



Quartermaster

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN
AUTUMN 2004
PB 10-04-3
WARRIOR LOGISTICIANS



*Logistics determines
the operational limits
of the campaign.*

See Page 2.




From The Quartermaster General

I hope this note finds you all healthy and enjoying life! I am so happy to return to the Home of the Quartermaster Corps from sunny Iraq.

I would like to thank all of you Quartermasters for such a warm welcome home. I am still shaking out the sand from my gear. I really look forward to settling down and applying lessons learned to our training strategy - the crucial training the Army has charged us to administer to the world's finest Soldiers.

Our Quartermaster warriors in Iraq are plying their trade in hard places. They are "Supporting Victory" against a determined and adaptive enemy. Quartermaster Soldiers that I saw in action on the battlefield were true Warrior Logisticians. They are a big force multiplier in Iraq. I saw heavy lifting, loading, planning, coordinating, transporting, and let us not forget the guard duties and patrols. Even under these tough conditions, Quartermaster Soldiers were motivated and proactive. The Mortuary Affairs Specialists (92M) are as busy as they have ever been, unfortunately. They are taking on the inevitable and somber task of caring for our fallen comrades. The Parachute Riggers (92R) are breaking new ground in the area of precision airdrop. The Laundry and Textile Specialists (92S) continue to be favorites in the brutally dusty climate. Showers are in great demand always. The Water Treatment Specialists (92W) are purifying water at high and sustained rates. The Unit Supply Specialists (92Y) are dedicated to keeping their respective units fit and ready. The Petroleum Supply Specialists (92F) are "in the fight" across the battlespace. We all know the job of the



Brigadier General Scott G. West

Food Service Specialists (92G), seven days a week, day-in and day-out staying motivated and putting forth every effort to help maintain the high level of morale in their units. The Petroleum Laboratory Specialists (92L) are doing their part to make sure that Class III (petroleum, oils and lubricants) products are meeting specifications for the high mileage and hours on vehicles necessary to US forces in Iraq. Our Soldiers remain vigilant and dedicated to "Supporting Victory." I refer you to my article, "Supporting Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom," in this edition of the *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* for further details on my mission in Iraq.

Congratulations to the winners of the Chief of Staff, Army, Supply Excellence Award Program. Unit personnel put forth their best efforts and utilized every ounce of knowledge and talents to be the best in their categories of supply. It was truly a tough competition. I salute all of the units and individuals who competed in this year's competition. Their individual and collective efforts caused their units to be even more battle ready and mission capable. They symbolize "the best of the best," thereby benefiting their units and ultimately, the Army.

I would like to farewell two truly outstanding Warrior Logisticians. COL William A. "Bill" Jenks took the helm of the US Army Quartermaster Center and School during my deployment to Iraq and did an outstanding job. He kept the schoolhouse focused on training our Soldiers by instilling in them a "Warrior First" mentality and restructuring our Logistics

(Continued on Page 7)

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PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

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The Quartermaster General

Brigadier General Scott G. West

Editor-in-Chief

COL Gary R. Grimes

Editor

Linda B. Kines

Electronic Printing and Design Specialist

Martha B. Guzman

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PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:


JOEL B. HUDSON

Administrative Assistant to the
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OUTSIDE FRONT COVER: The quotation about the current global war on terrorism is referencing an article in this edition by BG Scott G. West, the 48th Quartermaster General who was deployed in support of *Operation Iraqi Freedom* from July 2003 to July 2004. He describes some lessons he learned about supporting combat operations in the contemporary operating environment.

INSIDE BACK COVER: The full pages on battalion-size units that Keith K. Fukumitsu, Quartermaster, has researched and illustrated for each edition since 1991 are archived on the Quartermaster Home Page under Professional Bulletin, Quartermaster Unit Lineages, at www.quartermaster.army.mil.



Quartermaster Commentary

Supporting Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Brigadier General Scott G. West, The Quartermaster General

On 10 Jul 03, I was alerted to deploy to Iraq to serve as the Director for Logistics, C4 for Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7) for a period of 179 days, with a possible extension. I arrived at Camp Victory in Baghdad on July 23 by way of Kuwait. Within 90 days of my arrival, it became somewhat obvious that this was going to become a one-year tour. What I intend to capture in this article is a short description of the combined joint task force's mission, my role as the warfighters' logistics staff officer and the lessons I have learned about supporting combat operations in the contemporary operating environment.



My job was to plan, coordinate and provide staff supervision for logistics support of a joint and combined warfighting formation of about 150,000 personnel, six divisions (including two multinational divisions), numerous nondivisional units and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) during *Operation Iraqi Freedom*. The CPA was the agency responsible for governing Iraq in the wake of the change in regime following the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist government. In short, my role was to be the staff lead for CJTF-7 to help establish logistics at the operational level of war.

Sustaining the Campaign

Sustaining the campaign, a nebulous concept called Logistics in the Operational Art, is characterized by uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Sustaining the campaign requires the staff to function at three levels, simultaneously. Staff functions include building the linkages between the combat formations fighting

at the tactical level, the theater support units at the operational level and the national providers at the strategic level. Success relies on acquiring and maintaining the agility to meet the materiel requirements of the day by planning 90 to 180 days in advance of the tactical fight.

Looking back, I found my experiences in Nicaragua providing disaster relief to Hurricane Mitch victims in 1998 and my following tour with the Joint Staff invaluable in preparing me for deployment to Iraq. Nicaragua proved an enormous intellectual exercise in bridging the gap between the agencies at the strategic level and the units at the tactical level. Though US forces operated in a much more permissive environment than Iraq in Southwest Asia, the problem of supporting efforts across a wide expanse of Central American jungle and mountains a long way from the US simply cannot be duplicated in training. My time on the Joint Staff taught me about the Army responsibilities of Title 10, US Code, and more about the various logistics agencies and how they operate and interface with the military services. At the time, many complained that stability and

support operations (SASO) diverted focus and resources from the primary “warfighting” mission. For better or worse, my SASO experience made me a much more capable logistician.


I sought the counsel of several smart logisticians with recent experience in Iraq. Interestingly, while all agreed that distribution of commodities in Iraq would prove problematic, some viewed logistics as rapidly approaching routine in 2003. They emphasized the push to bring contracted logistics on line, open up additional air transportation nodes, reduce or adjust the logistics footprint, and improve supply distribution throughout the theater.

I expected an increasingly safe or permissive SASO, with an emphasis on consolidating and reducing the logistics footprint in theater. I suspected that my biggest challenges would be in the areas of distribution and base camp development, with heavy participation by government contractors. I figured that it would not take more than about six months to get to “steady-state” logistics.

The Operational Environment

How far wrong could this Quartermaster have been? The operating environment was not permissive. It was absolutely nonpermissive. The battle space in Iraq compares in size to the state of California. Let me shift gears and tell you about the operational environment. Suffice to say, Iraq has it all. Iraq is a large country with porous borders, a harsh climate and poor infrastructure. Combat and security operations are attended by long, unsecured lines of communication, an asymmetric threat and complex urban terrain. From a historical perspective, it is further from the ports in Kuwait in the south to Mosul, Iraq, in the north than from the beaches of Normandy to Berlin. In World War II, we owned the lines of communication up to the last tactical mile. In *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, the last tactical mile runs the length and breadth of the country.

Logistics must be fought as combat operations in order to negotiate the operational distances and to defeat an adaptive and determined enemy that targets sustainment convoys. As a result in my opinion, logisticians are at greater risk on this Iraqi battlefield than are combat forces. As an example, one day in



mid-April, we put 122 convoys on the road throughout the battle space. Of the 122 convoys, 122 of them were shot up by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), small arms fire and mortars: **100 percent of our convoys were engaged in mortal combat.** Every day we had “green” and “white” convoys on the road. Green are military and white are commercial. The enemy focuses on the white convoys for a greater effect, both militarily and in terms of non-lethal results such as valuable operational information. In addition to targeting convoys, the enemy routinely hits logistics bases with indirect fire and vehicle-borne IEDs.

On any given day, coalition forces have 130 to 140 convoys on the road in Iraq. This represents about 1,800 to 2,200 trucks and 4,000 personnel engaged in convoy operations, including the force protection requirements. These convoys are moving rations, water, fuel, repair parts, ammunition, construction materiel and medical supplies to forces engaged in urban combat operations and security operations in a battle space the size of the state of California.

Operational Logistics

The very essence of operational logistics is to bridge gaps. There are time gaps, distance gaps, gaps in battle rhythm and gaps in agility. A certain tyranny exists on this battlefield of Iraq that engages logisticians from the tactical to the strategic level. “Stuff” is consumed at the tactical end at an alarming rate. Watching the Marines fighting in cities such as Fallujah, for example, you will see empty cartridges spitting out of their weapons at a rate that appears faster than we can manufacture ammunition at the strategic level or faster than we can transport it at the operational level. The operational logistician must

plan and coordinate to bridge that gap. We cannot allow those Marines to run dry on ammunition.

Operating in Three Time Zones

Therefore, we find ourselves operating in three time zones. At the tactical level in the most immediate time zone, real fighters are consuming real materiel in real time; and the logistics status changes in minutes and hours. Logisticians operate in a second time zone where lift requirements, distance and conditions of the battlefield and availability of materiel require days and weeks to get the right stuff to the right place. The third time zone has administrative and production lead times of months and years required for matching operational appetite with industrial strength.

Speaking of operational appetite, I want to share with you a couple of vignettes that attest to the responsiveness of the US military-industrial complex to the operational needs of warfighters. Today in Iraq, our forces have been fielded almost 9,000 armor ballistic kits that protect high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) against small arms fire and IEDs. In October 2003, this HMMWV protection was only a concept and a drawing. We went from nothing to 9,000 armor ballistic kits in 10 months. In the area of precision aerial delivery, we completed the third of three very successful resupply operations using the Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System (JPADS) in July 2004. The time between issuing the operational needs statement and having the materiel solution on the ground, or in the air in the JPADS case, was 75 days. These are phenomenal responses to critical, battlefield sustainment needs.

Sustaining the Force

Early in *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, it became apparent that perhaps the most broken and contentious logistics function on this battlefield was feeding the troops. This was a clear-cut case of “haves and have nots.” About 30,000 personnel were being fed by contract dining facilities (DFAC) under the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program. The others were eating commercial, operational rations provided under local contracts. Whatever the case, field feeding was broken and represented a serious force protection challenge. This became a top priority for the staff of CJTF-7. Coupled with the feeding problem was the provisioning of bottled water and a cooling capability

for the water. Soldiers will not and should not drink hot water. In the 130-degree heat of an Iraqi summer, cooling water was an imperative.

For about 90 days, the logistics staff focused on how rations were ordered and tracked through the theater distribution system. Personnel in the CJTF-7 Food Service Section rode on ration convoys from Kuwait to Mosul and Al Asad, the northern and western distribution hubs, to determine where the problem areas were and what actions we needed to take. We needed to reduce or eliminate delays that resulted from double handling, lost convoys, broken refrigeration units and “frustrated” cargo. The concept of putting “eyes on” the troubled spots led us to a natural solution. We fixed ownership of the various segments of the distribution system, established acceptable standards for rations in transit, improved In-transit Visibility (ITV) and reported on the food distribution system’s behavior and performance. By November 2003 the CJTF-7 ration distribution program was on track.

Protecting the Force

The other top priority was fielding of force protection equipment, particularly Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), the combination of Outer Tactical Vests (OTV) and Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). The IBA for individual Soldiers proved an absolute winner on the battlefield, early on. It was saving lives in the summer of 2003 (and continues to save lives today), but we were woefully short throughout the battle space. In late summer, we were determining requirements. Thanks to the great cooperation of the Army Materiel Command and the Headquarters, Department of the Army G8 (Resource Management), we took action to equip every member of CJTF-7 by the end of January 2004. Our national providers led the effort to increase production in the US industrial base to speed delivery of more than 100,000 sets of IBA to forces in combat in less than five months.

Fueling the force, for the most part, was on “autopilot” from the summer of 2003 until the spring of 2004. Fuel deliveries transferred from military convoys to commercial convoys in the September-October 2003 timeframe. There were only minor challenges in this commodity area until the spring of

2004. As a result, the fuel function captured little time for CJTF-7. However, in early April convoys came under complex attacks aimed at cutting lines of communications, isolating the forces fighting in the central portion of the country (including Baghdad) and focusing on the commercial convoys in an effort to interdict the flow of sustainment. On the morning of April 9, we woke up to the realization that the main supply routes between Kuwait and Baghdad were “raining bridges.” We experienced a period of about five days when our distribution system for all commodities ground to a halt. Through close coordination with Engineers to rebuild or repair the bridges and the application of heavy force protection for convoys, we were able to get the routes reopened. Critical materiel was flowing again by April 15. We had replenished the entire shortfall in materiel by May 7 and had increased stocks to an all-time high. It must be noted that the logisticians of CJTF-7, divisional and nondivisional, and those of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) applied brute force and absolute heroics in order to accomplish this monumental feat. *Nothing failed due to logistics.*

Deployment, Employment, Sustainment and Redeployment

I will digress for a moment to tell you about an operational endeavor that set a high-water mark for the US Army and joint warfighting forces. From mid-January through mid-April 2004, CJTF-7 and CFLCC combined to execute perhaps the largest and most complex military maneuver in the history of modern warfare. The challenge was to “swap out” the forces of *Operation Iraqi Freedom I* with the forces for *Operation Iraqi Freedom II* during this 90-day period. This involved the deployment and redeployment of 260,000 personnel and more than 50,000 pieces of equipment north to south and south to north, without reducing the operating tempo or combat readiness. In short, this was the simultaneous deployment, redeployment, employment and sustainment of all US and coalition forces. This operation was planned, rehearsed and executed very rapidly and, by all measures, was a huge success. It was not without glitches - big glitches - but, in the final analysis, success was attained by planning at all levels and the heroic applica-

tion of technical expertise and leadership by all involved. Keys to success were multiechelon planning, early identification of critical processes and process owners, and monthly operational rehearsals sponsored by CFLCC.

Contractor Logistics Support

At the risk of sounding sarcastic or irreverent, allow me to say that whoever first had the idea of replacing the military logistics capability with a commercial-contracted application has not been to Iraq. It is difficult to explain the magnitude of the perils associated with this concept on such a battlefield. Negotiating the long competitive lines of communication and facing an asymmetric threat in hostile urban terrain are inherently military functions. This battlefield is the domain of *warriors*, not business personnel.

Having said that, contractor logistics support (CLS) is a fact of life. Contract personnel will be with the US military out of necessity, so the challenge is to determine how to keep them alive and “in the fight.” CJTF-7 encountered significant shortfalls in CLS. Shortfalls included some contractors’ inability to hire, train, deploy, employ, support, protect and retain



the quantity of personnel with the requisite technical skills to perform the functions we were paying them to do - many of which the US military can no longer perform because we traded off the force structure in favor of CLS.

Failure Not an Option

So then, how can we achieve success with the tremendous problems associated with CLS? The first step is for both military and contractor personnel to recognize up-front that failure is not an option. For the second step, military leaders must determine how to protect contractors and commercial assets on the battlefield and must commit the resources needed to secure them. Finally, it is imperative to reduce the risk profile and vulnerability of contractors by controlling their movements, offsetting contract capability with military capability wherever possible and maintaining good situational awareness of where the contractors are on the battlefield - all of which will consume significant resources of the military force.

Something I never considered before my duty in *Operation Iraqi Freedom* but confronted on almost a daily basis in Iraq was the amount of operational information that contractor personnel pass over unsecured cellular phones and via E-mail using the Internet. I was appalled to read "in the clear" messages containing vital, time-sensitive information about current operations. The only way CJTF-7 brought this situation under any control was to enforce operational security (OPSEC) discipline by threatening to terminate contracts and remove or bar violators from the theater of operations.

Contractors on the Battlefield

Contractors on the battlefield taught logisticians many lessons. The Army must do a better job in institutional and leader training to teach commanders, staff officers and noncommissioned officers how to employ contractors, including the tools available to assure success. We must also provide much more robust contracting capability at all levels of combat formations. The commanders and leaders who are dealing with contractor problems as a matter of routine scarcely have the technical expertise at their disposal to meet their requirements. We need to train and employ contingency contractors within battalion-level organizations in significant numbers.

Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program

In the vein of CLS, I am compelled to discuss the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). This is the program the Army used, as in the Balkans and in other locations, to develop operating bases, improve the quality of life for deployed forces and offset "green suit" logistics capability with a commercial capability. LOGCAP was a \$5.2 billion endeavor for the first 16 months of *Operation Iraqi Freedom*. As a result, I spent fully one-third of my time dealing with LOGCAP matters. This is the one area where I had no training and, therefore, was getting "on-the-job" experience. Although LOGCAP is a great concept, in a nonpermissive environment there are challenges aplenty, including the contractors' ability to attain the human capital and materiel to meet the needs of the combat force in a timely manner.


The contractual requirements to make LOGCAP successful are mind-boggling, considering that CJTF-7 was trying to meet the needs of all 150,000 personnel with a single task order. That fact coupled with the varying priorities of each warfighting command made this a management nightmare. To correct the problem, logisticians began the process of breaking up the single task order into smaller, more manageable task orders aligned with major subordinate commands. That process is ongoing in Iraq, today. The Army must do a better job of training Soldiers, commanders and other leaders as well as logisticians, on how to use and manage LOGCAP and similar contractor capabilities.

Logisticians Think Like Warriors

I could go on and on. However, by now those of you who are still reading are weary. Logistics support at the operational level in the contemporary operating environment requires greater agility and lethality (read force protection) than previous battlefields. Young logisticians, contractors and logistics leaders are in harm's way as never before. They rise to the challenge every day and, like so many of their combat arms counterparts, they are applying the tactics, techniques and procedures required to assure survival and success. Logistics operations in Iraq demand that our Soldiers think and act like *warriors*. They will be warriors, no question about that. The only question is will they be warriors before they deploy or only after they survive their first encounter with mortal combat?

We owe it to our Soldiers, their families and to those we support to prepare them - now.

One final note: I report with a certain sense of pride that Warrior Logisticians were getting the job done under the toughest battlefield conditions during the time I served in Iraq. They assured that ***NOTHING FAILED DUE TO LOGISTICS!***



(Continued from Inside Front Cover)

From The Quartermaster General


Warrior field exercise with lessons learned from *Operations Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom*. We must not forget these lessons if we are to continue to provide combatant commanders with the right *materiel*, at the right time and at the right place.

On 2 Sep 04, we farewelled another great Warrior Logistician, Major General Terry E. Juskowiak, the 47th Quartermaster General. Through his illustrious career as a leader and logistician, MG Juskowiak has made a lasting impact on the Quartermaster Corps. His legacy will live on in an organization ready, willing and able to do our nation's bidding. On a personal note, I want to thank MG Juskowiak and his gracious wife Susan for their mentorship and support over the many years of our association. Most importantly, thank you for your friendship.

We wish these great Americans much success in their retirements and future endeavors. We thank them for their many years of dedicated and selfless service to the Quartermaster Corps, the Army and our nation. We are a better Army and a better Corps for their selfless service.

I would like to close with a reminder: remember to keep Soldiers, Marines, Sailors and Airmen combating the global war on terrorism in your thoughts and prayers. They are shouldering the burden of honoring our non-negotiable contract with the people of America, to fight and win our nation's wars. The Quartermaster Corps must continue to prepare Soldiers to honor this contract and stay the course.

While serving as the 48th Quartermaster General, Brigadier General Scott G. West was detailed as the Director for Logistics, C4, Combined/Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7) and Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-1) from July 2003 to July 2004. He became the Commanding General of the US Army Quartermaster Center and School (USAQMC&S), Fort Lee, Virginia, and The Quartermaster General of the Army on 16 May 03 after he had served as the USAQMC&S Deputy Commander since 31 Jul 02. Brigadier General West has held key leadership and staff positions, including positions in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2d Infantry Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Corps Support Command, 6th Infantry Division (Light) and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He served as the Division Parachute Officer, 82d Airborne Division, during Operation Just Cause and as the Executive Officer of the 407th Supply and Transport Battalion during Operation Desert Storm. Other assignments include Chief, Office of the Quartermaster General, Fort Lee, Virginia; Chief, Sustainment Division, Director for Logistics, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J4 (Logistics), the Pentagon, Washington, DC; and Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G4, US Army. His several command positions include the 706th Main Support Battalion, 6th Infantry Division, Fort Wainwright, Alaska; and the 46th Corps Support Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Also, he commanded the Joint Logistics Command in Joint Task Force Aguila during humanitarian assistance operations in Central America after Hurricane Mitch from 1998 to 1999.



CSS, Goldminers and the NTC



Command Sergeant Major Jose L. Silva

The weather for today: sunny with high of 107 degrees and winds gusting up to 30 miles per hour, so if you are not careful you can dehydrate, burn up and get blown away, all at the same time


The weatherman's morning forecast kept echoing in my head, making me smile as our HMMWV (High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) kept rolling down the dusty trail at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. Attempting to keep a steady hand while holding the binoculars, I was trying to peek through the mirage to search for our rallying point or "Four Corners" as it is commonly known at the NTC.

I could still remember my first visit to the NTC, a little over 20 years ago, a young SPC with the 82d Airborne Division, a rifleman in an Infantry squad. I remember my platoon in single file "humping" our large rucksacks, up and down those mountains in the middle of the night. These memories made me appreciate once more the great job that Soldiers are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan during today's global war on terrorism in Southwest Asia. The NTC provided then and continues to provide now realistic, challenging conditions for training. I had a special interest for this visit last summer since I was about to observe combat service support (CSS) Soldiers conduct combat operations.

We had been driving close to 50 minutes when my driver, who was the post command sergeant major's driver (and my driver for the day), pointed ahead. Four Corners came in sight. The observer controllers (OCs) were already there, looking at maps, talking on their radios and waiting for me. The call sign for the OCs is "Goldminers" and identifies them

as the trainers at the NTC. The OCs had been alerted to my visit on short notice, and they were very professional (and kind enough) to jump through the traditional hoops to make the proper arrangements. I had told the Goldminers neither to change nor stop any training because I didn't want to become a training distracter - and they didn't.

Once we arrived and dismounted, I was greeted by the master sergeant who is Goldminer 40: the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Sergeant Major Trainer. Goldminer 40 took me to the briefing area, a sand table drawn on the desert floor, complete with terrain features and scaled-down Soldiers, vehicles and equipment. Goldminer 40 introduced me to



CSM Jose L. Silva with F Company Soldiers After a Successful Training Scenario


Goldminer 30: the captain who is the Tactical Signal and Staff Trainer for the Goldminer FSB Trainers. Goldminer 30 was the designated briefer on the training events for the day. The unit had conducted live-fire exercises that morning and was preparing to conduct a dry-fire exercise to prepare for the afternoon live-fire under a different scenario.

The mission for that afternoon: F Company (Forward Support Company) 3/69th Armor, 3d Infantry Division will conduct convoy operations to deliver parts and supplies to a forward base a few miles north of F Company's location. The convoy had these eight vehicles: one command and control (C2) HMMWV, one M-113 (personnel carrier) with M2 50-caliber machine guns, an M-88 (medium track recovery vehicle) with an M2, two Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTVs), two cargo HMMWVs and one LMTV wrecker for recovery operations. The convoy route would take them through the two villages of Pefferton and Fefferville. The intelligence update stated that no enemy activity had been reported in the past but to be aware that the villages were unstable due to the political situation of the region. F Company had to be ready for the worst-case scenario.

As noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the convoy conducted their precombat inspections, I was being briefed on my location within the convoy, last vehicle at a safe distance as an observer. Goldminer 40 was to be by my side (to provide positive control, safety and additional directions if needed). An hour or so after my sand table briefing, we were moving out. Order of movement as planned, tactical dispersion as rehearsed, weapons at the ready and expecting the unexpected, we continued toward our first village.

Riding in the back of a convoy is no fun at all. Visibility can be hampered by the amount of dust generated by the vehicles in front of you and creates the hazard of getting too close or too far from the vehicle in front of yours. This "accordion" effect can jeopardize the tactical configuration of a moving element because fields and concentration of fires depend on the integrity of the convoy as a whole.

As we entered the outskirts of the village of Pefferton, the terrain became rockier and less sandy,



A sand table drawn on the desert helps Soldiers and leaders understand terrain.

which meant more visibility for the convoy and less dust entering our windpipes. Small huts were dispersed along our right and left flanks. "Villagers" peeked out of the doors and windows. Others were sitting around small tables along the road and posed no visual threat to the passing vehicles. The piles of broken and abandoned furniture littering both sides of the road gave the impression that something had happened, but no one in the convoy was going to stop and ask. We cleared the village in less than three minutes. I knew this was a training event, but for some reason I was actually relieved that nothing had happened. That's how realistic the NTC felt. Now we were heading to the next village, and I knew that



Logisticians dismount and take defensive positions at Fort Irwin, California.

this time we were going to get busy. The opposing forces (OPFOR) were somewhere in the village, waiting and looking forward to “letting us have it.”


Fefferville was a short distance from Pefferton, maybe three miles. Just like the first one, the second village looked strangely quiet and deserted. We entered the Fefferville to witness the same scenario: small huts, trash and abandoned furniture. One thing that was missing was the folks sitting around the tables. By the time I figured that out, I saw the first of three flashes followed by three detonations coming from our two o’clock. Three rocket-propelled grenades had been fired. The grenades hit two vehicles, and another vehicle was destroyed by an improvised explosive device (IED).

First Time: Dismounting Logisticians

The response from the convoy element was almost instantaneous: weapons systems opened up as to cover the area with a shower of bullets. Commands were being yelled, radio transmissions began filling the airways, vehicles were repositioned to provide fire support, and Soldiers were dismounting to take defensive positions. The convoy couldn’t move forward. The lead vehicle had been destroyed and blocked the road. One Soldier lay between vehicles face-down, status unknown.

I told my driver to back up and move to a different location because I wanted to see the action from a different perspective. In the process of starting the relocation move, we ran into another group of OCs watching the ongoing battle. We dismounted, and introductions and handshakes followed. Among the OCs were a lieutenant colonel who is the Senior Logistics Training Officer for the Operations Group, and the major who is Executive Officer (XO) for the Forward Support Battalion. The battalion XO is also responsible for running the convoy live-fire lane. “This is the first time we have dismounting logisticians,” the XO said. “They must be able to find, fix and destroy the enemy.”

The NTC training environment is under constant change as lessons learned from *Operation Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan and *Operation Iraqi Freedom* are implemented. The Soldiers going through this village or “lane” were experiencing the



Urban training at the National Training Center includes a new tunnel complex.

conditions they might encounter while conducting convoy operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Ambushes, IEDs, obstacles, target discrimination (being able to determine who is an enemy combatant among the civilian population) and even wedding celebrations are just a few of the tasks integrated in the scenarios at the NTC. Soldiers must be exposed to these situations to ensure they can react accordingly and minimize the enemy threat and civilian casualties.


Villages have been built to expand training events and scenarios. For example, Tiefert City has a large complex of buildings that includes a school, a mosque and a city hall. A tunnel complex also runs under Tiefert City. All of this provides for realistic training in an urban environment.

The CSS Soldiers from F Company had secured the area and treated their wounded. Reports had been sent to higher headquarters. They were now in the process of recovering the vehicle and moving out of the area to assemble one more time, this time on a safe zone to consolidate and reorganize and submit the final situation report.

A couple of hours later, we were back at the sand table for the big after action review. The Soldiers looked confident and motivated. Their leadership was very proud of their warfighters. Of course, some mistakes had been made; but leaders and Soldiers were in the right place to fine-tune, retrain, rehearse and execute to correct mistakes. F Company and the



Downtown Tiefert



Tiefert City Hall

Villages at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, have been built to expand training events and scenarios. For example, Tiefert City has a large complex of buildings that includes a school, a mosque and a city hall.

Goldminers had accomplished one of their missions in a very fruitful manner.

More missions would follow and more rotations would come, but each rotation is treated as if the

very first one. The NTC and its trainers apply the same intensity, the same dedication and the same focus to ensure all Soldiers have the best training they can get before their deployments. When the Goldminers train Soldiers as they fight, they mean business.

CSM Jose L. Silva is the 8th Regimental Command Sergeant Major (CSM) for the Quartermaster Corps. He deployed to Uzbekistan for Operation Enduring Freedom, 7 Nov 01-26 Jul 02, as the 507th Logistics Task Force CSM and also served as the first Camp Sergeant Major for Camp Stronghold Freedom in Karshi-Khanabad. His responsibilities took him to Bagram, Mazar-e-Shariff and Kabul. Then as the CSM for the 10th Division Support Command, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, he redeployed to Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom IV to serve as the Joint Logistics Center CSM before coming to the US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, Virginia. CSM Silva enlisted in the Army in July 1982 as an 11B (Infantryman) in the 82d Airborne Division. He became a Petroleum Supply Specialist in July 1986.

I will always place the mission first.


I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.



Petroleum Systems Technician - A New Specialty for the 21st Century



Chief Warrant Officer Five James C. Tolbert

On 9 Jul 04, as a result of an Army Training and Leader Development Panel recommendation, warrant officers began wearing their distinctive branch insignia replacing the "Eagle Rising" insignia which has been a part of the warrant officer's uniform for over 84 years. This change represents more than a symbolic gesture of branch affiliation: the change is an incremental process to merge warrant officer education and management into one Officer Education System. While many are skeptical of the insignia change, it is necessary in order for future warrant officers to have better training opportunities as members of a single Officer Education System. This Officer Education System must incorporate a shared training environment that includes training elements unique to officers and to warrant officers as well as elements common to both cohorts.

As the Army continues to battle the global war on terrorism while at the same time transforming to a modular expeditionary force, warrant officers will continue to serve in vital roles. On the battlefield today, Quartermaster Warrant Officers are true Warrior Logisticians serving in a multitude of organizations performing key logistical functions. Commanders at all echelons expect warrant officers to operate and sustain critical combat support functions on the battlefield. If warrant officers are to continue to serve as the Army's premier technical experts expected to administer, manage, maintain, operate and integrate key Army logistical systems and equipment, they must be adequately trained not only to serve as officer technicians, but also as leaders at all levels within the Army. The future expectations and requirements of

warrant officers will require a more robust education system that offers training much like the current Officer Education System. While numerous transformational efforts are ongoing throughout the Army, the Warrant Officer Education System must meld into one Officer Education System.

As work continues to realign Quartermaster functions to operate in the future modular structure, the Quartermaster Corps will introduce a new Quartermaster Warrant Officer Specialty – *Petroleum Systems Technician (military occupational specialty 923A)*. The driving force behind the requirement for Petroleum Warrant Officers centers on the shift in Petroleum Officer (92F) management in recent years. Previously, the Army produced a cadre of functional officers, among them petroleum officers who were primarily trained in petroleum operations and served most of their careers in petroleum units. While 92F Petroleum Officers are still trained in petroleum operations, their time assigned to petroleum units has decreased. The Officer Personnel Management System-XXI (OPMS XXI) transformed combat service support officers into multifunctional logisticians, in essence requiring those officers to serve in a multitude of assignments where knowledge of all tactical logistics functions was the focus. Simultaneously, the need for fuel experts on the battlefield grew as the Army's operating tempo has increased since the first Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s.

To respond to the growing requirement for petroleum expertise, focus shifted to pursue creating a Petroleum Warrant Officer specialty, one that will

provide a cadre of technicians who by the nature of their career progression will bring stability to technical positions and provide sustained petroleum expertise on the battlefield. The Petroleum Warrant Officer initiative will create positions in each Army component: Active Army, Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. To field this new specialty, selected petroleum officer positions were identified for conversion. Positions selected for conversion were those deemed more technical in nature that would serve as an excellent transition to be filled by a warrant officer. Existing Petroleum Officer (92F) leadership and branch-qualifying positions were not identified for conversion because those positions will continue to serve as critical developmental assignments for petroleum officers.

Recruiting efforts will target Petroleum Noncommissioned Officers in the Quartermaster Corps as the primary candidates to serve as Petroleum

Warrant Officers. Accessions will commence during the FY05 warrant officer recruiting year. Specifically, the first Quartermaster Soldiers are expected to appear before the US Army Recruiting Command Accessions Board in November 2005.

The creation of the Petroleum Systems Technician is one example of change in response to the needs of the Army. Warrant officers must be continually aware that change is necessary in order to meet the needs of the future force. Success will depend on the ability to recognize the need for change, adapt and transform to change. To ignore or resist the need for change will lead to irrelevance.

I am excited by the prospects this new Quartermaster Warrant Officer specialty will bring to the force. Future Petroleum Warrant Officers will join an already elite cohort of officers who provide unparalleled technical expertise to the Army.

CW5 James C. Tolbert is currently assigned to the Office of the Quartermaster General, US Army Quartermaster Center and School (USAQMC&S), Fort Lee, Virginia, as the Regimental Warrant Officer/ Quartermaster Warrant Officer Proponent. He has served in a variety of assignments worldwide. These include Battalion Supply Technician, 223d Aviation Battalion, Schwaebisch Hall, Germany; and Property Book Officer, 26th Signal Battalion, Heilbronn, Germany, where he deployed to Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield/Storm in December 1990. Also, he served as a Property Book Team Chief and later Chief, Asset Visibility Section, Division Materiel Management Center, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; Property Book Officer, US Army Central Command, Camp Doha, Kuwait; Instructor/Writer, USAQMC&S, Fort Lee, Virginia; and Personnel Career Management Officer assigned to the US Total Army Personnel Command (now Human Resources Command), Alexandria, Virginia. He has completed every level of the Warrant Officer Education System and holds a master's degree in logistics systems management from Colorado Technical University at Colorado Springs.

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Quartermaster Commentary

Logistical Lessons

From a Contemporary Operating Environment

CPT Sidney F. Byrne Jr.

My intent is to convey the lessons that Logistics Task Force 264 learned during *Operation Enduring Freedom* and to present the tactics, techniques and procedures that we developed to effectively combat the theft of bulk fuel in the northern and central regions of Afghanistan. Although interdiction and theft of supplies along lines of communication (LOC) and main supply routes (MSR) dates to the first supply trains, the Army's current linear-based battlefield doctrine, as well as individual Soldier training, proved outdated and inadequate against the *methods* of the pilferage we faced. Our enemy struck from every direction and then quietly melted away into the masses undetected. He represented a repressed, warring and fiercely tribal-based culture that regarded outsiders with a great deal of skepticism and distrust. We were the outsiders, and we occupied a small piece of land in territory where all land avenues of approach were under tribal control.

Fresh Tactics

History is full of examples of US military forces entering armed conflict with little knowledge of the enemy's tactics or culture, but we have always proven ourselves to be a quick study. This war was no different in that respect. Logistics Task Force 264 soon realized that fresh tactics were necessary to combat the innovative nature of the threat we faced. Our best reference was both our nemesis and our ally: the poverty-stricken and distrustful Afghans driven to the edges of endurance by the ravages of war, drought and oppressive occupation. The Afghans quickly taught us that the technology, endless resources and formal education that made our military forces so enviable - by themselves - were no match for their cunning, ingenuity and sheer desperation born from decades of warfare and oppression. The Afghani men that I am describing were not enemy Taliban combatants. They were farmers, laborers, drivers, contractors and - above all - they were survivors.

We did face another enemy who attacked the inbound tankers traversing the MSR from our fuel supply in Karachi, Pakistan, to Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. The inbound trucks were contracted and controlled by Defense Energy Support Center-Middle East (DESC-ME). We could do little more than record and report the losses to DESC-ME, which at times well exceeded 500,000 gallons per month. These losses were frustrating and sometimes threatened to limit coalition actions from Bagram Air Field. However, the battle to secure international MSRs is better left for another author of more suitable experience, rank and security clearance. The problem for Logistics Task Force 264 to solve was the theft of fuel between Bagram Air Field and its forward bases.

Living in Real Poverty


The Afghans were formidable opponents who knew, thanks to the untiring efforts of the psychological operations teams, that the US forces were *not* going to harm noncombatants and that we were *dependent* on their local trucking industry to adequately resupply our forward bases. To the average Afghani living in real poverty, the situation, coupled with his perception of American wealth, equaled an irresistible opportunity to profit handsomely. They also correctly surmised that there was little risk of suffering the repercussions he was accustomed to suffering under the rule of the Taliban and the former Soviet Union for the same actions.

The logistical obstacles at Bagram were vastly different from the ones that we were trained to encounter and overcome. Also, the methods and perpetrators of fuel theft were as imaginative as they were numerous. We, on the other hand, were initially unimaginative and rigidly faithful to proven, linear-battlefield training and doctrine. We failed to realize the significance of the fact that our knowledge and training were based on our experiences using

American contractors and US military equipment and personnel traveling routes under US military control. We were now forced to use unknown local national contractors, drivers and equipment to transport cargo of considerable military and civilian value through impoverished areas inhabited by a heavily armed populace without the benefit of a coalition armed escort. Most of the routes to our forward units were not under our control or a central governmental control, and these routes were occasionally rendered impassable by local nationals who were openly resentful of our presence and often hostile to the local nationals we employed.

We realized that one of the first steps necessary was to gain the trust and goodwill of the tribal leaders, who exerted a great deal of influence over the local population as well as the contracted drivers. We believed we needed to build a mutually and financially beneficial and a culturally acceptable relationship for all parties. Beginning with this knowledge, the support of the base contracting office and the wide degree of latitude granted to us by our battalion commander, we developed a plan to change the nature of our business relationship with the local nationals.

With the assistance of the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of our base contracting office (the one place we were guaranteed to find the most influential local leaders as well as the contractors supplying the trucks and drivers we needed), we met and discussed our problems with the local leaders, contractors and US contracting officers. Operating on the principle of never giving something without receiving something in return, we were able to obtain the support of local leaders by giving nothing more than reasonable financial compensation, as approved by the contracting officers, for our truck modification and contractual demands. We outlined our goals and intentions and solicited their suggestions and input to demonstrate our respect for their knowledge and abilities. We knew if we treated the Afghani leaders with respect, we would build their prestige within the ranks of their people. Then the Afghani leaders, in exchange for their perceived increase in stature with us, would be much more inclined to use their authority to help us obtain our goals in a non-confrontational and cooperative manner.



Since many of the contracted tankers were arriving at their intended destinations well short of the amount of fuel loaded at Bagram without visible signs of tampering, we decided to modify the local national fleet in order to better secure all hatches and ports of the tankers. We knew sealing the hatches and ports would not deter armed aggressors, but would deter the contractors and drivers because of the stiff fines attached for tampering. We began an intensive inspection and modification program for all contracted fuel tankers and drivers.


The Logistics Task Force 264 inspection program was a thorough and continual process encompassing the entire fuel tanker. Logistics Task Force 264 was well equipped to inspect the exterior of the tankers, but not well equipped to inspect the interior of the fuel chambers. Although actual chamber inspections are the most definitive method to determine if the host nation tankers are carrying contraband or if they are fit to transport US-owned fuel, the process poses risks and raises several safety concerns. Until the US Army formally incorporates such inspection practices for fuel tankers into current doctrine and training and also adds the necessary safety equipment to unit modification tables of organization and equipment, we recommend contracting this procedure to a civilian firm experienced in hazardous materials.

Logistics Task Force 264 inspections revealed hidden chambers, inoperative and odd-sized valves and discharge ports, and deceptive gauging tubes and

rods. We countered by requiring our contractors to weld steel nuts to all loading and discharge hatches and ports so we could secure them with seals before departure from Bagram. We also required the local nationals to equip their trucks with fittings that would couple to the Army's 3-inch and 4-inch fuel lines, the standard fuel lines used by all military services and commercial companies. We learned we could not waiver on this point, or we would find ourselves trying to load and unload from the top. The contractors will charge a fee for the fittings, but they *will* make them. Competition for the guaranteed pay of a US contract is fierce, and this fierce competition is something to use to your advantage in order to get the type of local equipment you need. The fittings will not be as durable as you would like, and the contractor-made fittings will wear out within a few months. However, if you ensure that you include the "fully operable, non-leaking, 3-inch and/or 4-inch fitting requirement" in your contract, you will not have too many problems keeping the proper fittings on each truck.


Logistics Task Force 264 learned to use serial-numbered steel cables no less than 1/8-inch in diameter because the local nationals demonstrated a remarkable ability to defeat every other type of seal with relative ease without leaving a trace of evidence. We assigned permanent bumper numbers to each truck after we inspected and certified it as fit to carry fuel by securing a serial-numbered steel cable to the steering column. We then photographed the driver and his assistant with their truck, recorded their names and company with the photograph, and created logbooks for each forward base as well as for Logistics Task Force 264 records. These trucks were inspected and recertified quarterly. The drivers and trucks were compared to the logbook photographs before they were permitted access to any installation. Within a month, we had inspected and marked approximately 100 local national trucks in such a manner. The cost to the US government was about one dollar per truck.

This procedure allowed US forces to determine if the driver at their gate was the same man that Logistics Task Force 264 had hired to deliver the fuel or if it was someone else who possibly hijacked the truck with the hopes of gaining entry onto a military



base and causing destruction. All parties seemed to enjoy the idea of establishing the identities of the contracted personnel before their arrival at coalition bases. Our guards were more at ease knowing who was supposed to arrive. The local national drivers felt a sense of relief because they would not be mistaken for enemy Taliban supporters by coalition forces. As an aside, we also bought a great deal of goodwill by providing a copy of the photograph to the local national driver. In a country with little technology, a computer-generated color photograph sheathed in a document protector went a long way. The drivers usually displayed their photos prominently by taping them, face outward, to the inside of their windshields.

Logistics Task Force 264 also started selecting drivers for specific destinations according to their family and tribal ties. Since the roads were usually controlled by the strongest (most heavily armed) local leader, we would ask him to find drivers (as he was usually the one controlling or at least influencing contracts for his region) from his district to transport our supplies through his territory. The contractors and drivers were satisfied with this arrangement because such coordination ensured they would be traveling through areas guarded by their family members and guaranteed them future employment as long as they delivered all of the fuel they loaded at Bagram to the intended recipient. The local leader was satisfied because he was receiving a tribute, a percentage of the driver's income, without having to use force (as he would have done with a man from a different tribe or village traversing his territory). We were satisfied because our fuel shipment reached its destination intact and on time.



Alternative transportation assets included pack animals (left) to reach remote bases in Afghanistan over barely passable roadways. One contractor drove a disguised fuel tanker.

As initial suspicion toward each other gave way to the profits of business and mission accomplishment, we discovered that our new relationship with the local nationals afforded us the ability to readily secure the means to transport supplies over barely passable roadways to reach the most remote bases that we previously resupplied by air. Logistics Task Force 264 was making noticeable improvements in the ground resupply success rate and, at the same time, reducing our requests for costly aerial delivery assets. Even hiring a driver to haul barrels of fuel to a destroyed bridge, securing a team of mules to drag the barrels across to the other side, and then hiring another truck to deliver the barrels to the final destination was less expensive than the cost of using our already overworked utility helicopters and crews to accomplish the same task. Some local nationals even built smaller fuel tankers able to negotiate a small number of the mountain passes, which we thought of as goat trails, in order to demonstrate their desire to further their business relationship with us. One contractor, who was never able to get a fuel truck through a certain region unmolested no matter who operated the vehicle, agreed to place a 2,500-gallon tank in the back of a covered cargo truck in order to accomplish the mission. The ruse worked magnificently, and we never suffered another fuel loss along that route.

We conducted briefings and debriefings with the local national drivers after each delivery and reported all incidents to the S2/G2 intelligence sections. We provided financial compensation to vehicles damaged or destroyed by hostile action. We included the driver's and contractor's suggestions in our military

decision-making process because theirs were the lives sometimes lost while delivering the supplies. Although enemy action accounted for a smaller percentage of Logistics Task Force 264 losses than theft, the threat was real and at times deadly. The Department of the Army limit for loss of JP8 fuel is one-half percent of the total amount, with contingency and wartime losses as the exceptions. Although acceptable wartime loss rates are not published, we believed our initial losses of 16-20 percent per month to be excessive. We knew we could not stop the losses completely, but we did bring them to a more than manageable level of less than two percent.

Cold, armed Afghans seeking fuel for cooking and heating stoves accounted for a sizeable amount of our fuel losses. The impoverished Afghani, whether he was a bachelor, husband or father seeing a large tanker of fuel, did what most other men would at least consider doing in his situation. He forced the truck to stop, took as much fuel as he needed or could store, and sent the contracted truck on its way. The thought of US military reaction to a small amount of missing fuel from such a large tanker or to broken seals and possible contamination of fuel intended for aviation purposes did not enter his mind. He was only concerned with staying warm.

As US citizens, Soldiers pride themselves on moral and ethical standards and on the ability to apply the proper technique, including but not limited to deadly force, in order to resolve any situation. One arctic-like morning, a freezing individual in threadbare clothing provided us with an opportunity to


demonstrate our ability to effectively resolve problems before reaching the level of deadly force. A local national had been caught stealing fuel by diligent Military Police (MP) patrolling the line of vehicles waiting to enter the base. Instead of leaving the fuel truck and retreating, the local national, possibly driven by desperation, chose to level his weapon at a young MP. Great credit is due this MP because he correctly assessed the situation for what it was and, without firing a shot, disarmed and detained the local national. He marched the local national back to the gate, explained the situation to his commander and the local militia commander, and thus opened the way for us to end another part of our fuel loss headache.

With the battalion commander's permission, Logistics Task Force 264 sought out the local leaders. We agreed to provide local nationals the waste fuel that we were unable to return to Department of the Army standards if they agreed not to steal fuel from contracted trucks. Not only did this mutual agreement stop the theft of fuel by local nationals, but it also allowed us to dispose of contaminated fuel without having to pay the outrageous price being charged for the same service by a contracted HAZ-MAT (hazardous materials) company.

We also introduced one of the influential local nationals to the opportunities afforded by the base contracting office. Once he understood the benefits of providing a service for a fee, he submitted bids for jobs he felt the men in his control could perform. Thirty of his men repairing roads or building sidewalks would net a profit for his village and keep 30 armed men off of the roads used to transport supplies. He profited without having to use force or to "tax" people traversing his area, and we had fewer obstacles to negotiate to get our supplies to the supported units.

Experiences of Logistics Task Force 264 were far from unique, but different from what we were initially prepared to encounter. Logisticians are no longer operating in a linear environment behind the forward line of troops, and we are relying heavily on the contracted support of local nationals to move supplies through military areas of responsibility.

Our opponents will continue to present us with challenges and adopt different tactics as we adjust to



JP8 Fuel Losses Decreased as Security Measures Increased

and overcome each obstacle. Logisticians must be prepared to surmount these obstacles efficiently to maintain the adage that "Nothing fails due to logistics." The most effective tools were, are and will continue to be our persistence and our capacity and our *willingness* to adapt and to think in unconventional terms. These qualifications fostered the *desire* and ability of Logistics Task Force 264 to establish and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with the local nationals and their leaders that proved critical to our mission success in Afghanistan.

CPT Sidney F. Byrne Jr., Quartermaster, is currently serving as an Executive Officer in a Forward Support Company, Special Operations Support Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He served as the Deputy Support Operations Officer (SPO) for the 264th Corps Support Battalion (CSB) (Airborne) while deployed to Afghanistan from September 2003 to June 2004. He is a Year Group 1999 graduate of Officer Candidate School who began his Army career in 1993 as an 11B (Infantryman) in the 1/505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg. His first assignment after completing the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course was as a Platoon Leader, 259th Field Services Company, 264th CSB (Airborne) at Fort Bragg. Subsequent assignments at Fort Bragg included Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) Platoon Leader and SPO, 364th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support); and Executive Officer, 600th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Equipment Repair and Supply).

Proposed Unit of Action/Unit of Employment, X Doctrinal Concept of Support

CPT Jeremy D. Smith

EDITOR'S NOTE: Now that the Army's Unit of Action (UA) concept is becoming operational, the UA is correctly referred to as the Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

The Army validated Soldier training and doctrine with decisive, rapid victories during *Operation Enduring Freedom* against the Taliban in Afghanistan and during *Operation Iraqi Freedom* against the former regime in Iraq. Currently engaged in the global war on terrorism and deployed to support the continuing operations in Southwest Asia, the Army's combat arms, combat support and combat service support (CSS) units have been stretched to the breaking point. These Army organizations are too large, take too long to deploy and generally bring much more to the fight than necessary.

The Army's divisions cannot easily break into smaller units. The Army needs a new, modular organization that can be tailored to fight across the full spectrum of military operations. Another requirement is to develop a force pool of units available to deploy in support of any contingency. All these units must be self-contained and mission-oriented. These units need the capability of rapidly unplugging from their garrison command and control, rapidly deploying and then rapidly plugging into a parent organization task-organized for the mission. In short, the Army needs to reorganize its structure and how it accomplishes its missions.

Spearheading this reorganization are the 3d Infantry Division, 24th Corps Support Group (CSG), and other units in Georgia at Fort Stewart, Hunter Army Airfield and Fort Benning. Unfortunately, this necessary Army reorganization precedes changes in doctrine. There is no doctrine for these new units, and Soldiers have had to "make it happen" throughout execution. This article's purpose is twofold: to discuss the steps taken for

Army reorganization and to propose a doctrinal concept of support for these new organizations.

In October 2003, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) directed the commanding general of the 3d Infantry Division to reorganize his division into four or five brigade-sized combat elements with greater unit integration of combat arms, combat support and CSS units. The intent was to create a modular "brigade-based" Army that will be more responsive to the needs of regional combatant commanders, better employ joint military forces, facilitate force packaging and rapid deployment, and deploy self-contained units capable of full spectrum operations. The approved "Marne Plan" for the 3d Infantry Division called for a division headquarters with four similar maneuver brigades, one aviation brigade, division artillery and a division support brigade. Meanwhile, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command was tasked to develop the concept of task force modularity as one of the CSA's areas of immediate focus.

Develop a Template

In November 2003, the 1st Corps Support Group (COSCOM) directed the commander of the 24th CSG to address lessons learned during the early stages of *Operation Iraqi Freedom* and develop a "straw man" plan to convert the 24th CSG into a logistical support group (LSG) comprised of multifunctional and modular logistical task forces (LTFs). These LTFs were to provide support (DS) to the reorganized 3d Infantry Division's maneuver brigades and other similar organizations, while continuing area support to nondivisional units in the division's area of operations. The goal was a concept to transform the 24th CSG into an LSG with multifunctional and modular LTFs that could be used as a template for other CSS units in echelons above division as Army Transformation continued throughout the entire force structure. Figure 1 shows 24th CSG's garrison task organization before reorganization.




Figure 1. 24th Corps Support Group Garrison Task Organization Before Reorganization


LEGEND:	FSGA	Fort Stewart, GA	MED	Medical	
AMMO	ammunition	FST	forward surgical team	OD	Ordnance
BN	battalion	GS	general support	PERS	personnel
CO	company	HAAF	Hunter Army Airfield, GA	PLS	Palletized Load System
COSCOM	corps support command	HHC	headquarters, headquarters	POL	petroleum, oils and lubricants
CSB	corps support battalion	HHD	headquarters, headquarters	PREV	preventive
CSG	corps support group	HSC	headquarters support company	PUR	purification
DET	detachment	MACDILL	MacDill Air Force Base, FL	QM	Quartermaster
DIV	division	MAINT	maintenance	S&S	supply and services
DS	direct support	MCT	movement control team	SSB	soldier support battalion
ECB (H)	engineer combat battalion, heavy	MDM	medium	TRANS	transportation
FIN	finance			TRK	truck
				WS	water supply

The 24th CSG's proposed reorganization into an LSG called for the conversion of the 260th and 559th Quartermaster Battalions into multifunctional, modular LTFs to better support the 3d Infantry Division and the Army's overall transformation goals. A key lesson learned during *Operation Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan was that functional battalion headquarters cannot serve as multifunctional LTFs without additional personnel and equipment.

The 260th and 559th Quartermaster Battalions regularly execute multifunctional missions in garrison. They also executed multifunctional missions during recent deployments to Southwest Asia. However, without the authorization to be a multifunctional headquarters, these battalion headquarters continuously face turmoil as they prepare to execute missions.

A similar lesson learned during *Operation Iraqi Freedom* was that creating new task organizations during a combat operation is overly risky.

These two lessons drove the 24th CSG's reorganization efforts. Each LTF would have a multifunctional staff. The 24th CSG would retain its functional supply, maintenance and transportation company headquarters. However, the functional teams, sections and platoons would be redistributed as modules between companies and battalions so all would have similar capabilities. Separate general supply (GS) and maintenance supply support activities (SSAs) would be consolidated in the Quartermaster DS supply companies. Petroleum supply companies would be reorganized from two platoons of three squads each to three platoons of two squads each,



LEGEND:

- CSG corps support group
- CSH combat support hospital
- LSG logistical support group
- LTF logistical task force
- MCT movement control team
- SSB soldier support battalion

Figure 2. Proposed 24th Corps Support Group Logistics Support Group Redesign

similar to the organization of transportation platoons. These reorganized platoons would be redistributed as modules to other companies and battalions. Transportation assets would be diversified to provide task-organized companies with separate Palletized Load System (PLS), stake and platform (S&P) and petroleum platoons.

February 2004, created three LTFs. Each LTF has modular capabilities to support up to three similar, reorganized maneuver brigades in the 3d Infantry Division or two similar maneuver brigades and the aviation brigade. This proposal addressed the themes of the conference and task force modularity. Figure 2 shows the 24th CSG's proposed redesign.

This proposal, as presented at the CSS Logistics Transformation Conference at Fort Lee, VA, in

Figure 3 is an example of the task organization for one of the new multifunctional LTFs. The 260th




Figure 3. Example of Task Organization for a New Multifunctional Logistics Task Force

LEGEND:

- | | | | |
|------|---------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------|
| FBGA | Fort Benning, GA | MST | maintenance support team |
| FSGA | Fort Stewart, GA | PLT | platoon |
| HAAF | Hunter Army Airfield, GA | POL | petroleum, oils and lubricants |
| HHD | headquarters, headquarters detachment | S&P | stake and platform |
| LTF | logistics task force | SSA | supply support activity |

LTF's task organization for upcoming Rotation 04-10 of the Mission Readiness Exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA, in support of the 3d Infantry Division illustrates how to create multifunctional companies and battalions by redistributing functional teams, sections and platoons from different units from different locations. The 559th LTF successfully tested a similar task organization during Rotation 04-07 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.

By February 2004, the 3d Infantry Division's reorganization and task force modularity merged. Brigade-sized units are now called Units of Action (UA). There are two types of UA: maneuver UA and support UA. Maneuver UA consist of integrated combat arms, combat support and CSS units. Support UA specialize in the following tasks: protection, aviation, sustainment, reconnaissance and surveillance, and fires. Division-sized units are now referred to as Units of Employment, X (UEX). The UEX headquarters plans future operations for any number of maneuver and support UA and may serve as a joint task force headquarters with augmentation of personnel from the US Marines, Air Force or Navy.

At the execution level, incorporating task force modularity concepts broadened the scope of the 24th CSG's reorganization. The two most significant changes for logisticians were merging the division support command (DISCOM) and COSCOM missions and functions in the division area of operations and developing a plan to create forward support companies (FSCs) to provide DS for each combat arms battalion.

Major CSS Changes

The traditional DISCOM consisting of three forward support battalions (FSBs), one aviation support battalion (ASB) and one main support battalion (MSB) no longer exists under this reorganization. New modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs) made each FSB look identical and eliminated the subtle differences that made each one unique. The FSB mission changes from providing support to the maneuver brigades to providing DS to the FSCs and reinforcing support to the UA. The ASB is no longer subordinate to the DISCOM but permanently attached

to the aviation UA that the ASB traditionally supported. The division rear also ceases to exist. For the 3d Infantry Division, the 703d MSB became the FSB for UA4. Excess MSB equipment and personnel will fill shortages in the FSCs, other FSBs, the Sustain UA, and the UEX G4 (Logistics).

A new organization, called the Sustain UA, replaces the DISCOM and the forward CSG that traditionally operated in the division area. The Sustain UA commander and staff are now solely responsible for providing support to all units operating in the UEX area of operations. The Sustain UA assumes DISCOM's mission to support UA and UEX units and assumes the CSG's mission to support any non-UA and non-UEX units operating in the UEX area. The Sustain UA consists of a headquarters, the FSBs and any number of CSS battalions task-organized to support the mission. These task-organized CSS battalions are similar to the 24th CSG's proposed LTFs. The Sustain UA headquarters has a robust support operations section with distribution and materiel management, contracting, aviation and medical planning. The Sustain UA headquarters also has signal and medical companies and a component repair platoon to help it manage its new, expanded mission.

The FSC provides DS to the combat arms battalion, but the FSC is assigned to the FSB that habitually supports the UA. CSS capabilities migrating from the combat arms battalion's headquarters, headquarters company (HHC) form the nucleus of the FSC. These capabilities include the support platoon, food service and organizational maintenance. The maintenance support team that the FSB traditionally aligns with the organizational maintenance becomes permanently assigned to the FSC. The support platoon receives additional personnel, equipment and transportation assets. The creation of FSCs consolidates the battalion's support capabilities under a logistics captain, allowing the HHC commander to focus on combat tasks.

Proposed LOGSTAT Reporting Flow

To fully understand the proposed concept of support to the UAs and UEX, it is important to start at the lowest level and work higher. Combat arms units need to help themselves by learning how they are

supported. Understanding the request and flow of supplies will help them learn to trust a supply system that some believe is unresponsive to their needs.

Current LOGSTAT reporting for UA combat arms companies, troops and batteries is transparent and does not change. The only visible change for a combat arms unit is that the S4 (Logistics) is now authorized as a 90A logistics officer instead of a combat arms officer.

Unit status continues to be reported through unit supply sections to the battalion S4. The battalion S4 continues to consolidate unit reports and sends the battalion's report to the UA S4. The UA's status is reported to the FSB support operations officer (SPO) before being forwarded to the Sustain UA SPO. The Sustain UA SPO consolidates all UA reports and sends the UEx report to the UEx G4 for visibility and the next higher unit for action. This echelon above UEx could be any one of the following: corps, theater, outside the United States (CONUS), another military service, an allied nation or the host nation.

Current LOGSTAT reporting for non-UA and non-UEx units also does not change with reorganization. The CSBs or LTFs will continue to offer direct support to non-UA units operating in their areas and to offer reinforcing support to FSBs. External non-UA and non-UEx units report their status through their supply sections to the CSB/LTF SPO. The SPO consolidates reports and sends them to the Sustain UA SPO. The CSB or LTF units also send their status through their supply sections to the CSB/LTF SPO, who consolidates and reports to the Sustain UA SPO. The Sustain UA reports to the echelon above UEx and furnishes a copy of the report to the UEx G4 for visibility.

The UEx headquarters LOGSTAT report should be sent to the brigade troops battalion (BTB) S4. The BTB S4 reports the UEx headquarter status directly to the Sustain UA SPO.

Proposed Requirements and Resupply Flow

On a nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield, how do CSS units support these new organizations? The requirements flow from the foxhole up the chain follows the same flow as LOGSTAT reporting.

Resupply above the UA level changes significantly without an MSB or division rear. Requirements flow culminates at the echelon above UEx organization. Based on strategic priorities, the theater distribution center located at any theater seaport, railhead or airport is responsible for pushing supplies forward to distribution hubs utilizing corps, theater or contracted assets.

The non-FSB, CSS subordinate battalions of the Sustain UA are best organized to serve as area distribution hubs responsible for supporting both UA and non-UA units operating within its area. These battalions, organized similar to traditional CSBs, have SSAs that regularly receive, store and issue supplies to divisional and nondivisional units, Special Operations Forces and other military services during deployments. The support operations offices for these battalions also maintain the expertise for planning, managing and executing the CSS missions of water production, water distribution, food storage and shipment, fuel testing and distribution, field services, mortuary affairs, transportation and maintenance. These battalions also maintain the flexibility to rapidly weigh support throughout their areas of operations based on the commander's guidance.

Although the FSB may also serve as a distribution hub, the mission will always be secondary to the FSB's primary mission of supporting the FSCs and the UA. FSBs are neither equipped nor staffed to support a distribution mission in support of non-UA units. FSBs are organized to plan, supply and reinforce the FSCs. Assuming an additional mission to serve as a distribution hub would greatly tax the FSB's resources. FSBs may serve as distribution hubs under limited, specific conditions in new areas with relatively small support requirements until the Sustain UA begins support operations with a CSB or LTF.

The theater distribution center would push supplies forward utilizing corps, theater or contracted assets to the various distribution hubs operated by the Sustain UA's subordinate battalions. The theater distribution center may also push supplies directly to the FSB as a secondary option. The CSB/LTF is responsible for distributing supplies to any FSB and any non-UA, non-UEx unit operating in its area of

operations. Based on the new UA MTOEs and unconstrained by geography, one CSB serving as a distribution hub could support up to three similar UAs.

Proposed STAMIS Flow

The most challenging task to date has been establishing Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS) flow and support relationships between these new organizations. The 24th CSG proposes a consolidation of the DS Quartermaster supply company's Class II (general supplies), IV (construction and barrier materiel) and Class VII (major end items) SSA and the DS maintenance company's Class IX (repair parts) SSA into a multiclass SSA located in the DS Quartermaster supply company. Consolidating the SSAs creates a single supply interface between all supported units and the DS Quartermaster supply company.

The UA combat arms Unit Level Logistics System-Ground (ULLS-G) computers transmit maintenance information to the Standard Army Maintenance System-1 (SAMS-1) computer located in the FSC in direct support of the maneuver battalion. Units in the BTB in direct support of the UA and the FSB transmit their maintenance information from their ULLS-G to the SAMS-1 located in the FSB field maintenance company. All UA units send ULLS-S4 and ULLS-G supply requisitions to the Standard Army Retail Supply System-1 (SARSS-1) computer located at the FSB's SSA.

Non-UA and non-UEx units send their ULLS-G maintenance information to the SAMS-1 computer located in the CSB/LTF maintenance company, DS. The ULLS-S4 supply requisitions go to the SARSS-1 computer located in the SSA of the DS Quartermaster supply company. The UEx BTB's maintenance information flows from the ULLS-G to the SAMS-1 in the DS maintenance company while the UEx BTB's supply requisitions flow from the ULLS-S4 and ULLS-G computers to the SARSS-1 computer in the DS Quartermaster supply company.

The SAMS flow begins to simplify as information passes from SAMS-1 to SAMS-2. The FSC's SAMS-1 connects to the SAMS-2 computer located with the FSB SPO maintenance officer. The field maintenance company's SAMS-1 computer also

sends data to the SAMS-2 in the FSB SPO. The DS maintenance company sends its information to the CSB/LTF SPO maintenance officer.

The SARSS flow for divisional units changes. SARSS information previously sent to the division materiel management center SARSS-2A/D computer is passed from the SARSS-1 computer located in the support battalion SSAs to the SARSS-2A/C computer located at the Corps/Theater Automated Data Processing Service Center (CTAS) assigned to the divisional unit, following the same SARSS flow that nondivisional units already use. The UEx G4 and the Sustain UA SPO may still review unit SARSS information by utilizing a remote CTAS workstation.

SAMS-2 flow remains largely unchanged. The SAMS-2 located with the FSB sends information to the Sustain UA SPO readiness officer, formerly the maintenance officer. The SAMS-2 located with the CSB/LTF also sends its information to the Sustain UA SPO readiness officer. SAMS-2 information then proceeds to the CTAS.

Doctrinal Concept of Support

The reorganization currently underway with the 3d Infantry Division represents the first steps of transforming the Army's divisions and the units that support them. Within the next few years, every Army division will undergo reorganizations similar to 3d Infantry Division. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) is beginning to reorganize after redeploying from Iraq and is experiencing similar problems to "make it happen" without new doctrine to point the right direction. As Army CSS units work to reorganize themselves to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, it is imperative to have a doctrinal concept of support to focus efforts on sustaining the warfighter.

CPT Jeremy D. Smith recently became Commander, 226th Quartermaster Company (Direct Support Supply), 87th Corps Support Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia. As the Reorganization Officer-in-Charge for the 24th Corps Support Group (CSG) in his previous assignment, CPT Smith was responsible for development and planning of CSG assets in support of the 3d Infantry Division's reorganization.



Springfield, Illinois



Evaluator Onsite



Under Evaluation

2004 Supply Excellence Awards

In the 19th year of competition, the 2004 Chief of Staff, Army, Supply Excellence Award (SEA) Program recognized 45 units for logistical readiness and supply effectiveness. This year the Army recognized 39 winner/runner-up units and 6 honorable mentions. Represented were 23 Active Army, 16 Army National Guard (ARNG) and 6 US Army Reserve (USAR) units.

Nominated units that were unavailable for the evaluation because of deployment/mobilization are encouraged to participate in the FY05 SEA program. Also, the "Best of the Best" competition for individual soldiers was eliminated in FY04.

The Department of the Army and the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) cosponsored an awards ceremony 1 Sept 04 in Alexandria, VA. The Chief of Staff, Army presented plaques to unit representatives. As in previous years, the NDIA provided the plaques.

Competition begins with major Army commands (MACOMs) nominating units based on their performance in the local Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP) evaluations. Strict adherence to both the Army's CSDP and to logistics management is the stepping stone to competing in the SEA Program. Evaluators from the US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, VA, augmented by ARNG and USAR evaluators, travel worldwide from January through June conducting onsite assessments.

The SEA Program provides a positive incentive for extraordinary supply operations. To participate, a unit must contact its MACOM SEA point of contact (list available at AKO>KCC>TRADOC>Quartermaster>Supply Excellence Award) for details regarding the FY05 SEA nomination/competition process. Additional information about the SEA Program is available at the Army Knowledge Online (AKO>KCC) and in an article published in the Spring 2003 edition of the *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* on the Quartermaster Home Page at www.Quartermaster.army.mil under Professional Bulletin.



Baumholder, Germany



Wheeler Army Airfield, Hawaii



On-the-Spot Advice

Unit Winners and Runners-Up for 2004

CATEGORY	COMP	STANDING	UNIT
MTOE Level I (A) Company/Battery/Troop/ Detachment with Property Book	Active	Winner	HHD, 59th Signal Battalion, Fort Richardson, AK (NETCOM)
		Runner-Up	HHC, 8th Military Police Brigade, Yongsan, Korea (EUSA)
MTOE Level I (B) Company/Battery/Troop/ Detachment without Property Book	Active	Winner	11th Signal Detachment, Mannheim, Germany (NETCOM)
		Runner-Up	70th Transportation Company, Mannheim, Germany (USAREUR)
MTOE Level II (A) Battalion/Squadron with Property Book	Active	Winner	205th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Shafter, HI (INSCOM)
		Runner-Up	95th Military Police Battalion, Mannheim, Germany (USAREUR)
TDA Level I (Small)	Active	Winner	222d Base Support Battalion, Baumholder, Germany (IMA)
		Runner-Up	Aviation Technical Test Center, Fort Rucker, AL (ATEC)
		Honorable Mention	HHD, 202d Military Police Group, Mannheim, Germany (CID)
TDA Level II (Large)	Active	Winner	2d Bn (SHORAD), 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Fort Bliss, TX (TRADOC)
		Runner-Up	6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC (USASOC)
		Honorable Mention	Material Support Center, 19th Theater Support Command, Camp Carroll, Korea (EUSA)
		Honorable Mention	527th Military Intelligence Battalion, Camp Humphreys, Korea (INSCOM)
SSA Level I (A) Small MTOE Class IX	Active	Winner	G Company, 52d Aviation Regiment, Wonju, Korea (EUSA)
		Runner-Up	C Company, 25th Aviation Regiment, Wheeler Army Airfield, HI (USARPAC)
		Honorable Mention	558th Transportation Company, Floating Craft General Support, Fort Eustis, VA (FORSCOM)
SSA Level I (B) Small MTOE Class II, IV, VII	Active	Winner	305th Quartermaster Company, Yongsan, Korea (EUSA)
		Runner-Up	26th Quartermaster Supply and Service Company, Hanau, Germany (USAREUR)
SSA Level I (C) Small TDA	Active	Winner	HHC, 22d Area Support Group, Vicenza, Italy (IMA)
		Runner-Up	80th Area Support Group Augmentation, Chievres, Belgium (IMA)
		Honorable Mention	Supply Point 60, 20th Support Group, Camp Carroll, Korea (EUSA)
SSA Level II (A) Large MTOE Class IX	Active	Winner	D Company, 701st Main Support Battalion, Kitzingen, Germany (USAREUR)
		Runner-Up	A Company, 172d Support Battalion, Fort Wainwright, AK (USARPAC)

Unit Winners and Runners-Up for 2004

CATEGORY	COMP	STANDING	UNIT
MTOE Level I (A) Company/Battery/Troop/ Detachment with Property Book	ARNG	Winner	107th Maintenance Company, Sparta, WI (Region IIIA)
		Runner-Up	694th Maintenance Company, New Bern, NC (Region II)
MTOE Level I (B) Company/Battery/Troop/ Detachment without Property Book	ARNG	Winner	HHC, 1/114th Infantry Battalion, Fort Dix, NJ (Region IB)
		Runner-Up	909th Quartermaster Detachment, Tamuning, Guam (Region IA)
		Honorable Mention	HHC, 46th Infantry Brigade, Wyoming, MI (Region IIIA)
MTOE Level II (A) Battalion/Squadron with Property Book	ARNG	Winner	HQ, 1/125th Field Artillery Battalion, New Ulm, MN (Region IIIA)
MTOE Level II (B) Battalion/Squadron without Property Book	ARNG	Winner	HQ, 2/127th Infantry Battalion, Appleton, WI (Region IIIA)
TDA Level I (Small)	ARNG	Winner	HQ, 209th Regional Training Institute (RTI), Ashland, NE (Region IIIB)
		Runner-Up	Joint Forces HQ, MSARNG, Jackson, MS (Region II)
TDA Level II (Large)	ARNG	Winner	Joint Forces HQ, WIARNG, Madison, WI (Region IIIA)
		Runner-Up	66th Troop Command, Jackson, MS (Region II)
SSA Level I (A) Small MTOE Class IX	ARNG	Winner	B Company, 193d Aviation (AVIM), Wheeler Army Airfield, HI (Region IVA)
SSA Level I (C) Small TDA	ARNG	Winner	USPFO, Supply Center, Lincoln, NE (Region IIIA)
		Runner-Up	USPFO, S&S Division, Camp Douglas, WI (Region IIIA)
SSA Level II (A) Large MTOE Class IX	ARNG	Winner	USPFO, S&S Warehouse, Springfield, IL (Region IIIA)
		Runner-Up	Director of Logistics Class IX Warehouse, Little Falls, MN (Region IIIA)
MTOE Level I (B) Company/Battery/Troop/ Detachment without Property Book	USAR	Winner	216th Transportation Detachment, Fort Bragg, NC (FORSCOM)
MTOE Level II (B) Battalion/Squadron without Property Book	USAR	Winner	317th Quartermaster Battalion (Supply and Services), Lawrence, KS (FORSCOM)
TDA Level I (Small)	USAR	Winner	4249th Port Security Detachment (Military Police), Pocahontas, IA (FORSCOM)
		Runner-Up	SETAF Augmentation Unit, Vicenza, Italy (USAREUR)
TDA Level II (Large)	USAR	Winner	Area Maintenance Support Activity 57, Belton, MO (FORSCOM)
		Runner-Up	HHC, 353d Civil Affairs Command, Fort Wadsworth, Staten Island, NY (USASOC)

Quartermaster Commentary

Forward Logistical Element Works With Jordanian Army

CPT Sean P. Kelly

I deployed to Afghanistan for *Operation Enduring Freedom* under the impression that I was going to be a liaison officer (LNO) between my corps support group (CSG) and a Reserve Component corps support battalion (CSB) from Beaumont, TX. The CSB was responsible for a forward logistical element (FLE) in Mazar-e-Shariff, Afghanistan, with the mission of providing logistical support to the Jordanian Army field hospital.

After a couple of weeks, my mission drastically changed. I was sent to Mazar-e-Shariff with one mission: "fix it." The infrastructure, operations and base security needed a complete overhaul. Soldiers also needed to get a grasp on what supplies and equipment were on hand and try to regain accountability.

First Major Task

The mission of the FLE for Logistics Task Force 46 was to provide Class I (rations), Class II (general supplies), packaged and bulk Class III (petroleum, oils and lubricants), Class IV (construction and barrier materiel), Class VI (personal demand items), Class VII (major end items), Class VIII (medical supplies) and Class IX (repair parts) to the Jordanian Army field hospital and Jordanian Special Forces soldiers who secured the field hospital in support of *Operation Enduring Freedom*. The FLE also ran and secured the arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) and operated the airfield tower. The FLE was responsible for safe landings of all resupply flights. This was the first major task that needed overhauling.

All resupply flights were under cover of darkness, which provided its own set of challenges. The runway was the most vulnerable target. The FLE needed a plan and needed efficiency. Not a single one of my Soldiers was an air traffic controller or had ever operated an A/DACG. However, if we wanted resupply, then we needed to adapt and overcome.

Our first airfield mission was the textbook example of not having a plan, with complete inefficiency and downright danger. It took us nearly three hours to unload the aircraft, reassemble, gather all our security forces and convoy back to the base camp. For planning purposes, from the entrance to the base camp to the base of the airfield tower was less than a quarter of a mile away. Because this first mission took place during the transition of authority, I could sit back and see what changes we needed to make. I quickly realized that the reason we were so inefficient was because we had no plan, and no one actually had an assigned job. First, we needed to build a sand table so we could go over step-by-step what each Soldier would be doing. The Soldiers never really visually saw what their counterparts were doing. We also went through a series of battle drills and rehearsals. We needed to cut down our time on the airfield and operate as a well-rehearsed team. Just getting back to the basics and doing the right thing allowed us to cut our time on target to one hour from landing to departure. Before every mission we rock-drilled and rehearsed actions on the objective, as well as conducted an after action report (AAR) on what we could have improved.

The second improvement was to increase the quality of our support to our customer, the Jordanian Army. One of the Jordanians' many complaints centered on rations and our Class I supply point. The previous command had set up a Class I point with three refrigerated "reefer" vans (two of which were inoperable) and more than 20 huge CONEX containers purchased locally. We had three situations that needed resolution quickly. The first problem was that no one knew what was in each CONEX. There was no inventory accountability, and this led to our second problem of rotating stock. The third problem was a limitation on the number of fresh food enhancements to the Unitized Group Rations-A

(UGR-A) that we were able to store because only one of the three refrigerated vans was operating. This resulted in issuing UGR-Heat and Serve meals day-in and day-out. The Jordanians knew what we were capable of issuing to them, and they often complained after weeks of just “heat and serves,” supplemented by the Army’s standard Halal meal.

To make these improvements to the Class I point, we first conducted a complete stock inventory. Then we labeled each CONEX with its contents posted on the outside. Next, we needed to establish the first-in, first-out concept. We needed to rotate all stocks and move stocks forward as we were resupplied. The Jordanians refused, not accepting anything that had expired - and rightly so. As for the “reefer” vans that did not refrigerate perishable foods, the standard answer was “I don’t know why they don’t work, Sir.” Wrong answer! We quickly found out that the “reefer” vans were not hooked up to the correct generators. Quick and easy fix. Now, with three, fully mission capable “reefers,” our ability to store perishable foods increased twofold. This was a step in the right direction to improving our relationship with the Jordanians. All this step took was a little adult supervision, and a basic understanding of supply support activity operations and commodity accountability.

Plan of Action

After improving resupply operations and the quality of rations support to the Jordanians, we needed to completely overhaul the camp infrastructure and security operations. We had to develop a plan of action. Typical missions included base camp design and closure, force protection analysis, ammunition supply point upgrade, main supply route maintenance, and basic public works missions in support of base camps.

A book of standards, commonly referred to as the “Red Book,” was developed by United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineers. The “Red Book” provided a blueprint for planning and requirements for base camp construction and maintenance. A similar book of standards known as the “Sand Book” was developed for the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. This “Sand Book” field guide was modeled after Chapter 9 of FM 3-34 (Engineer Operations), titled “Engineer Combat Service Support and Logistics.” FM 3-34

outlines base camp operations and provides infrastructure and base camp layouts. The CENTCOM “Sand Book” tells month-to-month what the camp should look like and what improvements to plan to make. With the “Sand Book” as a guide, we realized that we needed some major improvements.

Before we started these infrastructure and security improvements, we realized we needed to do three things: request engineer/carpenter support, figure out what projects we were going to do and request the appropriate supplies, and discuss our plans with our neighbors the Jordanians, especially when securing the camp. The Jordanian Army sent a company-plus sized element of their Special Forces soldiers with their field hospital staff to provide security for the camp. This sounds good on paper, but the Jordanian Army’s methods of securing the camp and the US Army’s methods are completely different.

In order not to offend the Jordanians in any way, we were very careful to assume the US Army’s “teach, coach, mentor” role. Not only did US Soldiers have our own disagreements on security for the base camp, there seemed to be an internal disagreement between the Jordanian special forces commander and the Jordanian hospital commander. The Jordanian hospital commander did not want the camp to become a “fortress,” as he would say. He wanted the camp to be inviting because he believed anything less would deter Afghani patients from coming for much-needed medical attention. In the end, after a few rocket attacks and random rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire on the camp, the Jordanians realized that much more security was needed.

We first tightened up front gate procedures. The front gate was too accessible. The solution was to locally purchase 55-gallon drums from an Afghani merchant, fill them with rock and dirt and place them as obstacles on the main road to slow down the cars and trucks coming to the gate. This security measure, of course, did not sit very well with the hospital commander until we promised to paint the Jordanian flag and United States flag on every other barrel - not too tactical a solution to the hospital commander’s displeasure but a compromise.

We used an Army Engineer handbook to figure out how far apart to separate these barrels to control

the speed of vehicles approaching the main gate. This was an attempt to stop a suicide bomber from smashing through. We then placed lined, wire-mesh barricades filled with dirt and rock (called HESCOs because of the manufacturer's trademarked name) in front of the triple-strand wire that stretched around the camp to block any high-speed avenues of approach. We later set more triple-strand in front of the HESCOs to act as "slow go." Instead of just one deterrent (triple-strand wire), we had three.

Nontactical Compromise

That also took some negotiating with the Jordanians, another nontactical compromise. Before setting up the HESCOs, we told them our plan. Immediately, the Jordanians said "no." If the Jordanians would allow HESCOs around the base perimeter, we offered to build towers in six locations around the perimeter to protect Jordanian soldiers on guard duty from the elements. The Jordanians agreed with the HESCOs and also gave the go-ahead to build six spotting towers that were as high as two CONEXes, which we already had plans to build in the first place. The lesson learned? Force protection may be a huge priority for the US Army, but coalition counterparts may not see the situation the same way. We chose to find ways for the Jordanians to "buy into our program." We always remembered our goal: protection of troops.

Another major problem was trash and trash disposal. Our two cultures had different viewpoints. The Jordanian Army and the US Army had different standards for keeping the camp clean. We felt that the camp's appearance was a direct reflection on us. Our solution was to hire a local contractor to pick up the trash. The bigger issue became what to do with the collected trash. We decided upon bringing all trash collected to a location at least one mile away for burning and then burial. Sounds easy enough? Wrong.

No matter what was collected as trash, the local Afghans wanted it. Eventually, we realized our local contractor was getting "shaken down" for the camp's trash. We decided to escort him to the burn site, set up 360-degree security around the site, watch him burn the trash, bury the trash, and to keep any Afghans from trying to jump into the fire to retrieve any salvageable trash. Local Afghani citizens did try to come

through our perimeter at the burn site. It was important to make sure the camp's trash was destroyed because a lot of our trash was also medical waste.

Trash pick-up was a big issue for us - not only for the camp's outward appearance, but also for sanitary purposes. I gathered all our Afghani trash collectors, put them at double-arm interval and walked with them from one end of the camp to the other, showing them everything we expected them to pick up. We took this walk a couple of times because they would sometimes miss what we defined as trash. I will never forget the day I looked out of the tent to see the Afghani trash collectors walking on line without me organizing them to pick up trash and clean the camp.

Once we got the mission down and every Soldier understood that his job was more than just pumping fuel, rotating stock or inventorying medical supplies, everything went more smoothly. Each Soldier's job was whatever needed to be done to survive. We not only had issues trying to do our job in a hostile environment where rocket fire and stray RPGs were the norm, we also had to provide support to the Jordanian Army that has different procedures and standards. It took a lot of patience and hard work from both sides to understand each other and live together. Working with an army within the coalition for *Operation Enduring Freedom* can be very challenging, but very rewarding. It provides a firsthand look at how different coalition forces operate, interact, live and overcome cultural differences. It also provides an insight on how different countries view their roles in the global war on terrorism.

CPT Sean P. Kelly is completing the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course at Fort Lee, Virginia. His next assignment will be as a Logistics Operations Officer, 2/160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Previous duty positions include Rigger (Aerial Delivery) Platoon Leader and Rigger Executive Officer (Aerial Delivery) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Executive Officer, Forward Logistics Element at Mazar-e-Shariff, Afghanistan; Battalion S4 (Logistics) at Fort Bragg; and a year in Korea with the 2d Infantry Division. He has a bachelor of arts degree from Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.

Army Rapid Acquisition Initiative Yields Improvements in Property Accountability

COL David W. Coker

Since the mid-1990s, the Army has invested in information systems and communication technologies to enhance its logistical flow and improve its warfighting capability. Innovations in property accountability and real-time asset information tracking were at the heart of these efforts. As web-based technology and network-centric architectures became realities, the Army realized an immediate need for a system that could use those capabilities to address the shortcomings of legacy systems and fulfill the logistics needs of an increasingly complex, global operational environment.

Legacy logistics systems developed in the 1970s and 1980s were built for “sneaker net” communications. They used floppy disks, ZIP disks and other media to transfer information from one computer to another. The disparate and duplicative nature of these databases and software systems could not support the increased volume or fulfill the situational awareness and information needs of today’s fast-paced tactical operations.

To solve asset accountability and tracking problems, the Army developed the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army) program, which includes modernization of the Army’s existing property book system, known as the Standard Property Book System-Redesign (SPBS-R). In a parallel attempt to resolve accountability issues across all military services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense released the Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) 54, mandating the implementation of web-based data environments for early deploying units.

Transition From Pilot to System

To address a long history of property accountability problems and answer the mandate to web-enable data environments by FY04, the Army established a property book pilot program to determine the feasibility and benefits of using web-based

logistics technology for standard Army information systems. The pilot was based upon three key assumptions. First, available communications would allow the system developer to pursue state-of-the-art web technology. Second, the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) portal would be used to leverage its security, E-mail, single sign-on, and planned disaster recovery capability. Third, a rapid acquisition program would be used.

The key to the pilot program’s success was its rapid acquisition strategy, which featured a spiral development team approach and extensive business process reengineering. In a very short time, the pilot program successfully demonstrated that Army property book personnel and managers could perform their duties from any computer equipped with a web browser. (An additional stand-alone capability that supports split-based operations was developed for users to operate for months without communications.)

Extremely well-received by the Army leadership, the pilot program became a major catalyst in the funding of interim satellite communications for the combat service support community until the Warfighters Information Network-Tactical can be fielded (expected in FY09). In fact, the initial pilot program was so successful that the acquisition strategy for the property book module of GCSS-Army was restructured to a web-based capability.

In less than a year after the pilot program, a new software package called Property Book-Enhanced was ready for Armywide operation. The project manager for Logistics Information Systems, Fort Lee, VA, then directed the expansion of the Property Book-Enhanced software to include unit supply. The updated software, renamed Property Book and Unit Supply-Enhanced (PBUSE), replaced these two aging legacy systems: the SPBS-R and the unit supply version of the Unit Level Logistics System

(ULLS-S4). PBUSE is serving as an interim step to future capabilities in tactical organizations.

Benefits of the PBUSE System

Improved Data Accuracy and Availability. The most immediate and tangible benefits of PBUSE are the improved data accuracy and ease of data retrieval. Data from the Army's legacy systems were frequently inaccurate and outdated by 15 to 45 days. With a centralized database, PBUSE effectively eliminates this delay and data are presented in real-time.

As PBUSE is fielded, weapon system project managers and item managers can see the location of their assets. Warfighters can call upon a reliable source of information to support operational planning and command and control systems. PBUSE also increases the warfighter's reporting capability. Gone are the hard-coded and paper-based reports. Using a relational database and the World Wide Web, information from PBUSE can be downloaded or exported in formats that are user friendly. With accurate and up-to-the-minute information, planning is far more efficient, allowing units to accomplish more with less.

Better Operational Support. With PBUSE's web-enabled capabilities, organizations based in the continental United States (CONUS) can better support deployed operations. The new system helps weapon system project managers and commanders manage lateral transfers and tactical deployments. Property being transferred is instantaneously visible to and owned by the gaining unit, ensuring proper accountability. Improvements in the quality of serial number tracking, weapons accountability and strategic-level visibility ensure total Army asset visibility worldwide.

Fewer Data Sources. PBUSE's centralized database eliminates the need for thousands of smaller databases throughout the Army. Decision makers at all levels can readily access accurate, real-time information. Duplicate serial numbers and poor accountability cited by past audits have been eliminated. In addition, the unit supply rooms and the property book offices use the same database, so time-consuming data reconciliation is no longer necessary.

Better Collaboration and Interoperability.

PBUSE provides a common source of information required to support war-planning. To aid planning, personnel on the Army and Joint Staff can view data relevant to their operations and download required information directly into the Global Combat Support System (GCSS), the joint command and control system.

The GCSS's interface with the Logistics Integrated Database that is managed by the Army Materiel Command's Logistics Support Agency (LOGSA) provides the relevant and accurate asset visibility data sought by operational planners. When LOGSA personnel extract information, they are assured of consistent and accurate data.

Use of the centralized PBUSE database also eliminates any need for monthly reporting (such as on-hand property and serial number reporting) by units to LOGSA. Likewise, users no longer need to submit the annual Federal Financial Management Improvement Act reports because algorithms built into PBUSE generate this report for LOGSA submission.

Easier Use. The user is the focus of the PBUSE system. The software is easy to use, and a property book officer (PBO) with experience in SPBS-R can learn the basics of PBUSE in just eight hours. All authorized users - from decision makers to clerks - can obtain information from any computer with an Internet connection and a web browser. The commander no longer needs to call a PBO to request information. With PBUSE, the commander can access the information directly without calling the PBO; or the PBO can immediately requisition items while the commander is still on the line.

Before PBUSE, about 30 percent of all requisitions were submitted incorrectly, which often delayed the delivery of much-needed supplies to a unit. PBUSE eliminates time-consuming automated processes (such as reporting and reconciliation) and frees time to focus on property management. For example, LOGSA now updates the current Federal Catalog (FEDLOG) database in the PBUSE database every month. Not only is FEDLOG data reconciled immediately upon submission, but also the user is notified of errors immediately.

User Transition

In April 2002, the Army redirected the technical baseline for its tactical logistics modernization effort from custom development to an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) baseline. Over the last 10 years, private industry had proven conclusively that ERP-integrated solutions provided enormous gains in operational efficiency, data quality and access, global reach, software quality, post deployment support and return on investment. PBUSE, because of its innovative use of web portals, data access and high data integrity, paved the way for Army users to gain knowledge of web-based applications and more readily adapt their behavior to optimize the capabilities of web-based solutions. Almost immediately the concept of an integrated system that operated in real time with a single source of accurate, timely data became the benchmark to influence leaders that the Internet could become a combat multiplier for the Army, much as the Internet had influenced profitability and market share for private industry.

PBUSE Scope of Operations

PBUSE is the first standardized Army information system to operate on the Army Knowledge Online portal. When fielding is complete, PBUSE will be used in every major command's property book and company supply operation. Every property book in the Army could conceivably be updated in PBUSE. This includes supporting units that are less than company size or even Army museums and other historical property.

During the Armywide fielding - the largest single-system fielding ever conducted under Army project management control - 28,000 personal computers will be issued to support PBUSE. Users are provided Pentium-class workstations using a Windows 2000 operating system. Other computers may be used for access to the central database, but random access memory (RAM) and storage requirements must be met to ensure system performance is not degraded.

To date, PBUSE has been fielded in 30 percent of its intended basis of issue plan, including 7 of the 8 Army National Guard (ARNG) divisions, 12 of the 14 ARNG enhanced brigades, and 2 of the 10 Active Army divisions. As of January 2004, 850 SPBS-R and 787 ULLS-S4 systems have been converted to

PBUSE, 4,000 computers have been fielded, and more than 3,412 users received formal training. This equates to a 516-man-year cost avoidance.

PBUSE already controls more than \$42.5 billion of property and tracks more than 1.8 million items. PBUSE contains a customer base of 7,912 unit identification codes and manages more than 500,000 transactions per month.


PBUSE Concept of Operations

PBUSE consists of a protected central database server and web server, and several client computers. With the fielded hardware suite, users have the office automation tools, communications and web browsers necessary to access the central server. They also are equipped with a laser printer for document and report production.

PBUSE relies on a sustainable telecommunications network. The primary link to the user is the Internet, with access provided either through a local area network or a dial-up communications network. Because the system can also operate in the stand-alone mode, PBUSE can be linked through tactical networks using satellite or land communications. Primary tactical communications are through the Mobile Subscriber Equipment network.

Figure 1 illustrates the basic concept of operation of the PBUSE system and demonstrates the network-based links among warfighters, the logistics system and the Army Knowledge Online portal.

Army innovation has developed and fielded a highly accurate, modern, user-friendly software tool to manage Army property. PBUSE will take the Army into a new era of systems architecture and shared data environments. The technology and vastly improved asset accounting of PBUSE will resolve many longstanding Army accountability and audit problems with chief financial officer compliance. More importantly, PBUSE offers Army planners and commanders the superlative data retrieval capability they require in today's remarkably fast-paced battlefield. PBUSE has proven that dedicated satellite communications is a viable solution to providing Army logisticians and their customers the global data environment they need to achieve their logistics and transformation goals.



PBUSE is the first web-based accountability system business process reengineering of SPBS-R and ULLS-S4

PBUSE can operate in a stand-alone configuration for disconnected operations

PBUSE supports split-based operations

PBUSE is CFO compliant for the MTOE and fielded on COTS laptops

Figure 1. Property Book and Unit Supply-Enhanced (PBUSE) Concept of Operation

LEGEND:

AKO Army Knowledge Online
 CBS-X Continuing Balance System-Expanded
 CFO chief financial officer
 COTS commercial off the shelf
 LIDB Logistics Integrated Data Base
 MACOM major Army command

MTOE modification table of organization and equipment
 NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
 PB property book
 PBO property book officer
 PBUSE Property Book and Unit Supply-Enhanced
 SPBS-R Standard Property Book System-Redesign
 ULLS-S4 Unit Level Logistics System

The rapid acquisition process and partnership with industry that has been so critical to this program will become the benchmark, increasing the cost effectiveness and timeliness of other follow-on acquisitions. PBUSE has placed the Army on course with tomorrow's

information technology innovations and increased the effectiveness of Army knowledge management systems and the capabilities of all users of the system Armywide. As a result, Soldiers will get the tools they need more quickly and more effectively.

COL David W. Coker is the Project Manager, Logistics Information Systems, Fort Lee, Virginia. He entered the Army in 1980 after completing the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, as a Distinguished Military Graduate. He has bachelor of science degree in business administration, master of science degree in procurement/contract management, master's degree in business administration, and a master's degree in national strategic resource management. He is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff College, Logistics Executive Development Course, Program Managers Course, Senior Acquisition Course, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Program Managers Executive Development Course. He is responsible for developing, fielding and sustaining the following systems: Property Book Unit Supply-Enhanced (PBUSE), Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army), Movement Tracking System (MTS), Joint Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistics Support (JCALS), Tactical Logistics Data Digitization (TLDD), Financial Management Tactical Platform (FMTP), and current logistics Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS).

Initial Communist Chinese Logistics in the Korean War

LTC Patrick A. Reiter

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The Korean War began with a surprise attack June 25, 1950, when 90,000 soldiers of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) attacked across the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) to the south. Many in the NKPA had served in the Chinese and Soviet armies in World War II. The United Nations Security Council denounced North Korea's actions and called for NKPA withdrawal to the 38th Parallel dividing North and South Korea. Combat operations did not end until 37 months later, with the signing of an armistice on July 27, 1953.*


In 1950, the Chinese Communist regime was terribly vulnerable. The civil war in mainland China had ended only the previous August with the fleeing of Chiang Kai-shek to the island of Taiwan. Since then, the Chinese Communist government had been engaged in the suppression of hundreds of thousands of anti-communist "bandits" and many secret societies dedicated to the overthrow of the communist state. The mainland Chinese leadership was wrestling desperately with the staggering economic problems caused by 12 years of civil war, 1937-1949.

Agricultural acreage was less than two-thirds of prewar tillage, and output fell by more than 40 percent. Only half of the prewar draft animals remained. Declines in hogs, sheep and fertilizer reached 80 to 90 percent. Farm tools were fewer by 40 to 60 percent. Industrial production had also declined. Compared with the "pre-liberation" peaks, physical output in 1949 Communist China was as follows: petroleum 38.1 percent of capacity, pig iron 13.6 percent, steel 17.2 percent, and metal-cutting machines 29.4 percent.

Communist leaders were still seeking to secure what they considered China's own borders. On October 7, 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army moved into Tibet. (This was the same day the

United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution approving the advance of American and Allied forces under the United Nations Command into North Korea.) China completed its occupation of Tibet the following year.

Meanwhile, in the east, Beijing's attentions were overwhelmingly focused upon eliminating Taiwan (then called Formosa) as the base of Nationalist Chinese opposition to the communist regime in mainland China. Throughout the summer of 1950 invasion barges (called "junks") were being built. Some 5,000 junks assembled, and airfields prepared to support the assault on Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan stronghold. The Third Field Army's deputy commander, Su Yu, declared that the invasion would be "an extremely big problem, and will involve the biggest campaign in the history of modern Chinese warfare." Yet amid all this, Mao Zedong was seeking to demobilize vast masses of his unwieldy People's Liberation Army. Mao sought to return soldiers to the factories, fields and workshops where they were so desperately needed. The simultaneous demobilization of soldiers in mainland China while preparing for invasion of Taiwan was a problem that



South Korean Refugees

leadership in Beijing had failed to resolve by the autumn of 1950.

At the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Mao Zedong had visited Moscow in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) controlled by the Soviet Communist Party. The widely publicized outcome was a friendship treaty between China and the Soviet Union, a continued Soviet presence in the Chinese region of Manchuria, and \$300 million in economic aid to China spread over 5 years. This was one-tenth of the amount Mao had hoped to obtain from Soviet Communist leadership.

The People's Liberation Army in China was still equipped with arms captured from the Japanese, supplied by the Americans to the Nationalist Chinese or with Czechoslovakian weapons bought on the open market. However, much of this equipment was worn out or stalled for lack of spare parts. The most limited small arms production could not be expected for two or three years. The manufacture of heavy weapons would have to wait until mainland China manufactured enough steel.

Manchuria had housed China's largest industrial base. However, the Soviets had gutted the factories and shipped the machinery back home. Ammunition supplies were dangerously low because aging reserve stocks were deteriorating more rapidly than China's few arsenals could replenish them. Communist China, including Manchuria, was producing artillery ammunition in 1950 at a rate close to 90,000 rounds a year. (By way of comparison, 21 United Nations battalions fired 309,958 rounds in support of X Corps during the Battle of Soyang, May 17-23, 1951.) Production of small arms ammunition was approximately 1.25 million cartridges per day. China did not produce enough steel for its own use.

Primitive Field Equipment

In terms of actual field equipment in China, the People's Liberation Army in 1950 was primitive by any standards. It has been compared to any army of 1914, primarily an army of infantry soldiers without trucks and artillery. No air support and no anti-aircraft defense existed. Communications from regiment downward was by telephone or by runners. Normally, each battalion headquarters had only one field

telephone, and none below that. Bugles, whistles and runners were the communications methods below battalion level. The local population had provided logistical support during the Chinese civil war. When the Chinese Communist forces entered Korea, these Chinese soldiers were fighting outside of their home territory for the first time.

Key to Chinese Warfare

Manpower was the Chinese key to warfare, and manpower almost alone. On July 15, 1950, the People's Liberation Army totaled 5,138,756 Chinese soldiers. Of these, fewer than half could be considered combat-effective. In many regiments only one man in five had a weapon. The others were told to use grenades until they managed to capture a rifle. Grenades, mortar tubes and mortar shells were plentiful and cheap to manufacture.

The collapse of the Nationalist Chinese armies came so suddenly during China's civil war that the victorious People's Liberation Army had picked up 2.25 million prisoners in the last two years of the war alone. The surrendered soldiers could neither be left to starve, nor could they be allowed to roam freely and cause trouble. These former "enemy" Chinese soldiers had to be temporarily absorbed into the People's Liberation Army in some capacity. Between 50 and 70 percent of the members of the units sent to Korea in the initial intervention were made up of former Nationalist Chinese soldiers, including the noncommissioned officers and junior officers.

For logistical transport, rail, truck and pack animals were all very limited in the initial operations. The Chinese soldiers had to lean, as in the past, on the sturdy shoulders of the laboring masses. For example, China's Revolutionary Committee of the Northeast had recruited more than half a million unskilled laborers called "coolies" to carry food and ammunition south across the Yalu River in North Korea.

On October 14, Chinese Communist forces began to cross the Yalu River in great secrecy. By October 24 when ready to strike, they would number nearly 200,000 in North Korea – more than three times the size of the largest force that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur had estimated Chinese Communists could possibly get across the river. On

November 2, General MacArthur told the US Joint Chiefs of Staff that Beijing had so far sent in a total of about 16,500 men.

Discipline 'Perfect'

Upon crossing the Yalu River, the Chinese forces employed in the initial attacks were given 4 or 5 days worth of cooked rations and between 40 and 80 rounds of ammunition. In bivouac, no Chinese soldier showed himself, for any reason. Discipline was firm, and perfect. Any man who violated instructions in any way was shot. Chinese soldiers were inured to hardship. They were accustomed to living in the open in all extremes of weather and to subsisting on small amounts of food. They were trained and experienced in guerilla warfare and were adept at hiding, at improvising and at maneuvering on foot in the most inhospitable terrain. The Chinese cavalry forces were mounted on Mongolian ponies.

In 1950 in North Korea, the principal means of transportation were railroads and oxcarts. Few paved roads existed and most of these were in the southern part of the country. Nearly all other roads were dirt, scarcely of all-weather construction, and mostly single lanes. A good many were barely traversable by military vehicles. Most of the roads held up reasonably well in the freezing weather. For the Chinese forces, the North Korean road system was of minimal importance. The two Chinese transportation units (5th and 42d Truck Regiments) assigned to operations in Korea had a total of 800 trucks (the Americans were thought to have at least 2,400), but were lucky to keep more than 300 or 400 trucks operational. The breakdown rate was appalling.

The civilian population in North Korea and the meager resources of the land did not provide the Chinese armies with the support upon which they relied in China. There was little opportunity for living off the land. Even so, the Chinese did requisition grain from the limited resources of some of the Korean villages. Those grain requisitions, depriving many villages of their winter food supply, contributed to a huge refugee problem.

General Peng Dehuai's army, after only five days of operations, was running out of supplies and could not maintain the pace. It was not the Americans who

were defeating him: it was winter and the Chinese inability to fight this sort of war on a straight offensive basis. The logistics of an attacking army are much more difficult than those of a defending army. General Peng's logistics, by his own statements, were so ridiculous as to be laughable.

The rubber-and-canvas tennis shoes worn by the Chinese soldiers provided no protection against the cold and resulted in extremely heavy rates of frozen feet. The basic uniform was heavily quilted cotton, usually of a mustard brown hue that blended with the bleak Korean landscape. Warm in dry weather, the quilted uniforms were impossible to dry when soaked. Few Chinese soldiers had gloves, so many suffered from frostbitten or frozen hands. They often had to sleep out in the open, in minus-30 degrees Centigrade, without blankets. It was so cold that they could not sleep lying down but had to rest in a sitting position. They could not light fires because of the United States planes. Ears, noses, fingers and toes often dropped off at a mere touch. Sleeping bags were obtained only if captured from the United States forces. In fact, two-thirds of the Chinese casualties were from the cold that winter, against one-third from combat. Chinese veterans later declared that 90 percent of the "volunteers" in Korea suffered from some degree of frostbite in the winter of 1950.

Steady, Unvaried Diet

While cooks were part of the Communist Chinese forces, the Chinese soldiers mainly subsisted on shaoping, a hard unleavened bread. Each soldier carried his own measure of a concoction of sorghum, millet, lima beans and wheat flour from which he prepared shaoping and then ate while on the move. The Chinese soldier had little opportunity to enjoy hot food because United States air superiority and continual air reconnaissance obliged Chinese units to avoid building fires. The steady, unvaried diet of cold food caused large numbers of Chinese soldiers to suffer diseases of the digestive tract.

Medical evacuation and treatment of the wounded were minimal, sometimes nonexistent. In the extremely cold weather, a wounded Chinese soldier was often a dead soldier. There is some evidence that Communist Party members were given preferential medical treatment. According to one

account by a captured Communist Chinese forces officer who later refused repatriation, Communist Party members had a special insignia inside their jackets. Aid men were told to look first to see if a wounded man had such an insignia. If so, he was saved if at all possible. It did not matter about the other soldiers. If they were unable to walk, they were either left or shot.

Soldiers Left Where They Fell

No documentation could be found to confirm that mortuary affairs services were part of the initial Communist Chinese forces. Basically, soldiers were left where they fell. The resources to recover, process and transport bodies simply did not exist. Burial was not considered.

China's Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai, reporting the international situation to a group of government officials soon after China's intervention, announced: "We are prepared to withdraw, if necessary, from the coastal provinces to the hinterland, and build up the Northwest and Southwest provinces as bases for a long-drawn-out war." The Chinese, in fact, did remove machinery and other materiel from China's coastal provinces, including the huge furnaces of an important steelworks.

The long-term logistical impact was immense. According to the Pentagon in Washington, DC, the Chinese losses were 401,401 killed, 21,211 missing and 486,995 wounded. The economic cost of the war in Korea to China proved crippling.

Perhaps most surprising, the strongest evidence of the Soviet Union's lack of enthusiasm for the Korean War lies in the sluggishness with which Stalin in Moscow supplied materiel to Mao in Beijing. Only in Autumn 1951 did Soviet military supplies begin to move in quantity to China. Not only did the Soviet leaders demand money for weapons but they also collected interest. Also, China was excluded from the United Nations and therefore lost any chance of conclusively ending its own civil war by taking Taiwan. Economic reconstruction was impeded by the demands of the war, and the Communist Chinese regime accumulated a huge debt to the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. The Communist Chinese later complained that no free aid

was ever offered by the communist leadership in the Soviet Union.

In summary, the initial Communist Chinese logistics in the Korean War proved that support could be provided over relatively short distances with a very basic infrastructure. The ability to provide support dropped proportionally to the distance the assets were transported. Additionally, the willingness to forgo certain logistical support made transport available for other requirements. The decision to use the Soviet Union's aid to develop the logistical system quickly changed the support framework of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea.

LTC Patrick A. Reiter is enroute back to the US Army Combined Arms Support Command (USACASCOM) at Fort Lee, Virginia, after serving as Executive Officer, 55th Theater Materiel Management Center, Theater Support Command, Daegu, Republic of Korea (ROK). LTC Reiter previously served as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Project Officer at USACASCOM and in the Eighth Army G4 (Logistics), Yongsan, ROK. Previous military positions also include Support Operations Officer, 68th Corps Support Battalion, and Maintenance Officer, 43d Area Support Group, and S4 (Logistics Officer), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Carson, Colorado; Garrison Company Commander and Brigade S4 (Logistics), Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; Commander, 496th Repair Parts Company, Boblingen, Germany, and Operation Desert Storm; S2 (Intelligence Officer)/S3 (Operations Officer) and Petroleum Officer, 13th Supply and Services Battalion, Ludwigsburg, Germany. His initial service was as M1 Platoon Leader and Company Executive Officer, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He is a graduate of the Airborne School, Armored Cavalry Officer Basic Course, Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course, Combined Logistics Captains Career Course and the Command and General Staff College. He has a bachelor's degree from Bowling Green State University in Ohio and a master's degree from Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana.



SAFETY SAVES SOLDIERS



Safety and Leader Support

Michael L. Davis

Safety Specialist Assigned to the US Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, VA

Army missions are demanding and become complex as the Army is forced to extend operations. Missions are also inherently dangerous, not only for personnel but also for equipment. Leaders of all ranks must remember to integrate the Army Safety Program into all military decisions.

While leaders are responsible for the overall goals of the Army Safety Program, all personnel are responsible for following all standards and using their training to help reduce accidents and injuries.

Remember that budgetary requirements need amendments to meet all safety measures, including safety training or equipment replacement if damaged or destroyed. Lack of resources cannot be used as an excuse for not complying with safety standards.

Safety, supervision and controls do not work when the unit's safety program is not supported and resources are not provided.

A proactive safety program provides for successful accomplishment by training personnel on hazards and how to avoid them. Leaders must influence personnel to accomplish the mission with direction, support, resources, manpower, training and motivation. Only total support of safety programs - not just verbal support - training and practice can make individual Soldiers and the unit proficient in safely performing the tasks that make up a mission. Leaders need to identify specific actions that will support their safety programs.

The following are some benefits of supporting an effective safety program:

- Helps a leader to identify realistic controls that are clear, practical and specific.
- Allows accountability by leaders.
- Useful as reinforcement training.
- Assists in identifying areas in the unit that may require supervision or additional training
- Identifies feasible and effective control measures where published standards do not exist.
- Allows a leader to identify the major hazards that personnel and equipment will face during a training event or during a real operation.
- Enhances situational awareness as a unit safety program.
- Helps leaders to maintain Army standards and discipline.
- Helps identify weak points in the unit capabilities and how to improve the unit abilities.
- Acts as a very good tool to assess the ever-changing hazards that may affect an operation.
- Helps leaders in making decisions that balance risk with mission benefits.
- Allows leaders to conserve lives and equipment.
- Helps reduce the degradation of the mission and increases unit effectiveness.

Failure to enforce safety requirements makes operations costly as measured by loss of personnel and equipment, and damage to the environment. Support of safety is not just leader's business - everyone makes safety happen! However, accidents can be reduced only when the tools of the Army Safety Program are integrated, used and applied to the unit's mission.



CAREER NEWS

Professional Development

The US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) has merged into the US Army Human Resources Command (HRC). The HRC combines the Active Component and Reserve Component personnel commands into one command. Quartermasters now access the content of the former PERSCOM online web site from the new HRC home page at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/>. For more information about Quartermaster Corps officer, warrant officer and noncommissioned officer issues, access the Office of the Quartermaster General web site at www.quartermaster.army.mil/. Access www.us.army.mil to set up a free E-mail account with Army Knowledge Online.

Significant Changes in Army Personnel Management

LTC Tracy Cleaver, Chief, Quartermaster Officer Personnel Management
Tracy.Cleaver@hoffman.army.mil, DSN 221-5266

Significant changes in Army personnel management will continue during the next couple of years. The Human Resources Command (HRC) is currently leading a Chief of Staff, Army initiative to review Officer Personnel Management System III and recommend adjustments to better serve Soldiers. As those recommendations are approved, we will ensure notification to the field.

Officer Assignment Process

Since I arrived at HRC two years ago, the Army's assignment process has changed constantly. The system has changed from two assignment cycles that moved most officers during the summer cycle to a system that will assign officers using three cycles per year (1 October-31 January, 1 February-31 May, 1 June-30 September). This three-cycle system will best support both the Army at war and the Army as it modularizes. During this process, we will continue to match officer skills and experience, professional development and personal preferences, where applicable. The three-cycle system will require some Army families to move during the school year. Officers will be notified of a permanent change of station (PCS) 6 months before the report date instead of the previous timeframe of 10-12 months before the report date. We will continue to provide as much time as possible in the notification process. However, that is out of Quartermaster Branch's hands most of the time. The overall, driving factor in every officer assignment will be meeting the Army's requirements.

Functional Area (FA) 90 Certification Panel

The HRC Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) recently conducted a FA90 Certification Panel with the FA90 Proponent at the US Army Combined Arms Support Command (USACASCOM). This panel will be held annually along with the release of the Lieutenant Colonel Promotion List. The intent of the panel is to ensure that only officers who complete FA90 branch qualification according to DA Pamphlet 600-3 (Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management) retain the FA90 designation. The panel reviews the files of all lieutenant colonels selected in the Quartermaster, Medical Service, Aviation, Ordnance and Transportation Corps who possess the FA90 designation of multifunctional logistician. Officers who do not retain FA90 certification will not be able to compete for command in the multifunctional categories of 6S and 6SM. Officers who do not retain their FA90 designator will still be eligible to compete in their basic branch functional categories and 6SR (multifunctional training and strategic support). There is an appeals process. If you would like more information, contact the FA90 Branch or your assignments officer. The following chart shows this fiscal year's results:

<i>FY04 Certification Panel Statistics for FA90</i>					
<i>Branch</i>	<i>Number of files reviewed</i>	<i>Number who retained FA90</i>	<i>Percent retained</i>	<i>Number not retained FA90</i>	<i>Percent removed</i>
Aviation	21	5	23.81	16	76.19
Medical Service	13	7	53.85	6	46.15
Ordnance	58	50	86.21	8	13.79
Quartermaster	62	58	93.55	4	6.45
Transportation	54	29	53.70	25	46.30
Total	208	149	71.63	59	28.37

In closing, I must say that the Quartermaster Corps is full of outstanding officers who stand ready to meet Army requirements and answer the call on short notice. During the past six to eight months, we have had to call upon officers in the Officer Basic Course and Combined Logistics Captains Course and officers around the world to divert them from current orders or place them on short-notice report dates (most with only 30 days to report) to meet requirements of the global war on terrorism. All Quartermasters have answered the call. Their dedications to duty, professionalism and selfless service have been humbling. It is an honor to serve you as the Quartermaster Branch Chief, and I know you will continue "Supporting Victory" wherever and whenever called.

*FY06 Lieutenant Colonel Battalion Command Board,
Cohort Year Groups, Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) Online*
LTC Timothy D. Brown, Lieutenant Colonel Assignments Officer
Timothy.brown@hoffman.army.mil, DSN 221-5269

FY06 Lieutenant Colonel Battalion Command Board.

The FY06 Lieutenant Colonel Battalion Command Board will convene on or about 30 Sep 04. Battalion command is extremely competitive. In an average year, about 70-75 percent of the officers in the primary zone are selected for lieutenant colonel. Of that 70-75 percent who are promoted, only 16 to 17 percent are selected for battalion command. An officer can get six looks for command. Year Group (YG) 88 officers will be up for their first look, with most of those selected coming from this year group.

To help answer some questions, I have added a link to the Battalion Command Slate web site at <http://perscomnd04.army.mil/CmdSlateInfo.nsf/>. You can access it with your Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login and password. You will see the battalion command slates for Quartermaster Branch, the 90A multifunctional commands, and other branches. You will normally see two slates in each of the categories. One will be for an even-numbered fiscal year (such as FY04) and one will be for an odd-numbered fiscal year (such as FY03 or FY05). If your cohort year group is an even number such as 1988, then you will compete for commands in the even-numbered fiscal year. The same applies to odd-numbered cohort year groups and fiscal years. By reviewing the lists, you will see what battalions are potentially available when you are eligible for battalion command. The Combat Service Support Battalion Command board meets in October of each year and selects officers for commands available the next fiscal year. For example, the battalion command board meeting this October (FY05) is for change of command dates in Summer 2006 (FY05). The following is a list of those categories:

<i>Battalion Command Categories</i>	<i>Area of Concentration</i>
6E-Supply Units Tactical	92B, 92A
6ER-Supply Units Training and Strategic Support	92B, 92A
6G-POL (petroleum, oils and lubricants) Units Tactical	92F
6GR-POL Units Training and Strategic Support	92F
6S-Multifunctional Support Battalion Tactical	15D,67,88,90,91,92
6SR-Multifunctional Support Battalion Training and Strategic Support	15D,67,88,90,91,92
6X-Institutional (Garrison/Brigade Support Battalion)	AS DISTRIBUTED
6Y-Institutional (US Army Recruiting Command)	AS DISTRIBUTED

Cohort Year Groups

Several officers have noticed that the Year Group shown on their Officer Record Brief (ORB) in the Basic Year Group (BYG) block has changed. This has caused confusion among some officers and commands. Earlier this year, a software update to the database software in the Total Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS) II changed the year shown from Cohort Year Group to Basic Year Group. For many officers, these two year groups are the same, but for other officers they are quite different. The BYG block on your ORB shows the fiscal year that you first started active duty. This is not necessarily your Cohort Year Group that determines when you are eligible for boards and that commands use as one criterion for slating majors to branch-qualifying jobs. Your Cohort Year Group is determined by your date of rank. Assignment officers here at HRC have asked for the Cohort Year Group to be added to the ORB. That recommendation is under review.

Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) Online

It is important to maintain your OMPF. The documents shown in the Performance, Commendatory Data, and Training & Education Data sections of your OMPF are exactly what selection and promotion boards see. If you do not keep your OMPF updated, you potentially put yourself at a disadvantage when going before a board. This could cause you to be a “nonselect” for schools or promotions because you did not maintain your OMPF. Just as civilians update their resumes before competing for the next job or promotion, officers must also update their OMPFs. Officers should review the entire OMPF the first time, and I recommend reviewing the entire file once per year.

Updating your ORB and your OMPF are simpler than ever before. Officers can access their OMPF online at the following link: <https://ompf.hoffman.army.mil/>. Access your OMPF using your AKO login and password. You will be able to view the Performance Data, Commendatory Data, Training & Education Data, and Restricted Data portions of your OMPF. You can quickly determine which documents and information, if any, are missing. OMPF Online is available 7 days a week, 24 hours a day.

You can update your OMPF in three ways. Submit missing documents through your personnel servicing battalion, send them directly to Officer Records at HRC or, as a last resort, send missing documents to Quartermaster Branch. Your social security number (SSN) must appear on the document. If your SSN is not shown on an award citation, for example, write your SSN in the upper right hand corner of the document. The quickest method is to send your documents to Officer Records by one of the three methods: E-mail, FAX or surface mail. The fastest method is to E-mail your documents to Officer Records at offrcds@hoffman.army.mil. You must scan the document in a “JPEG” format. You can send the document as stand-alone JPEG image or paste it on a Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, or Adobe document. The second method is to FAX your document to Officer Records at (703) 325-5204 or DSN 221-5204. Be sure to use a good quality FAX machine and the original document. The third method is to mail photocopies of your documents to Officer Records at Commander, Human Resources Command, ATTN: TAPC-MSR-S, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22332-0444.

You can also contact Officer Records by E-mailing to offrcds@hoffman.army.mil. Documents submitted to Officer Records should have your SSN written in the upper right hand corner. I strongly encourage you to check OMPF online three to four months before any board. If you have never checked OMPF online before, you should look at each Officer Evaluation Report front and back, as well as all other documents shown to verify they are yours. If documents are missing, submit them to Officer Records for inclusion. Documents submitted within 60 days of a board date are held for inclusion in your board file and may not appear on your OMPF until several months later after the board results are released. If a document appears in your OMPF online, it will appear before the board - except for items shown in the restricted portion of your OMPF.

Assignments, File Maintenance and Board Preparation

MAJ Darren Werner, Major Assignments Officer
Darren.Werner@hoffman.army.mil, DSN 221-5267

October-January Assignment Cycle

We at HRC are receiving requirements for officer assignments with a report date of 1 Oct 04 through 30 Jan 05. We are using the new Dynamic Distribution System (DDS). The assignments will be available on the AKO web site as they are made available. I will also post the cycle assignments on this web site. Officers assigned to units identified as "donors" will be contacted by E-mail. All officers can review the assignments available and identify preferences for future consideration

Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Board Results

Quartermasters on the FY04 promotion list for lieutenant colonel (LTC) can be found at the following link: <https://www.perscomonline.army.mil/select/ltc04.htm> The results of this promotion board confirm what we at Quartermaster Branch believe are prerequisites for promotion to LTC. The promotion rate to LTC this year was 79 percent across all branches and 72 percent for Quartermaster officers. Promotion to LTC is very competitive and will remain competitive for years to come. Two Quartermasters were selected Above the Zone (AZ), 54 officers selected in the Primary Zone (PZ), and 6 officers selected Below the Zone (BZ). With the exception of the BZ category, Quartermaster Branch experienced a reduced promotion rate this fiscal year. To determine the specific reason that Quartermasters were below the Army average for promotion is challenging, but there is a consistent theme gained from reviewing the experience and performance of those officers selected for promotion. Quartermaster majors who have a minimum of 12 months in a branch-qualifying job (BQ) and have a "heartbeat" in their evaluations have the best chance for promotion. Officers who show no peaks in their performance (flat line performance) do not get selected for promotion. The following data provides more details about results of the promotion board.

Select Analysis Primary Zone (PZ):

FY04 Board: Total number eligible = 75/ Total number selected = 54/ Percentage selected = 72.0%

FY03 Board: Total number eligible = 85/ Total number selected = 68/ Percentage selected = 80.0%

FY02 Board: Total number eligible = 78/ Total number selected = 55/ Percentage selected = 70.5%

The analysis for the Quartermaster majors selected for promotion in the PZ to LTC follows:

Of those selected, **0 or 0%** (0/54) did NOT serve in a BQ position.

Of those selected, **54 or 100%** (54/54) did serve in a BQ position.

Of those selected, **33 or 61%** (33/54) attended resident Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

Of those selected, **21 or 39%** (21/54) completed CGSC by correspondence.

Of those selected, **19 or 73.1%** (19/26) were minority officers

Of those selected, **4 or 57.1%** (4/7) were female officers

Of those selected, **3 or 6%** (3/54) held BQ jobs for more than two years.

Of those selected **27** or **50%** (27/54) held BQ jobs between 13 and 24 months.
Of those selected **24** or **44 %** (24/54) held BQ jobs for 12 months.

Overall Trends for Those Selected in the Primary Zone

***21 of 54 officers with only 12 months of BQ time were serving in a second BQ job when the board met and will complete the second BQ job before the LTC Battalion Command Board.

Select Analysis AZ:

FY04 Board: Total number eligible = **58**/ Total number selected = **2** /Percentage selected = **3.4%**
FY03 Board: Total number eligible = **61**/ Total number selected = **6** /Percentage selected = **9.8%**
FY02 Board: Total number eligible = **55**/ Total number selected = **5** /Percentage selected = **9.1%**

Overall Trends for Those Selected AZ

***Selected for upturns in performance. 1 x General Staff – last Officer Evaluation Report (OER) above center of mass (ACOM). 1 x Joint – last OER ACOM.

Select Analysis BZ:

FY04 Board: Total number eligible = **68**/ Total number selected = **6**/ Percentage selected = **8.8%**
FY03 Board: Total number eligible = **80**/ Total number selected = **3**/ Percentage selected = **3.8%**
FY02 Board: Total number eligible = **90**/ Total number selected = **2**/ Percentage selected = **2.2%**

The analysis for the Quartermaster majors selected for BZ promotion to LTC follows:

Of those selected, **0** or **0%** (0/6) did NOT serve in a BQ position.
Of those selected, **5** or **83%** (5/6) did serve in a BQ position.
Of those selected, **6** or **100%** (6/6) attended resident CGSC.
Of those selected, **0** or **0%** (0/0) completed CGSC by correspondence.
Of those selected, **2** or **8%** (2/25) were minority officers.
Of those selected, **0** or **0%** (0/7) were female officers.
Of those selected, **0** or **0%** (0/6) held BQ jobs for two years or more.
Of those selected, **0** or **0%** (0/6) held BQ jobs between 18 and 24 months.
Of those selected, **0** or **0%** (0/6) held BQ jobs between 12 and 18 months.
Of those selected, **5** or **83%** (5/6) held BQ jobs for 12 months.

Overall Trends for Those Selected BZ

***Light division BQ – 1, heavy division BQ – 4, and Armored Cavalry Regiment BQ – 1.

Non-Select Analysis PZ:

FY04 Board: Total number eligible = **75**/ Total number not selected = **21**/ Percentage not selected = **28.0%**.
FY03 Board: Total number eligible = **85**/ Total number not selected = **17**/ Percentage not selected = **20.0%** (for comparison).
FY02 Board: Total number eligible = **78**/ Total number not selected = **23**/ Percentage not selected = **29.5%** (for comparison).

The analysis for the Quartermaster majors not selected for promotion in the primary zone to LTC follows:

Of those not selected, **11** or **52%** (11/21) did NOT serve in a BQ position.
Of those not selected, **10** or **47%** (10/21) did serve in a BQ position.
Of those not selected, **6** or **28%** (6/21) attended resident CGSC.
Of those not selected, **5** or **24%** (5/21) completed CGSC by correspondence.

Of those not selected, 7 or 27% (7/26) were minority officers (number of minorities selected/number of minorities eligible).

Of those not selected, 3 or 43% (3/7) were female officers (females selected/females eligible).

Of those not selected, 1 or 5% (1/21) were joint-qualified (3A/3L) or serving in joint positions.

Of those not selected, 0 or 0% (0/21) were previously selected BZ for promotion.

Of those not selected, 1 or 5% (1/21) previously served at the United States Military Academy.

Of those not selected, 0 or 0% (0/21) held BQ jobs for 2 years or more.

Of those not selected, 5 or 24% (5/21) held BQ jobs between 18 and 24 months.

Of those not selected, 0 or 0% (0/21) held BQ jobs between 12 and 18 months.

Of those not selected, 8 or 38% (8/21) held BQ jobs for 12 months.

Of the Non-Select Officers with BQ OERs: 11 or 52% completed Command and Staff College (CSC), and 10 or 48% did not complete CSC.

Overall Trends For Those NOT Selected

***52% did not BQ. 48% did not complete CSC. 38% did not complete BQ and CSC.

New Assignment Process

As the Army transforms during the global war on terrorism and the "Way Ahead" initiative, the assignment process in the Officer Personnel Management Directorate at HRC must also transform. A new assignment process known as the Dynamic Distribution System (DDS) will provide the Army a more flexible distribution system that can adapt to the changing requirements as worldwide operations continue. The HRC will use four-month assignment cycles managed three times a year. However, assignment priorities may be readjusted at any time during a DDS cycle to allow introduction of changing Army requirements into the cycle if needed.

Starting in June 2004, HRC began working the cycle of assignments with a report period of 1 Oct 04 to 31 Jan 05. The most significant change to the assignment process is that PCS moves will be closely managed by looking at Army needs, command priorities, and an officer's skills and experience. The HRC will no longer depend on the year-month available (YMAV) date on the officer's ORB to determine if the officer is available to move. Bottom Line: There must be a reason to move you.

PCS moves will be initiated under two distinct categories: Non-Discretionary or Discretionary. Non-Discretionary moves include those moves that involve hard dates in an officer's career. Some examples include a date of expected return (DEROS) from an overseas assignment, a report date to a professional school, a graduation date from a school, a command selection, a professor of military science (PMS) selection, a joint tour completion, a sequential assignment report date, and a retirement date. Discretionary moves include those moves triggered by an assignment officer working to ensure an officer continues appropriate career development. Some examples include situations where an officer needs a new skill set (Joint or Army Staff), where an officer's skills are no longer applicable to the current assignment, or where an officer is repositioned for a career-enhancing position such as command. Moves driven by the individual needs of the officer are also included in this category, including joint domicile, compassionate reassignments, and personal preference.

With the YMAV no longer the key indicator to generate a PCS move, DDS will identify "donor" and "receiving" units. Donor units are identified as those "over" their authorization and/or a lower priority account from which HRC can "pull" and reassign officers. Receiving units are identified as units that are "under" their authorization and/or a higher priority account we must fill to a certain percentage. If you are in a donor unit, you could be considered available for assignment (PCS) if you have at least 12 months time on station (TOS) as of this next reporting period.

Once HRC determines the requirements based on the needs of the Army, we will notify you and your command as being a “donor” unit and your “availability” in the upcoming assignment period. Assignment officers will consider input from the command and the officer in deciding which officers will be reassigned. Please remember to keep in contact with your assignment officer and feel free to ask us any questions.

Homebase/Sequential Assignments

HRC has directed assignment officers to notify individuals with a pending sequential/homebase assignment in 2005 of a recent change. As the Army transforms during the global war on terrorism and the “Way Ahead” initiative, we must transform the assignment process in HRC. This new DDS assignment process will provide the Army a more flexible distribution system that can adapt to the changing requirements as global operations continue. HRC will use four-month assignment cycles managed three times a year. However, assignment priorities may be readjusted at any time during the cycle to allow changing Army requirements to be introduced into the cycle if needed.

This is where a sequential/homebase assignment may come into review. HRC approved sequential assignments based on a one-year projection against authorizations, not Army priorities. However, with future operations and Army “modularity” pending, we may have to readjust assignments based on the needs of the Army. We intend to honor your sequential assignment in 2005, but it is not “guaranteed.”

We have been directed not to release your pending sequential request for orders (RFO) until we can guarantee the requirement does exist. This may not be until November 2004 or later, when we receive the requirements for Summer 2005. Normally, we would release your sequential RFO once you arrive to your short tour assignment.

If your pending sequential assignment in 2005 is to a “high density” location such as the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Joint or Forces Command, Army (FORSCOM) units deploying in support of the global war on terrorism, your chance of honoring your sequential assignment is higher than other “low density” locations. Again, we should know more about your pending sequential assignment beginning in November 2004.

I will keep you updated of any additional changes that may impact your pending sequential assignment in 2005. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me.

File Maintenance and Board Preparation

The Information Age has given Quartermasters the ability to stay on top of their Official Military Personnel Files (OMPFs). Officers should periodically review their OMPFs to ensure synchronization of their three critical file components: OMPF, official photograph and Officer Record Brief (ORB).

OMPF. Review your OMPF online. Access it through the HRC online home page at <https://ompf.hoffman.army.mil/> Access is granted using your Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login and password. Review your ORB. Your supporting personnel servicing battalion (PSB) will input corrections.

Official Photograph. Ensure that you have a recent photograph. I recommend taking your photograph at least within the last year for any board. Always update your photograph after promotion and your return from deployment.

Corrections. Once you have identified discrepancies in your file, corrections can be made electronically by providing copies of your official documents to Officer Records. (E-mail to offrcds@hoffman.army.mil)

If you are having trouble correcting discrepancies, contact me. A common sense approach to reviewing your records will keep you prepared for any board or assignment nominations. A rule of thumb: If it is on your uniform in your Department of the Army photograph, then it is on your ORB and in your OMPF.

A Few Common Errors and Discrepancies

Missing Documentation. HRC no longer sends out copies of microfiche. Officers review their OMPF using the OMPF Online link on the HRC homepage. Access is granted using your AKO login and password. Send missing documents as soon as possible.

ORB Titles. Correct any incorrect, confusing or out-of-date information. Ensure that board members can understand your duty position. If it takes more than a minute to translate, then you need to simplify your information. One growing trend is for officers to be listed as “incoming personnel” or “reassignable overstrength.” If you have these entries in your current position, you need to see your S1 (Adjutant) and correct the information in the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) as well as on the ORB.

Awards/Badges. A common error is not wearing the proper badges with the correct documentation in your OMPF file.

Outdated Photographs. Official photographs should be no more than one year old, at a minimum. Three to five months old is better.

Physicals. Physical examinations should be updated every five years. It is imperative that you have an up-to-date AKO E-mail address on file at HRC. This is the only way that we will contact you to provide information about your file in order to correct deficiencies.

Up-to-Date Contact Information and AKO E-mail Accounts. I will normally contact you through your AKO E-mail account. Up-to-date contact information and an AKO E-mail account are absolute musts. You need to ensure that your home address, home phone and work phone numbers are updated. You can do this through your supporting PSB when you do your annual ORB audit. If I cannot contact you, I cannot help you get a potential assignment you requested. I will contact you for a variety of reasons, including upcoming boards, reassignments, nominative assignments and branch qualification. I am amazed at the number of officers with out-of-date contact information in their files. Some of these officers have been at their assignments for one to two years with out-of-date contact information. Out-of-date contact information will not prevent your selection for reassignment. However, it may prevent you from getting a more preferred assignment because I contacted someone else with the same preference. Officers must ensure that Quartermaster Branch has their latest contact information. One easy way is to review your ORB address. If it is incorrect, we do not have your latest information. Additionally, officers must have an AKO E-mail address. Your AKO login and password are also the method used to access your OMPF online and your assignment preferences using the Officer Online Preference Sheet. For those of you who do not want E-mail separate from E-mail received at work, you can set your AKO E-mail to automatically forward to your work E-mail. All you have to do is edit your personal settings in AKO. Just remember to change your personal settings when you PCS and change your work E-mail address.

New Assignment Process, October-January

CPT Frowene Harvey, Branch-Qualified Captain Assignments Officer
Frowene.Harvey@hoffman.army.mil, DSN 221-5281

As the Army transforms during the global war on terrorism and the “Way Ahead” initiative, the assignment process in the Officer Professional Management Directorate at Human Resources Command (HRC) is transforming also. Known as the “Dynamic Distribution System” (DDS), this new assignment process will provide the Army a more flexible distribution system that can adapt to the changing requirements as global

operations continue. HRC will use four-month assignment cycles managed three times a year. However, assignment priorities may be readjusted at any time during a cycle to allow changing Army requirements to be introduced into the cycle if needed.

Starting in June 2004, HRC began to work the next cycle of assignments that have a report period of 1 Oct 04 to 31 Jan 05. The most significant change to the assignment process is that permanent change of station (PCS) moves will be closely managed by looking at Army needs, command priorities, and an officer's skills and experience. We will no longer depend on the year-month available (YMAV) date on the Officer Record Brief (ORB) to determine if the officer is available to move. Bottom Line: There must be a reason to move you. PCS moves will be initiated under two distinct categories: Non-Discretionary or Discretionary.

Non-Discretionary moves include moves that involve hard dates in an officer's career. Some examples include a date of expected return from overseas (DEROS) from an overseas assignment, a report date to a professional school, a graduation date from a school, a command selection, a professor of military science (PMS) selection, a joint tour completion, a sequential assignment report date, an expiration term of service (ETS) or retirement date.

Discretionary moves include moves triggered by an assignment officer working to ensure an officer continues appropriate career development. Some examples include situations where an officer needs a new skill set (Joint or Army Staff), where an officer's skills are no longer applicable to the current assignment, or where an officer is prepositioned for a career-enhancing position such as commands or special schools. Moves driven by the individual needs of the officer are also included in this category to include the Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP), joint domicile, compassionate reassignments, and personal preferences.

With the YMAV no longer the key indicator to generate a PCS move, DDS will identify "donor" and "receiving" units. Donor units are identified as units who are "over" their authorization and/or a lower priority account from which HRC can "pull" and reassign officers. Receiving units are identified as units that are "under" their authorization and/or a higher priority account we must fill to a certain percentage. If you are in a donor unit, you could be considered available for assignment (PCS) if you have at least 12 months time on station (TOS) as of this next reporting period.

Once HRC determines the requirements based on the Army's needs, we will notify you and your command as being a "donor" unit and your "availability" in the upcoming assignment period. Assignment officers will consider input from the command and the officer in deciding which officers will be reassigned. Please remember to keep in contact with your assignment officer and feel free to ask us any questions. Thank you for your patience as we continue to modify the way we do business to better support our Army at war.

To Prepare for the FY05 Captain Promotion Board

***CPT Herman "Jay" Johnson, Lieutenant/Non-Branch Qualified Captain Assignments Officer
Herman.L.Johnson@hoffman.army.mil, DSN 221-5645***

The FY05 Captain Promotion board will meet 26 Oct 04 to 12 Nov 04. Please refer to MILPER Message 04-201. The board will ONLY review your Department of the Army (DA) photo, Officer Record Brief (ORB), and performance microfiche. Board members may also review "hard copy" OERs and other "last minute" documents such as letters forwarded to the president of the board to address or explain unusual circumstances not already covered in the officer's file. The following are the three main documents that the board reviews:

DA Photograph. A critical element of your promotion board file, your official photograph provides the board's first impression of you. If you need to provide a photograph, send two copies to CDR, HRC, ATTN:

AHRC-MSE-R, 200 STOVALL STREET, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332-0445. Make sure everything matches. If you wear an award or badge in your photograph, ensure it is on your ORB and in your microfiche, if required. Do not wait until the last minute to take your photograph. If there's a problem with the photo, there may not be time to re-take it. You could also be tasked for some last-minute deployment or other temporary duty (TDY) assignment that may prevent you from taking a photograph in time for the promotion board. Photos must be received no later than the board's convening date.

ORB. The "Promotion Board ORB" must be received at HRC no later than the board's convening date. If your local personnel servicing battalion (PSB) does not contact you to review your Promotion Board ORB at least a month before the board convenes, set up an appointment with the PSB yourself. The updated ORB is the actual ORB presented to the board. Your signature certifies its accuracy and demonstrates your active participation in the board preparation process. When reviewing your ORB, make any necessary corrections through your local PSB immediately, so that all information is accurately transmitted to the promotion board. If you have problems getting your ORB updated through your PSB, please contact me for assistance.

Microfiche. Your performance microfiche should contain copies of your OERs, Academic Efficiency Reports (AERs), award certificates, badge/tab orders, and course completion certificates for courses that do not give an AER or award a badge. Please review your performance microfiche and send additions and corrections with supporting documents to HRC's Officer Records Branch. Send the documents to CDR, HRC, ATTN: AHRC-MSR-R, 200 STOVALL STREET, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332-0444 or FAX the request and documents to (703) 325-5204 or DSN 221-5204. You can also request a new copy of your microfiche by E-mail, but only if your name is part of your E-mail address. Remember you can access your Official Military Performance File through Army Knowledge Online (AKO). You can submit additional documents to your official file and/or request a new copy of it. Since Officer Records Branch is very busy with other boards, you must do this immediately to assure timely posting of documents to your file. Make sure your social security number (SSN) is on the document. If the document has multiple names, underline or mark your name in some way. Do not use a highlighter to mark your name and SSN because highlighting shows up as a dark streak when scanned into the system. Please do not take this lightly. I am here to assist in any way possible.

Quartermaster Warrant Officers

CW3 Ross J. Wallage is now the Quartermaster Warrant Officer Career Manager at Human Resources Command (HRC), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332. He comes to HRC from the US Army North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brunssum, the Netherlands, where he was the Battalion S4 (Logistics Officer) and Property Book Officer for the Allied Forces North (AFNORTH) Battalion. Telephone: (703) 325-7839. FAX: (703) 325-5232. E-mail: ross.wallage@us.army.mil. Web site: <https://www.ahrc.army.mil/OPwod/wallage.htm>.

Enlisted Quartermasters

To contact the Quartermaster Proponent Liaison at Human Resources Command (HRC), telephone DSN 221-9791. Online, the Enlisted news section of the Quartermaster Home Page at www.quartermaster.army.mil includes a listing of the telephone numbers for the manager of each Quartermaster military occupational specialty at HRC in the Quartermaster Assignments Branch.

QUARTERMASTER

UPDATE

Quartermasters Responsible for Unclassified Maps

Albert P. Bell

EDITOR'S NOTE: This information updates an article by the author entitled "Map Doctrine Changes Involve Quartermasters" in the Winter 1996 edition of the *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin*. The *Bulletin's* previous issues are archived back to 1995 under Professional Bulletin at www.quartermaster.army.mil on the Quartermaster Home Page.

Despite the shift in responsibility for supplying unclassified maps from the S2 (Intelligence Officer) to the S4 (Logistics Officer) in the late-1990s, a Central Command observer in Southwest Asia reported widespread unawareness of the Army doctrinal change during the war on terrorism last summer. Nevertheless, the Army's automated system for ordering maps has been in place for combat service support commanders and support operations officers throughout *Operation Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan and *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.

Resources to assist Soldiers with ordering unclassified maps include the following official web sites: "MILSTRIP & FEDSTRIP Ordering Procedures" at <http://www.dscr.dla.mil/PC9/Ordering/MilstripOrdering.htm>, "How To Find a Standard NGA Product" at http://www.dscr.dla.mil/PC9/G_info/HowTo.htm, and "E-Tools Ordering Overview" at http://www.dscr.dla.mil/PC9/G_info/EtoolsOrderingOverview.htm. These three online sites originate with the Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR) in Richmond, one of the Defense Logistics Agency's supply centers.

Each military service has been transitioning its unclassified map distribution and ordering functions from the "intelligence shop" to the "supply shop." The Army has always required the timely provisioning of maps, charts and geodetic (MC&G) products under all circumstances. The supply of MC&G products had been historically hampered by contradictory Army

doctrine, wide local variations in requisitioning and stockage procedures, and poor access to the logistics and transportation networks.

Doctrinal changes in the Quartermaster Corps mission began in 1992 when the Directorate of Combat Developments for Quartermaster at Fort Lee, VA, developed a concept titled "Operational Concept for Map Supply." The first step was concept approval to facilitate the process for ordering MC&G products. In April 1997, Headquarters, Department of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (now the Army G4) drafted a message to the field Army titled "Ordering Maps, Charts and Geodetic (MC&G) Products Through the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS)." This message culminated years of hard work by representatives from Army G4, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Mapping Agency (renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency or NGA as referenced in official web sites), major commands and others to devise an easier method to order and distribute map products. A synopsis of that message states the following:

Both divisional and nondivisional customers process requisitions for MC&G products, using national stock numbers (NSNs) through the SARSS and the Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS). Map stockage and issue procedures will follow the provisions of AR 710-2 (Inventory Management, Supply Policy Below the National Level) for entry of map requisitions into

the Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP). Unclassified MC&G products will be included in stockage plans at General Support (GS) Class II, IV and VII supply points at Corps and TAACOM.

As a result of that message in April 1997, Quartermaster Corps proponent units assumed responsibility for general support (GS) supply and distribution of unclassified MC&G products. Map products were categorized under the Supply Category of Materiel Code (SCMC) as Class II (general supplies). All MC&G products were assigned NSNs. This was a massive cataloging effort because the map inventory exceeded 70,000 MC&G products. To facilitate the identification of map requisitions and ordering processes, new Federal Supply Classes (FSCs) were assigned. FSC 7641 represents Aeronautical products; 7642, Hydrographic; 7643, Topographic; and 7644, Digital products.

Map supply platoons were assigned to selected Quartermaster supply companies (GS) (Table of Organization and Equipment 422418L). At a minimum, map supply platoons were allocated one per supported corps support command (COSCOM) for the Active Component and one per supported theater Army area command (TAACOM) for the Reserve Component.

Existing direct support (DS) procedures did not change. All unclassified MC&G transactions are processed through existing or planned automated information systems. Unclassified maps, charts and geodetic products are included in stockage plans at GS supply points for Class II, IV (construction and

barrier materiel) and VII (major end items) at corps and TAACOM. For classified MC&G products, local standing operating procedures determine requisition, stockage and distribution.

The US Army Corps of Engineers remained the proponent for topography. Engineer topographic battalions continue their responsibility for producing special maps and terrain-related products and services. These Engineer battalions also retain the ability to produce limited quantities of standard maps in the field, as required. Requests for special maps and terrain-related products go through the Engineer channels.

The Defense Distribution Mapping Activity (DDMA) provides tailored logistics support during peacetime for maps, charts and geodetic products to all Department of Defense units and authorized agencies located within the various areas of responsibility (AOR). Further, DDMA maintains selected planning and reserve operational stocks to support crisis and contingency operations. DDMA supports most customers from its main facility in Richmond, VA. DDMA also provides specific AOR support through one of its nine Map Support Offices (MSOs). Located strategically worldwide, MSOs are in Germany; Hawaii; Tampa, FL; San Diego, CA; Norfolk, VA; Italy; Japan; Bahrain; and Korea.

The point of contact for Quartermaster map doctrine is Al Bell, Logistics Management Specialist, Directorate of Combat Developments for Quartermaster, Concepts Division, US Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, VA, at (804) 734-1167 or DSN 687-1167.

QUARMASTER HOTLINE

The Quartermaster HOTLINE collects immediate feedback from the field on issues such as doctrine, training, personnel proponency, and Quartermaster equipment development with a 24-hour telephone answering service. The Operations and Training Management Directorate records incoming calls after normal duty hours and responds to the caller the next duty day. DSN: 687-3767, Commercial: (804) 734-3767. Collect calls cannot be accepted.

Directory - Points of Contact

US Army Quartermaster Center and School

The Quartermaster General BG Scott G. West scott.west@us.army.mil	(ATSM-CG) 734-3458	Quartermaster Total Force Integration Officer (ATSM-ACR) COL Paul Fortune paul.fortune@us.army.mil	734-5224
Assistant Commandant COL Steven L. Hartman steven.hartman@us.army.mil	(ATSM-AC) 734-3759	Operations and Training Mgt Directorate (ATSM-AC-O) Nancy Briggs nancy.briggs@us.army.mil	734-4402
Deputy to the Commander Larry L. Toler larry.toler@us.army.mil	(ATSM-CG-DC) 734-3480	Army Center of Excellence, Subsistence (ATSM-CES) LTC Donald P. Vitpil Jr. donald.vitpil@us.army.mil	734-3007
Command Sergeant Major CSM Jose L. Silva jose.silva@us.army.mil	(ATSM-CSM) 734-3248	Mortuary Affairs Center (ATSM-MA) Tom D. Bourlier tom.bourlier@us.army.mil	734-3831
23d Quartermaster Brigade COL Lindy L. Buckman lindy.lee.buckman@us.army.mil	(ATSM-TPC) 734-4644	Aerial Delivery and Field Services Department (ATSM-ADFSD) Theodore J. Dlugos theodore.j.dlugos@us.army.mil	734-5370
49th Quartermaster Group (Petroleum and Water) COL Jack Vance jack.vance@us.army.mil	(AFFL-GC) 734-6026	Logistics Training Department (ATSM-LTD) LTC Charles W. Bonnell charles.bonnell@us.army.mil	734-3195
Chief, Office of the Quartermaster General COL Gary R. Grimes gary.grimes@us.army.mil	(ATSM-QMG) 734-4237	Petroleum and Water Department (ATSM-PWD) Marshall J. Jones marshall.jones@us.army.mil	734-2810
OQMG Officer Proponency LTC Richard D. Hansen richard.hansen1@us.army.mil	(ATSM-QMG-O) 734-3441	Noncommissioned Officer Academy (ATSM-SGA) CSM Cynthia M. Holland cynthia.holland@us.army.mil	765-2066
OQMG Warrant Officer Proponency CW5 James C. Tolbert jim.tolbert@us.army.mil	(ATSM-QMG-WO) 734-3702	Directorate of Combat Developments - QM (ATCL-Q) COL Donna Shaw donna.shaw@us.army.mil	734-0020
OQMG Enlisted Proponency SGM Joseph W. Brundy joseph.brundy@us.army.mil	(ATSM-QMG-E) 734-4143	Training Directorate - Quartermaster (ATCL-AQ) John E. Hall john.hall7@us.army.mil	765-1425

Fort Lee DSN prefixes: 687-xxxx or 539-xxxx

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MAILING ADDRESS:

QUARTERMASTER PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN
USAQMCS OQMG
ATTN ATSM QMG B
1201 22D STREET
FORT LEE VA 23801-1601

TELEPHONE:

DSN 687-4382
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Wounded 2d Infantry Division and ROK soldiers arrive at a 2d Medical Battalion Aid Station on a Korean hillside, February 1952




Illustration and Lineage by Keith Fukumitsu

302d Support Battalion

Organized in 1894 as the School of Instruction Hospital Corps, Washington Barracks, Washington, DC.

Redesignated as Company A, Hospital Corps in 1904.

Redesignated in October 1906, as Field Hospital #2, part of the Cuban Expeditionary Brigade.

Reorganized and redesignated as Field Hospital #2 and Ambulance Company in March 1911.

In November 1917, Field Hospital Company #2 and Ambulance Company reorganized as part of the 2d Sanitary Train, 2d Division at Bourmont, France.

Reorganized and redesignated as 2d Medical Regiment in 1921.

Reorganized and redesignated in October 1939 as the 2d Medical Battalion.

Transferred, less personnel and equipment, to Department of Army control pending reorganization, 16 December 1957 at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Reorganized in June 1958 at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Reorganized as the 302d Forward Support Battalion on 17 October 1989 at Camp Casey, Republic of Korea (ROK).

WORLD WAR I

* AISNE * AISNE-MARNE * ST. MIHIEL * ILE DE FRANCE 1918 * MEUSE-ARGONNE * LORRAINE 1918 *

WORLD WAR II

* NORMANDY * NORTHERN FRANCE * RHINELAND * ARDENNES-ALSACE * CENTRAL EUROPE *

KOREAN WAR

* UN DEFENSE * UN OFFENSE * CCF INTERVENTION * FIRST UN COUNTEROFFENSIVE * CCF SPRING OFFENSIVE *
* UN SUMMER-FALL OFFENSIVE * SECOND KOREAN WINTER * KOREA, SUMMER-FALL 1952 *
* THIRD KOREAN WINTER * KOREA, SUMMER 1953 *

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