Quartermaster Commentary -
Supporting Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Brigadier General Scott G. West, The Quartermaster General
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On 10 Jul 03, I was alerted to deploy to Iraq to serve as the Director for Logistics, C4 for Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7) for a period of 179 days, with a possible extension. I arrived at Camp Victory in Baghdad on July 23 by way of Kuwait. Within 90 days of my arrival, it became somewhat obvious that this was going to become a one-year tour. What I intend to capture in this article is a short description of the combined joint task force’s mission, my role as the warfighters’ logistics staff officer and the lessons I have learned about supporting combat operations in the contemporary operating environment.
My job was to plan, coordinate and provide staff supervision for logistics support of a joint and combined warfighting formation of about 150,000 personnel, six divisions (including two multinational divisions), numerous nondivisional units and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The CPA was the agency responsible for governing Iraq in the wake of the change in regime following the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist government. In short, my role was to be the staff lead for CJTF-7 to help establish logistics at the operational level of war.
Sustaining the Campaign
Sustaining the campaign, a nebulous concept called
Logistics in the Operational Art, is characterized by uncertainty, complexity
and ambiguity. Sustaining the campaign requires the staff to function at three
levels, simultaneously. Staff functions include building the linkages between
the combat formations fighting at the tactical level, the theater support units
at the operational level and the national providers at the strategic level.
Success relies on acquiring and maintaining the agility to meet the materiel
requirements of the day by planning 90 to180 days in advance of the tactical
fight.
Looking back, I found my experiences in Nicaragua providing disaster relief to Hurricane Mitch victims in 1998 and my following tour with the Joint Staff invaluable in preparing me for deployment to Iraq. Nicaragua proved an enormous intellectual exercise in bridging the gap between the agencies at the strategic level and the units at the tactical level. Though US forces operated in a much more permissive environment than Iraq in Southwest Asia, the problem of supporting efforts across a wide expanse of Central American jungle and mountains a long way from the US simply cannot be duplicated in training. My time on the Joint Staff taught me about the Army responsibilities of Title 10, US Code, and more about the various logistics agencies and how they operate and interface with the military services. At the time, many complained that stability and support operations (SASO) diverted focus and resources from the primary "warfighting" mission. For better or worse, my SASO experience made me a much more capable logistician.
I sought the counsel of several smart logisticians with recent experience in Iraq. Interestingly, while all agreed that distribution of commodities in Iraq would prove problematic, some viewed logistics as rapidly approaching routine in 2003. They emphasized the push to bring contracted logistics on line, open up additional air transportation nodes, reduce or adjust the logistics footprint, and improve supply distribution throughout the theater.
I expected an increasingly safe or permissive SASO, with an emphasis on consolidating and reducing the logistics footprint in theater. I suspected that my biggest challenges would be in the areas of distribution and base camp development, with heavy participation by government contractors. I figured that it would not take more than about six months to get to "steady-state" logistics.
The Operational Environment
How far wrong could this Quartermaster have been? The operating
environment was not permissive. It was absolutely nonpermissive. The battle
space in Iraq compares in size to the state of California. Let me shift gears
and tell you about the operational environment. Suffice to say, Iraq has it all.
Iraq is a large country with porous borders, a harsh climate and poor
infrastructure. Combat and security operations are attended by long, unsecured
lines of communication, an asymmetric threat and complex urban terrain. From a
historical perspective, it is further from the ports in Kuwait in the south to
Mosul, Iraq, in the north than from the beaches of Normandy to Berlin. In World
War II, we owned the lines of communication up to the last tactical mile. In
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the last tactical mile runs the length and breadth
of the country.
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Logistics must be fought as combat operations in order to negotiate the operational distances and to defeat an adaptive and determined enemy that targets sustainment convoys. As a result in my opinion, logisticians are at greater risk on this Iraqi battlefield than are combat forces. As an example, one day in mid-April, we put 122 convoys on the road throughout the battle space. Of the 122 convoys, 122 of them were shot up by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), small arms fire and mortars: 100 percent of our convoys were engaged in mortal combat. Every day we had "green" and "white" convoys on the road. Green are military and white are commercial. The enemy focuses on the white convoys for a greater effect, both militarily and in terms of non-lethal results such as valuable operational information. In addition to targeting convoys, the enemy routinely hits logistics bases with indirect fire and vehicle-borne IEDs.
On any given day, coalition forces have 130 to 140 convoys on the road in Iraq. This represents about 1,800 to 2,200 trucks and 4,000 personnel engaged in convoy operations, including the force protection requirements. These convoys are moving rations, water, fuel, repair parts, ammunition, construction materiel and medical supplies to forces engaged in urban combat operations and security operations in a battle space the size of the state of California.
Operational Logistics
The very essence of operational logistics is to bridge gaps. There
are time gaps, distance gaps, gaps in battle rhythm and gaps in agility. A
certain tyranny exists on this battlefield of Iraq that engages logisticians
from the tactical to the strategic level. "Stuff" is consumed at the tactical
end at an alarming rate. Watching the Marines fighting in cities such as
Fallujah, for example, you will see empty cartridges spitting out of their
weapons at a rate that appears faster than we can manufacture ammunition at the
strategic level or faster than we can transport it at the operational level. The
operational logistician must plan and coordinate to bridge that gap. We cannot
allow those Marines to run dry on ammunition.
Operating in Three Time Zones
Therefore, we find ourselves operating in three time zones. At the
tactical level in the most immediate time zone, real fighters are consuming real
materiel in real time; and the logistics status changes in minutes and hours.
Logisticians operate in a second time zone where lift requirements, distance and
conditions of the battlefield and availability of materiel require days and
weeks to get the right stuff to the right place. The third time zone has
administrative and production lead times of months and years required for
matching operational appetite with industrial strength.
Speaking of operational appetite, I want to share with you a couple of vignettes that attest to the responsiveness of the US military-industrial complex to the operational needs of warfighters. Today in Iraq, our forces have been fielded almost 9,000 armor ballistic kits that protect high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) against small arms fire and IEDs. In October 2003, this HMMWV protection was only a concept and a drawing. We went from nothing to 9,000 armor ballistic kits in 10 months. In the area of precision aerial delivery, we completed the third of three very successful resupply operations using the Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System (JPADS) in July 2004. The time between issuing the operational needs statement and having the materiel solution on the ground, or in the air in the JPADS case, was 75 days. These are phenomenal responses to critical, battlefield sustainment needs.
Sustaining the Force
Early in Operation Iraqi Freedom, it became apparent that
perhaps the most broken and contentious logistics function on this battlefield
was feeding the troops. This was a clear-cut case of "haves and have nots."
About 30,000 personnel were being fed by contract dining facilities (DFAC) under
the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program. The others were eating commercial,
operational rations provided under local contracts. Whatever the case, field
feeding was broken and represented a serious force protection challenge. This
became a top priority for the staff of CJTF-7. Coupled with the feeding problem
was the provisioning of bottled water and a cooling capability for the water.
Soldiers will not and should not drink hot water. In the 130-degree heat of an
Iraqi summer, cooling water was an imperative.
For about 90 days, the logistics staff focused on how rations were ordered and tracked through the theater distribution system. Personnel in the CJTF-7 Food Service Section rode on ration convoys from Kuwait to Mosul and Al Asad, the northern and western distribution hubs, to determine where the problem areas were and what actions we needed to take. We needed to reduce or eliminate delays that resulted from double handling, lost convoys, broken refrigeration units and "frustrated" cargo. The concept of putting "eyes on" the troubled spots led us to a natural solution. We fixed ownership of the various segments of the distribution system, established acceptable standards for rations in transit, improved In-transit Visibility (ITV) and reported on the food distribution system’s behavior and performance. By November 2003 the CJTF-7 ration distribution program was on track.
Protecting the Force
The other top priority was fielding of force protection equipment,
particularly Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), the combination of Outer Tactical
Vests (OTV) and Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). The IBA for individual
Soldiers proved an absolute winner on the battlefield, early on. It was saving
lives in the summer of 2003 (and continues to save lives today), but we were
woefully short throughout the battle space. In late summer, we were determining
requirements. Thanks to the great cooperation of the Army Materiel Command and
the Headquarters, Department of the Army G8 (Resource Management), we took
action to equip every member of CJTF-7 by the end of January 2004. Our national
providers led the effort to increase production in the US industrial base to
speed delivery of more than 100,000 sets of IBA to forces in combat in less than
five months.
Fueling the force, for the most part, was on "autopilot" from the summer of 2003 until the spring of 2004. Fuel deliveries transferred from military convoys to commercial convoys in the September-October 2003 timeframe. There were only minor challenges in this commodity area until the spring of 2004. As a result, the fuel function captured little time for CJTF-7. However, in early April convoys came under complex attacks aimed at cutting lines of communications, isolating the forces fighting in the central portion of the country (including Baghdad) and focusing on the commercial convoys in an effort to interdict the flow of sustainment. On the morning of April 9, we woke up to the realization that the main supply routes between Kuwait and Baghdad were "raining bridges." We experienced a period of about five days when our distribution system for all commodities ground to a halt. Through close coordination with Engineers to rebuild or repair the bridges and the application of heavy force protection for convoys, we were able to get the routes reopened. Critical materiel was flowing again by April 15. We had replenished the entire shortfall in materiel by May 7 and had increased stocks to an all-time high. It must be noted that the logisticians of CJTF-7, divisional and nondivisional, and those of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) applied brute force and absolute heroics in order to accomplish this monumental feat. Nothing failed due to logistics.
Deployment, Employment,
Sustainment and Redeployment
I will digress for a moment to tell you about an operational endeavor
that set a high-water mark for the US Army and joint warfighting forces. From
mid-January through mid-April 2004, CJTF-7 and CFLCC combined to execute perhaps
the largest and most complex military maneuver in the history of modern warfare.
The challenge was to "swap out" the forces of Operation Iraqi Freedom I
with the forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom II during this 90-day period.
This involved the deployment and redeployment of 260,000 personnel and more than
50,000 pieces of equipment north to south and south to north, without reducing
the operating tempo or combat readiness. In short, this was the simultaneous
deployment, redeployment, employment and sustainment of all US and coalition
forces. This operation was planned, rehearsed and executed very rapidly and, by
all measures, was a huge success. It was not without glitches - big glitches -
but, in the final analysis, success was attained by planning at all levels and
the heroic application of technical expertise and leadership by all involved.
Keys to success were multiechelon planning, early identification of critical
processes and process owners, and monthly operational rehearsals sponsored by
CFLCC.
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Contractor Logistics Support
At the risk of sounding sarcastic or irreverent, allow
me to say that whoever first had the idea of replacing the military logistics
capability with a commercial-contracted application has not been to Iraq. It is
difficult to explain the magnitude of the perils associated with this concept on
such a battlefield. Negotiating the long competitive lines of communication and
facing an asymmetric threat in hostile urban terrain are inherently military
functions. This battlefield is the domain of warriors, not business
personnel.
Having said that, contractor logistics support (CLS) is a fact of life. Contract personnel will be with the US military out of necessity, so the challenge is to determine how to keep them alive and "in the fight." CJTF-7 encountered significant shortfalls in CLS. Shortfalls included some contractors’ inability to hire, train, deploy, employ, support, protect and retain the quantity of personnel with the requisite technical skills to perform the functions we were paying them to do - many of which the US military can no longer perform because we traded off the force structure in favor of CLS.
Failure Not an Option
So then, how can we achieve success with the tremendous problems
associated with CLS? The first step is for both military and contractor
personnel to recognize up-front that failure is not an option. For the second
step, military leaders must determine how to protect contractors and commercial
assets on the battlefield and must commit the resources needed to secure them.
Finally, it is imperative to reduce the risk profile and vulnerability of
contractors by controlling their movements, offsetting contract capability with
military capability wherever possible and maintaining good situational awareness
of where the contractors are on the battlefield - all of which will consume
significant resources of the military force.
Something I never considered before my duty in Operation Iraqi Freedom but confronted on almost a daily basis in Iraq was the amount of operational information that contractor personnel pass over unsecured cellular phones and via E-mail using the Internet. I was appalled to read "in the clear" messages containing vital, time-sensitive information about current operations. The only way CJTF-7 brought this situation under any control was to enforce operational security (OPSEC) discipline by threatening to terminate contracts and remove or bar violators from the theater of operations.
Contractors on the Battlefield
Contractors on the battlefield taught logisticians
many lessons. The Army must do a better job in institutional and leader training
to teach commanders, staff officers and noncommissioned officers how to employ
contractors, including the tools available to assure success. We must also
provide much more robust contracting capability at all levels of combat
formations. The commanders and leaders who are dealing with contractor problems
as a matter of routine scarcely have the technical expertise at their disposal
to meet their requirements. We need to train and employ contingency contractors
within battalion-level organizations in significant numbers.
Logistics Civilian
Augmentation Program
In
the vein of CLS, I am compelled to discuss the Logistics Civilian Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP). This is the program the Army used, as in the Balkans and in
other locations, to develop operating bases, improve the quality of life for
deployed forces and offset "green suit" logistics capability with a commercial
capability. LOGCAP was a $5.2 billion endeavor for the first 16 months of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a result, I spent fully one-third of my time
dealing with LOGCAP matters. This is the one area where I had no training and,
therefore, was getting "on-the-job" experience. Although LOGCAP is a great
concept, in a nonpermissive environment there are challenges aplenty, including
the contractors’ ability to attain the human capital and materiel to meet the
needs of the combat force in a timely manner.
The contractual requirements to make LOGCAP successful are mind-boggling, considering that CJTF-7 was trying to meet the needs of all 150,000 personnel with a single task order. That fact coupled with the varying priorities of each warfighting command made this a management nightmare. To correct the problem, logisticians began the process of breaking up the single task order into smaller, more manageable task orders aligned with major subordinate commands. That process is ongoing in Iraq, today. The Army must do a better job of training Soldiers, commanders and other leaders as well as logisticians, on how to use and manage LOGCAP and similar contractor capabilities.
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Logisticians Think Like
Warriors
I could go on and on. However, by now those of you who
are still reading are weary. Logistics support at the operational level in the
contemporary operating environment requires greater agility and lethality (read
force protection) than previous battlefields. Young logisticians, contractors
and logistics leaders are in harm’s way as never before. They rise to the
challenge every day and, like so many of their combat arms counterparts, they
are applying the tactics, techniques and procedures required to assure survival
and success. Logistics operations in Iraq demand that our Soldiers think and act
like warriors. They will be warriors, no
question about that. The only question is will they be warriors before they
deploy or only after they survive their first encounter with mortal combat? We
owe it to our Soldiers, their families and to those we support to prepare them -
now.
One final note: I report with a certain sense of pride that Warrior Logisticians were getting the job done under the toughest battlefield conditions during the time I served in Iraq. They assured that NOTHING FAILED DUE TO LOGISTICS!
