Form 4187 through their Personnel Action Center (PAC), with a copy of their marriage certificate or license. (See DA Pamphlet 600-8, procedure 3-32-1 for details.) Once enrolled, married Army couples will be automatically considered for worldwide joint domicile assignments. Thereafter, when one member is being considered for reassignment, the other member will automatically be considered for reassignment to the same location. Assignment instructions will indicate whether or not the joint domicile is approved.

### **NCOs Eligible for Support Operations Course**

Senior Quartermaster NCOs, as well as officers, are eligible for the non-credit Support Operations Course (SOC) of the US Army Logistics Management College (ALMC), Fort Lee, VA. The SOC is taught in two phases. Phase I consists of 40 hours of correspondence work, and Phase II is a two-week resident course or a two-week on-site course.

For Phase I, senior NCO nominees must be graduates of the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC), in the rank of E7 or above. Phase I enrollment is through local education centers, with management by the Army Institute of Professional Development (AIPD), Norfolk, VA. Phase I emphasizes applying the multifunctional combat service support (CSS) battlefield operating system to arm, fix, fuel, move and sustain the soldier and his systems. For further information about SOC Phase I, contact the AIPD at DSN 927-3335.

For Phase II, the prerequisites for senior NCOs are the same as for Phase I, plus the nominees must have completed Phase I by correspondence and must be assigned or anticipate assignment as a support operations NCOIC within one year of course completion. Phase II builds upon Phase I to prepare senior NCOs to organize support functions and manage CSS in a support battalion/squadron during peace and war. Students in Phase II develop logistics plans and conduct scenario-driven support operations. For further information about Phase II, contact CPT Michael Morrow, ALMC, at DSN 539-0248.

### **Enlisted Quartermaster Issues**

*SSG James M. Moore, Professional Development NCO, Career Management Field (CMF) 77*

### **New Telephone System**

A new telephone system has been installed at PERSCOM that allows me to receive up to two calls at one time. Unfortunately, any additional calls will not be recognized by the system until a line is cleared. Please be patient. I will get to your call. For soldiers who still do not know how to contact me, here is my information: phone DSN 221-7394 or (703) 325-7394, FAX to DSN 221-4521 or (703) 325-4521, and E-mail to MOOREJA@PENTAGON-HQDADSS.ARMY.MIL.

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## **Noncommissioned Officer Education System**

### **ANCOC Enrollment**

In the past few months, the Quartermaster branch has received many calls about Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) enrollment. For ANCOC scheduling, soldiers must meet these prerequisites: selected for sergeant first class or selected for ANCOC, plus meet all the prerequisites in AR 351-1, Chapter 5, Section 5, Paragraph 5-20.

The following petroleum and water ANCOC classes are scheduled for FY97:

#### **ANCOC Classes**

<b>Class</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>End</b>	<b>Seats</b>
001	2 Oct 96	8 Jan 97	24
002	8 Jan 97	1 Apr 97	24
003	8 Jan 97	1 Apr 97	24
004	4 Apr 97	25 Jun 97	24
005	4 Apr 97	25 Jun 97	24
006	30 Jun 97	19 Sep 97	25

### **BNCOC Enrollment**

Soldiers requesting to be scheduled for the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) need to refer to AR 351-1, Chapter 5, Section 2, Paragraph 5-14 for the prerequisites. The Quartermaster branch has implemented a change to the grade prerequisites to attend BNCOC. Soldiers now must be a staff sergeant or a sergeant (promotable) to attend BNCOC. This change ensures that only the most eligible and deserving soldiers are scheduled for training.

The following BNCOC classes are scheduled for FY 97:

#### **77F BNCOC**

<b>Class</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>End</b>	<b>Seats</b>
001	4 Oct 96	3 Jan 97	22
002	4 Oct 96	3 Jan 97	23
003	10 Jan 97	27 Mar 97	22
004	2 Apr 97	13 Jun 97	23
005	10 Jun 97	22 Aug 97	23
006	10 Jun 97	22 Aug 97	26

#### **77L BNCOC**

<b>Class</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>End</b>	<b>Seats</b>
001	2 Oct 96	14 Nov 96	5

#### **77W BNCOC**

<b>Class</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>End</b>	<b>Seats</b>
001	31 Jan 97	11 Apr 97	9
002	18 Apr 97	27 Jun 97	9
003	18 Jul 97	26 Sep 97	9

**NOTE:** All classes and seats are subject to change.

## Drill Sergeant Authorizations

A large percentage of NCOs in CMF 77 want to attend Drill Sergeant School. These positions are maintained at 100 percent at all times. If interested in becoming a drill sergeant, submit a formal packet as prescribed in AR 614-200, Section 2, Paragraph 8-17. If there are no vacancies when your packet arrives, I will keep it on file for future considerations.

### CMF 77 Drill Sergeant Breakdown

	Fort Lee	Fort Knox
77F	14 Authorized/14 Assigned	2 Authorized/2 Assigned
77L	1 Authorized/1 Assigned	0 Authorized/0 Assigned
77W	3 Authorized/3 Assigned	0 Authorized/0 Assigned

## Recruiter Authorizations

There are currently 47 authorizations for recruiting in CMF 77. These positions are broken down among the three MOSs in the career field. 77F (Petroleum Supply Specialist) has 39 recruiter positions with only 36 soldiers on active recruiting status. 77L (Petroleum Laboratory Specialist) has two recruiter positions with two soldiers on active recruiting status. 77W (Water Treatment Specialist) has six recruiter positions with only two soldiers on active recruiting status. NOTE: These figures do not reflect soldiers with packets pending and also soldiers with school dates.

## Promotions

**Average Range of Promotion Points to Sergeant:** The following data is a cutoff score analysis, showing the average range of promotion points held by specialists/corporals in CMF 77 as of 1 Mar 96.

77F:	Range of promotion points held							#	Average	Cutoff score average	
	450-	500-	550-	600-	650-	700-	750+	on	points	for the past 12 months	
	499	549	599	649	699	749		list	held	PZ	SZ
	198	175	146	16	1	1	0	537	522	703	729
	Army Average:								549	727	760

77W:	Range of promotion points held							#	Average	Cutoff score average	
	450-	500-	550-	600-	650-	700-	750+	on	points	for the past 12 months	
	499	549	599	649	699	749		list	held	PZ	SZ
	32	46	39	18	7	0	0	142	546	776	784
	Army Average:								549	727	760

77L:	Range of promotion points held							#	Average	Cutoff score average	
	450-	500-	550-	600-	650-	700-	750+	on	points	for the past 12 months	
	499	549	599	649	699	749		list	held	PZ	SZ
	2	6	1	0	0	0	0	9	508	687	743
	Army Average:								549	727	760

**Average Range of Promotion Points to Staff Sergeant:** The following data is a cutoff score analysis, showing the average range of promotion points held by sergeants in CMF 77 as of 1 Mar 96.

77F:	Range of promotion points held						# on list	Average points held	Cutoff score average for the past 12 months		
	450- 499	500- 549	550- 599	600- 649	650- 699	700- 749			750+	PZ	SZ
	0	0	126	156	161	188	15	646	660	761	777
	Army Average:							649	649	763	773

77W:	Range of promotion points held						# on list	Average points held	Cutoff score average for the past 12 months		
	450- 499	500- 549	550- 599	600- 649	650- 699	700- 749			750+	PZ	SZ
	0	0	33	22	25	14	1	95	636	787	788
	Army Average:							649	649	763	773

77L:	Range of promotion points held						# on list	Average points held	Cutoff score average for the past 12 months		
	450- 499	500- 549	550- 599	600- 649	650- 699	700- 749			750+	PZ	SZ
	0	0	1	1	7	1	1	11	671	794	794
	Army Average:							649	649	763	773

LEGEND:  
#—Number    PZ—Primary Zone    SZ—Secondary Zone

### **Senior NCO Promotions Over the Past 12 Months**

77F	77L	77W
2 promotions to SGM	4 promotions to SFC	23 promotions to SFC
26 promotions to MSG		
66 promotions to SFC		

**NOTE:** Promotion data covers April 1995 through March 1996.

## **Joint Rigger Training**

**Ssgt Stephen M. Hampton**

The US Army Quartermaster Center and School (USAQMC&S) has taught parachute rigging at Fort Lee, VA, since 1951. The Airborne and Field Services Department has been tasked to train all branches of the armed forces in preparing many types of airdrop equipment. Before June 1987, the US Air Force had no permanent party personnel assigned to Fort Lee to assist the Army in teaching parachute riggers.

In June 1987, the Army's Quartermaster school and the Air Force's Air Education Training Command at Randolph Air Force Base in San Antonio, TX, agreed upon a small Air Force unit within the Airborne and Field Services Department to give Air Force students rigger training alongside the three other services already at Fort Lee. Once the details were worked out between the Army and Air Force, Operating Location-Alpha (OL-A) 345th Training Squadron was activated on 1 Jul 87.

At the beginning, OL-A was assigned to an Air Force training unit at Sheppard Air Force Base, TX, but in July 1993 was reassigned to the 37th Training Wing, 37th Training Group, 345th Training Squadron, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, TX. The unit received its first four instructors in December 1987. Those instructors spent many long days getting the unit up and running. All administrative help from the Air Force was 1,500 miles away. Personnel in the Airborne and Field Services Department went out of their way to help each Air Force member. The Army community accepted OL-A with open arms. Quickly, each Air Force instructor attended Army instructor qualification courses and then began to teach.

In August 1993, the OL began receiving four new instructors. These were the first new Air Force instructors since the establishment of the unit. Working with Army, Navy and Marine instructors is a unique experience. Because much of what goes on in the military is in a joint environment, the chance to spend three years with all three branches of the service in one location is a very good career move for anyone. More and more of the daily operations of each branch are being consolidated. The Army is the Department of Defense component of parachute rigger training, so it made sense to host instructors from each branch of the service at Fort Lee.

In the nine years since the OL-A 345th Training Squadron was established at Fort Lee, members of the OL have their families living and working at Fort Lee. The Air Force still sends many Air Transportation Specialists and Aircraft Loadmasters to train at the Quartermaster school. Branches of the service have benefited from one another. Different ideas and techniques have been incorporated into training soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines to be parachute riggers.

*Ssgt Stephen M. Hampton is a Technical Training Instructor assigned to the 345th Training Squadron, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, Operating Location-Alpha, Fort Lee, Virginia. He is a graduate of the Air Transportation Specialist Course, Airlift of Hazardous Material Course, Fabrication of Aerial Delivery Loads Course, Army Instructor Training Course, Air Force Principles of Instruction Course, and the Air Force Airman Leadership School. He holds an associate's degree from the Community College of the Air Force, Saint Leo College, and a bachelor of arts degree from Saint Leo College. Before coming to Fort Lee, he was a Mobility Instructor and an Air Transportation Specialist assigned to the 27th Fighter Wing, Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, and the 139th Aerial Port Flight of the Missouri Air National Guard.*

## **Slingload Inspector Certification**

The Department of Defense recently designated the USAQMC&S the proponent for External Aerial Transport (Slingload). After extensive research, the Airborne and Field Services Department, the new proponent agency, is establishing a Slingload Inspector Certification Course. This course, along with the Infantry School's Air Assault and Pathfinder Courses, will train a noncommissioned officer (NCO) or officer to perform final inspection for any slingload cargo or equipment configuration and certify NCOs and officers to instruct unit personnel in slingload operations. The course is designed to standardize slingload training and operations, reassure commanders and air crews of the positive control of slingload operations, and enhance ground crew and aviation safety. The one-week Slingload Inspector Certification Course will be taught at Fort Lee, VA, for personnel unable to attend the Air Assault or Pathfinder Courses.

## **SARSS-O Management Training**

Officers attending the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course began training in the management of

the Standard Army Retail Supply System-Objective (SARSS-O) on 13 Feb 96. These officers receive 20 hours of training in SARSS-1 (direct support unit supply operations) and 12 hours of training in SARSS-2A (division, brigade and Armored Cavalry regiment supply operations). Instructors are senior warrant officers assigned to the Logistics Training Department with practical field experience on these systems.

### **New 92Y10 Training**

The new computer disk-read only memory (CD-ROM) Army Log System is now being trained to 92Y10 (Unit Supply Specialist at Level 10) students at the USAQMC&S. The Army Log System is the replacement for the microfiche and the microfiche readers that access the Army Master Data File (AMDF). This training started with Class 96-012, which graduated 26 Jan 96. The program of instruction includes 3.5 hours of demonstration and 4 hours of actual hands-on training using a computer system with a CD-ROM reader. After the CD-ROM Army Log training, the soldiers should be able to successfully perform the following tasks:

- ◆ Retrieve items from the data files and cross-reference items to different line item numbers (LINs), national item identification numbers (NIINs), and related national stock number/multiple class nomenclature (NSN/MCN).
- ◆ Use function keys to find the line definitions of the data elements and their values.
- ◆ Identify items that have substitute, new or deleted line numbers.
- ◆ Select and produce output of selected data elements instead of viewing the entire record.
- ◆ Produce a user manual for the Army Log System.
- ◆ Cross reference NIIN to national stock number.
- ◆ Locate and select item records within the AMDF.
- ◆ Perform cross-reference by single query list selection and multiple query list selection within the cross-reference data file.
- ◆ Perform cross-reference research among the following files: commercial and government entry code (CAGEC), NIIN, and nomenclature reference number.

### **92G Soldierization**

The 266th Quartermaster Battalion at Fort Lee, VA, is solely responsible for the soldierization of all the Army's Food Service Specialists. The demanding training requires the soldier to maintain focus on both technical military occupational specialty train-

ing and general military training. Physical fitness training is conducted six days a week with muscle failure and aerobic exercises, with running events, on alternating days. Each soldier must obtain at least 180 points on the End of Course Army Physical Fitness Test. However, the goal is to achieve 220 points, which is consistently achieved by each of the three Quartermaster companies responsible for the 92G training. This is no small achievement because many soldiers are only able to meet the Basic Combat Training (BCT) standard of 150 points approved by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) when the soldiers arrive at Fort Lee. Also, each soldier participates in a battalion 4-mile run (within 36 minutes) and several company 4-mile runs. Special Population Physical Fitness Training is also conducted six days a week for soldiers who have physical fitness deficiencies or who are recovering from a profile. Each company conducts a monthly 10-mile road march and provides opportunities for adventure training such as rappelling and the obstacle course. The soldiers also receive reinforcement of common training tasks taught in BCT, as well as many other general military subjects.

The highlight of advanced individual training (AIT) is participating in a multi-echelon field training exercise called Log Warrior. Food Service Specialists, guided by their instructors, feed three companies in a truly demanding tactical environment. They provide their own security, operate all food service equipment and learn field craft. They also participate in tactical lane training led by their assigned squad leader from the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. All participants are outfitted in Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) equipment, which is another highlight of their training at Fort Lee. All this, plus the state-of-the-art technical training conducted by the instructors of the Army Center of Excellence, Subsistence, completes their preparation to take their place in the ranks of Food Service Specialists throughout the Army. Other soldiers attending different AIT courses at Fort Lee receive similar physical training challenges and must meet the TRADOC standard of 180 on the Army Physical Fitness Test before leaving Fort Lee. Exceptions are soldiers with physical profiles.

### **Clothing and Individual Equipment Improvements**

The USAQMC&S assumed proponentcy for Clothing and Individual Equipment (CIE) in March 1993 for the following items: Army Green Service Uniforms (Class A/B) and accessories, Women's Dress Uni-

forms, General Officer Uniforms, Maternity Uniforms and Cooks' White Uniforms. The point of contact for CIE issues is CPT Jeff Mariano at DSN 687-0571 (FAX 0574), (804) 734-0571 (FAX 0574) or E-mail to marianoj@lee-dns1.army.mil. The following CIE initiatives are complete or are in progress:

**Woman's Oxford Shoe\*** This was a standardization effort between the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to replace the existing black oxford shoe. This shoe will be available about June 1996 at the Military Clothing Sales Store.

**Woman's Belt and Buckle\*** Adopted after favorable acceptance by test participants, this is now a clothing bag item that is standardized between the Army, Air Force and Navy. It will be available at the end of 1996.

**Woman's Slacks\*** A new and improved design was adopted to replace the existing slacks in the clothing bag. Changes in design features include a two-piece waistband with center back seam and 2 1/4-inch outlet for alterations; added belt loops; narrower legs; Department of Defense sizing system (waist/hip measurements in conventional 8, 10, 12 sizing); gripper strip on waistband; and outlet in the thigh and crotch area for alterations. The estimated date of issue is October 1996 (FY97).

**Woman's Overblouse** This is an optional purchase item. The new overblouse design offers flexibility for tuck-in or over-the-skirt appearance, front straight princess seams for alterations, three-piece back, two-button cuffs for accommodating sleeve lengths, larger armholes, and a wider chest area.

**Woman's Shirt, Long/Short Sleeves\*** New features include a tuck-in design, front straight princess seams for alterations, one-piece back, two-button cuffs for accommodating sleeve lengths, DOD sizing system, one collar design, larger armholes, and a wider chest area. The estimated issue in the clothing bag is FY97.

**Woman's Neck Tab\*** This item is standardized between the Army and Marine Corps. A replacement for the old neck tab, it will be available in the Military Clothing Sales Store in January 1996.

**Maternity Program** This standardization between the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps resulted in the adoption of a tunic, skirt, long/short sleeve shirts, and slacks. A fully elasticized waistband in the skirt and slacks received overwhelming acceptance by test participants in their third trimesters of pregnancy. This ensemble will be available in June 1996.

**Optional Purchase Army Green Service Uniform (AG 491)** An initiative to change the fab-

ric for the optional purchase AG 491 has been staffed worldwide. A need was identified to enhance the comfort, form, fit, function and durability of the existing AG 491 uniform. Prototype testing will begin in 3d/4th Quarter 1996. The two possible fabrics consist of a 75 percent polyester 25 percent wool blend and a newer 100 percent polyester fabric. No fabric will be selected if preset criteria are not achieved.

**\*Issue item for clothing bag.**

### ***Petroleum Field Manual Consolidation***

FM 10-70 (Inspecting and Testing Petroleum Products), dated 9 May 83, and FM 10-72 (Petroleum Surveillance: Laboratories and Kits), dated 11 Aug 86, will be consolidated into FM 10-67-2 (Petroleum Laboratory Testing and Equipment). FM 10-67-2 will give the Petroleum Laboratory Specialist an overview of responsibilities within the developed and undeveloped theaters. Some specific areas of interest will be environmental issues, new laboratories and test kits, and updated petroleum and petroleum-related products. FM 10-67-2 is scheduled for final print in 1st Quarter, FY97.

### ***Water Purification Equipment***

The 1,500-gallon per hour (GPH) Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) is a modified nondevelopmental program with the US Marine Corps that will replace the existing 600-GPH ROWPU in the Department of Defense inventory. The new ROWPU will be designed for skid, trailer or truck-mounted operation and will overcome many of the design shortfalls evident with the 600-GPH ROWPU. Specific development requirements include operating during cold weather, purifying coastal sea waters with high levels of total dissolved solids (up to 45,000 parts per million), and using corrosion-resistant materials. The total Army requirement is 160 systems. Each 1,500-GPH ROWPU will replace two 600-GPH ROWPUs in the division and will reduce the number of personnel required to operate a division's water point from four to three.

The materiel developer is the Tank Automotive Command Research Development Engineering Center-Mobility Technology Center, Fort Belvoir, VA. Prototype testing will begin during FY98/99. Equipping the first Army unit is scheduled for FY01/02.

### ***ROWPU Pressure Simulators***

A common problem identified by Active and Reserve Component units during field training is difficulty in obtaining environmental permits to discharge wastewater, brine water and treated wa-

ter to the original water source. Discharge permits often require a long lead time for state and local authority approval. In many cases, units cannot discharge waste, brine and treated water to the original source and must line-haul these waters back to the host installation for discharge into the installation's wastewater treatment plant. This can be costly in terms of manpower, time and use of limited transportation assets.

Membrane pressure simulators are available for training with the 600-GPH ROWPU. Pressure simulators can be useful because they allow units to operate ROWPUs without using costly reverse osmosis elements and also may eliminate the need for environmental discharge permits to water sources. However, treated water for consumption during field training exercises must be obtained from installation water points. Pressure simulators enhance training by allowing soldiers to operate their equipment at realistic pressure gauge readings. Also, pressure simulators can eliminate the requirement for line-hauling waste, brine or treated water back to the installation for disposal if water treatment chemicals are not used during ROWPU training.

These membrane pressure simulators are training aids that are not listed in 600-GPH ROWPU technical manuals. Two simulators (inlet and outlet) are required for each reverse osmosis membrane vessel. Plans are underway to obtain national stock numbers for pressure simulators used with the 3,000-GPH ROWPU. Simulators for the 600-GPH ROWPU will be available in the Army Supply System in May 1996.

Inlet end, 4610-01-408-2390, P/N (97403) 13229E0159, cost \$4.89.

Outlet end, 4610-01-408-0690, P/N (97403) 13229E0160, cost \$11.43.

Questions about installation and operating procedures are available from the Tank-Automotive Research Development Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, VA. Contact Martha Newman at DSN 654-1843.

### **Automatic Ripcord Release (AR2)**

The AR2 is the new replacement for the FF2 automatic ripcord release used with the MC-4 military free-fall system. The AR2 is a nondevelopmental item that capitalizes on the cooperation between the engineers at Natick Research and Development Center, Natick, MA, and private industry. The AR2 provides several additional features. Along with the

automatic opening at a specific predetermined altitude, it also has a rate-of-fall sensing chamber which will prevent the device from activating when the jumper is under full canopy. The current FF2 system activates even after the jumper is under full canopy, resulting in greater wear on the system, more maintenance and fewer actual jump activations. The new AR2 will only activate if the jumper fails to deploy the main parachute at the minimum required altitude. Another feature of the AR2 is its ability to be attached either to the main parachute or to the reserve parachute. The FF2 is used only with the main. The AR2 is almost maintenance-free and provides more actual jumps before requiring service.

### **Improved Reserve Parachute**

The reliability of the Troop Chest Reserve parachute has been improved with an Improved Reserve Parachute System (IRPS) modification. The modification added a spring-loaded deployed pilot parachute attached to a 13-foot bridle sling. Attached to the bridle line are two curved pins that are inserted into two soft loops to retain the canopy within the pack until deployment of the pilot parachute. This action provides for a more positive reserve deployment and inflation. The improved reserve also standardizes emergency procedures to a "single pull" activation. The spring-loaded device increases reliability to 95 percent with an added benefit of a 3.4-second faster opening. Currently, the Airborne and Field Services Department, USAQMC&S, has deployed New Equipment Training Teams to Fort Benning, GA, and Fort Bragg, NC, to qualify personnel on the new parachute. Training to new 92R (Parachute Rigger) advanced individual training students at the rigger school began in March 1996. These students are receiving training on both the standard T-10 reserve and new IRPS until all parachutes have been modified worldwide.

### **21st Century Classrooms**

The USAQMC&S is redesigning many of its classrooms to meet with the instructional needs of the 21st Century. This project, called "Classroom XXI" by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, will bring digitized presentation material such as lesson plans and charts to the soldier with both sight and sound (multimedia technology) to get the message to the student.

All classrooms will have a multimedia instructor station attached to a video presentation device. These components allow the instructor to present the old viewgraphs directly out of a PowerPoint presen-

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tation onto a screen as large as 300 inches diagonally. In addition, the instructor can cue up appropriate video tapes right into the presentation. High-level classrooms will have computers on each student's desktop and connection to the Internet. This allows access to the vast resources already digitized by the Army. Technical support centers, located throughout the Army, will store technical manuals, field manuals, Army regulations, programs of instruction and many other resources to allow not only the instructor, but the student to access the latest updated information.

The highest levels of Classroom XXI will incorporate two-way audio/video instruction. This allows a Quartermaster instructor at Fort Lee, with the aid of a facilitator at the receiving unit, to instruct a class that also includes a corps support command, division support command or a US Army Reserve unit. Students arriving for the Basic and Advanced and Noncommissioned Officer Courses, Basic Officer Course, Combined Logistics Officer Course, and Warrant Officer Basic and Advanced Courses will see this technology phased in, starting in June 1996.

### **Joint Mortuary Affairs NCO Course**

The Mortuary Affairs Center is developing a Joint Mortuary Affairs NCO Course for fielding in March 1997. This course is designed to provide NCOs with the education to work at higher-level staff positions in mortuary affairs. This two-week course for NCOs in all services will closely parallel the Mortuary Affairs Officer Course.

### **Mortuary Affairs Officer Course**

The Mortuary Affairs Officer Course will be offered 15–26 April and 21 October–1 November 1996. This course is specifically designed for officers working in mortuary affairs or anticipating an assignment in this field. It covers duties from platoon leader through assignments in various joint staffs. It is an excellent course for staff action officers involved in the planning for mortuary affairs. Recent experiences in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia have shown there is a real need for mortuary affairs staff planners. The two-week course awards the additional skill identifier 4V.

### **Division Redesign**

Division Redesign is a concept to develop a division that will take the Army into the 21st Century. The US Army Combined Arms Support Command (USACASCOM) is responsible for developing the concept of support to include the logistics support struc-

ture. The redesign focuses on the consolidation of combat service support assets (personnel and equipment) of the Mechanized, Armored and Aviation brigades into the division support command (DISCOM). The concept of support allows one day of supply within the division and a heavy reliance of throughput from corps. The DISCOM can remain as mobile as the division it is supporting.

The test bed for this Division Redesign is Task Force XXI, which is the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, TX. The 4th Infantry Division will outfit and test this concept in various stages over the next two years. Currently, USACASCOM is ensuring that adequate Quartermaster personnel and equipment are identified to support the force in the 21st Century.

### **Hot Refueling Training**

The Petroleum and Water Department is working on several initiatives to provide additional hot aircraft refueling training to the military occupational specialty 77F (Petroleum Supply Specialist) course. Currently, only cold aircraft refueling training is provided. Starting in April 1996, new petroleum soldiers will receive an additional 4 hours of training in basic hot refueling operations and 11 hours of training on the HEMTT Tactical Aircraft Refueling System (HTARS). The USAQMC&S also is exploring ways to overcome the costs and the safety and environmental risks associated with actual hot refueling training using live aircraft and fuel. One option is to modify some of the existing airframes in the training facility to simulate real world conditions. Submit recommendations from the field to CPT Vince A. Morikawa, Chief, Basic Petroleum Logistics Division, at DSN 687-2706.

### **Glass Pipeline Back in Operation**

The Petroleum and Water Department's famous "Glass Pipeline" will be back in operation by early Spring 1996. A department-wide effort completely overhauled the glass pipeline before reinstallation in the department's new building. The glass pipeline is a large-scale working model of a multiproduct petroleum pipeline that includes pumps, storage tanks, valves and lights. The system uses a combination of clear and colored water to simulate different petroleum products being shipped through a multiproduct petroleum pipeline into and out of petroleum storage terminals. The colored water enables the students to see how the products and their interfaces are managed to reduce commingling and contamination.

# Directory – Points of Contact

## U.S. Army Quartermaster Center and School

Fort Lee DSN prefixes: 687-xxxx or 539-xxxx  
Commercial prefixes: (804) 734-xxxx or (804) 765-xxxx

<b>The Quartermaster General</b> MG Robert K. Guest	(ATSM-CG) 734-3458	<b>Director of Instruction</b> Dr. William L. Kelley	(ATSM-DOI) 734-3215
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<b>Command Sergeant Major</b> CSM Ricky A. Vernon	(ATSM-CSM) 734-3248	<b>Army Center of Excellence, Subsistence</b>	(ATSM-CES) 734-3007
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
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*A 24th Quartermaster Company supply convoy moves to the front on Mindanao, Philippine Islands, June 1945.*



## ***24th Support Battalion***

*Constituted 17 March 1921 in the Regular Army as the Hawaiian Division Train, Quartermaster Corps.*

*Organized 3 May 1921 at Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii.*

*Redesignated 23 March 1925 as the Hawaiian Division Quartermaster Train.*

*Inactivated 31 May 1931 in the Territory of Hawaii.*

*Redesignated 1 May 1936 as the 11th Quartermaster Regiment and activated at Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii.*

*Redesignated 1 September 1942 as the 11th Quartermaster Battalion.*

*Reorganized and redesignated 1 November 1942 (less Ordnance Maintenance Platoon, separate lineage) as the 24th Quartermaster Company, 24th Infantry Division.*

*Reorganized and redesignated 1 December 1943 as the 24th Quartermaster Company.*

*Reorganized and redesignated 21 January 1963 as the 24th Supply and Transport Battalion (organic elements concurrently constituted and activated).*

*Inactivated 15 April 1970 at Fort Riley, Kansas.*

*Redesignated 21 January 1975 as the 24th Support Battalion and activated at Fort Stewart, Georgia.*

*Reorganized and redesignated 21 September 1975 as the 24th Supply and Transport Battalion.*

*Inactivated 15 September 1985 at Fort Stewart, Georgia.*

*Redesignated 1 May 1987 as the 24th Support Battalion and activated at Fort Stewart, Georgia.*

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