Quartermaster Commentary -
Logistical Lessons From a
Contemporary Operating Environment

CPT Sidney F. Byrne Jr.

     My intent is to convey the lessons that Logistics Task Force 264 learned during Operation Enduring Freedom and to present the tactics, techniques and procedures that we developed to effectively combat the theft of bulk fuel in the northern and central regions of Afghanistan. Although interdiction and theft of supplies along lines of communication (LOC) and main supply routes (MSR) dates to the first supply trains, the Army’s current linear-based battlefield doctrine, as well as individual Soldier training, proved outdated and inadequate against the methods of the pilferage we faced. Our enemy struck from every direction and then quietly melted away into the masses undetected. He represented a repressed, warring and fiercely tribal-based culture that regarded outsiders with a great deal of skepticism and distrust. We were the outsiders, and we occupied a small piece of land in territory where all land avenues of approach were under tribal control.

Fresh Tactics
     History is full of examples of US military forces entering armed conflict with little knowledge of the enemy’s tactics or culture, but we have always proven ourselves to be a quick study. This war was no different in that respect. Logistics Task Force 264 soon realized that fresh tactics were necessary to combat the innovative nature of the threat we faced. Our best reference was both our nemesis and our ally: the poverty-stricken and distrustful Afghanis driven to the edges of endurance by the ravages of war, drought and oppressive occupation. The Afghanis quickly taught us that the technology, endless resources and formal education that made our military forces so enviable - by themselves - were no match for their cunning, ingenuity and sheer desperation born from decades of warfare and oppression. The Afghani men that I am describing were not enemy Taliban combatants. They were farmers, laborers, drivers, contractors and - above all - they were survivors.

Living in Real Poverty
     The Afghanis were formidable opponents who knew, thanks to the untiring efforts of the psychological operations teams, that the US forces were not going to harm noncombatants and that we were dependent on their local trucking industry to adequately resupply our forward bases. To the average Afghani living in real poverty, the situation, coupled with his perception of American wealth, equaled an irresistible opportunity to profit handsomely. They also correctly surmised that there was little risk of suffering the repercussions he was accustomed to suffering under the rule of the Taliban and the former Soviet Union for the same actions.

Seals that can be defeated without leaving visible evidence Seals that cannot be defeated without leaving visible evidence

     The logistical obstacles at Bagram were vastly different from the ones that we were trained to encounter and overcome. Also, the methods and perpetrators of fuel theft were as imaginative as they were numerous. We, on the other hand, were initially unimaginative and rigidly faithful to proven, linear-battlefield training and doctrine. We failed to realize the significance of the fact that our knowledge and training were based on our experiences using American contractors and US military equipment and personnel traveling routes under US military control. We were now forced to use unknown local national contractors, drivers and equipment to transport cargo of considerable military and civilian value through impoverished areas inhabited by a heavily armed populace without the benefit of a coalition armed escort. Most of the routes to our forward units were not under our control or a central governmental control, and these routes were occasionally rendered impassable by local nationals who were openly resentful of our presence and often hostile to the local nationals we employed.

     We realized that one of the first steps necessary was to gain the trust and goodwill of the tribal leaders, who exerted a great deal of influence over the local population as well as the contracted drivers. We believed we needed to build a mutually and financially beneficial and a culturally acceptable relationship for all parties. Beginning with this knowledge, the support of the base contracting office and the wide degree of latitude granted to us by our battalion commander, we developed a plan to change the nature of our business relationship with the local nationals.

     With the assistance of the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of our base contracting office (the one place we were guaranteed to find the most influential local leaders as well as the contractors supplying the trucks and drivers we needed), we met and discussed our problems with the local leaders, contractors and US contracting officers. Operating on the principle of never giving something without receiving something in return, we were able to obtain the support of local leaders by giving nothing more than reasonable financial compensation, as approved by the contracting officers, for our truck modification and contractual demands. We outlined our goals and intentions and solicited their suggestions and input to demonstrate our respect for their knowledge and abilities. We knew if we treated the Afghani leaders with respect, we would build their prestige within the ranks of their people. Then the Afghani leaders, in exchange for their perceived increase in stature with us, would be much more inclined to use their authority to help us obtain our goals in a non-confrontational and cooperative manner.

     Since many of the contracted tankers were arriving at their intended destinations well short of the amount of fuel loaded at Bagram without visible signs of tampering, we decided to modify the local national fleet in order to better secure all hatches and ports of the tankers. We knew sealing the hatches and ports would not deter armed aggressors, but would deter the contractors and drivers because of the stiff fines attached for tampering. We began an intensive inspection and modification program for all contracted fuel tankers and drivers.

     The Logistics Task Force 264 inspection program was a thorough and continual process encompassing the entire fuel tanker. Logistics Task Force 264 was well equipped to inspect the exterior of the tankers, but not well equipped to inspect the interior of the fuel chambers. Although actual chamber inspections are the most definitive method to determine if the host nation tankers are carrying contraband or if they are fit to transport US-owned fuel, the process poses risks and raises several safety concerns. Until the US Army formally incorporates such inspection practices for fuel tankers into current doctrine and training and also adds the necessary safety equipment to unit modification tables of organization and equipment, we recommend contracting this procedure to a civilian firm experienced in hazardous materials.

     Logistics Task Force 264 inspections revealed hidden chambers, inoperative and odd-sized valves and discharge ports, and deceptive gauging tubes and rods. We countered by requiring our contractors to weld steel nuts to all loading and discharge hatches and ports so we could secure them with seals before departure from Bagram. We also required the local nationals to equip their trucks with fittings that would couple to the Army’s 3-inch and 4-inch fuel lines, the standard fuel lines used by all military services and commercial companies. We learned we could not waiver on this point, or we would find ourselves trying to load and unload from the top. The contractors will charge a fee for the fittings, but they will make them. Competition for the guaranteed pay of a US contract is fierce, and this fierce competition is something to use to your advantage in order to get the type of local equipment you need. The fittings will not be as durable as you would like, and the contractor-made fittings will wear out within a few months. However, if you ensure that you include the "fully operable, non-leaking, 3-inch and/or 4-inch fitting requirement" in your contract, you will not have too many problems keeping the proper fittings on each truck.

     Logistics Task Force 264 learned to use serial-numbered steel cables no less than 1/8-inch in diameter because the local nationals demonstrated a remarkable ability to defeat every other type of seal with relative ease without leaving a trace of evidence. We assigned permanent bumper numbers to each truck after we inspected and certified it as fit to carry fuel by securing a serial-numbered steel cable to the steering column. We then photographed the driver and his assistant with their truck, recorded their names and company with the photograph, and created logbooks for each forward base as well as for Logistics Task Force 264 records. These trucks were inspected and recertified quarterly. The drivers and trucks were compared to the logbook photographs before they were permitted access to any installation. Within a month, we had inspected and marked approximately 100 local national trucks in such a manner. The cost to the US government was about one dollar per truck.

     This procedure allowed US forces to determine if the driver at their gate was the same man that Logistics Task Force 264 had hired to deliver the fuel or if it was someone else who possibly hijacked the truck with the hopes of gaining entry onto a military base and causing destruction. All parties seemed to enjoy the idea of establishing the identities of the contracted personnel before their arrival at coalition bases. Our guards were more at ease knowing who was supposed to arrive. The local national drivers felt a sense of relief because they would not be mistaken for enemy Taliban supporters by coalition forces. As an aside, we also bought a great deal of goodwill by providing a copy of the photograph to the local national driver. In a country with little technology, a computer-generated color photograph sheathed in a document protector went a long way. The drivers usually displayed their photos prominently by taping them, face outward, to the inside of their windshields.

Alternative transportation assets included pack animals (left) to reach remote bases in Afghanistan over barely passable roadways. One contractor drove a disguised fuel tanker.

     Logistics Task Force 264 also started selecting drivers for specific destinations according to their family and tribal ties. Since the roads were usually controlled by the strongest (most heavily armed) local leader, we would ask him to find drivers (as he was usually the one controlling or at least influencing contracts for his region) from his district to transport our supplies through his territory. The contractors and drivers were satisfied with this arrangement because such coordination ensured they would be traveling through areas guarded by their family members and guaranteed them future employment as long as they delivered all of the fuel they loaded at Bagram to the intended recipient. The local leader was satisfied because he was receiving a tribute, a percentage of the driver’s income, without having to use force (as he would have done with a man from a different tribe or village traversing his territory). We were satisfied because our fuel shipment reached its destination intact and on time.

     As initial suspicion toward each other gave way to the profits of business and mission accomplishment, we discovered that our new relationship with the local nationals afforded us the ability to readily secure the means to transport supplies over barely passable roadways to reach the most remote bases that we previously resupplied by air. Logistics Task Force 264 was making noticeable improvements in the ground resupply success rate and, at the same time, reducing our requests for costly aerial delivery assets. Even hiring a driver to haul barrels of fuel to a destroyed bridge, securing a team of mules to drag the barrels across to the other side, and then hiring another truck to deliver the barrels to the final destination was less expensive than the cost of using our already overworked utility helicopters and crews to accomplish the same task. Some local nationals even built smaller fuel tankers able to negotiate a small number of the mountain passes, which we thought of as goat trails, in order to demonstrate their desire to further their business relationship with us. One contractor, who was never able to get a fuel truck through a certain region unmolested no matter who operated the vehicle, agreed to place a 2,500-gallon tank in the back of a covered cargo truck in order to accomplish the mission. The ruse worked magnificently, and we never suffered another fuel loss along that route.

     We conducted briefings and debriefings with the local national drivers after each delivery and reported all incidents to the S2/G2 intelligence sections. We provided financial compensation to vehicles damaged or destroyed by hostile action. We included the driver’s and contractor’s suggestions in our military decision-making process because theirs were the lives sometimes lost while delivering the supplies. Although enemy action accounted for a smaller percentage of Logistics Task Force 264 losses than theft, the threat was real and at times deadly. The Department of the Army limit for loss of JP8 fuel is one-half percent of the total amount, with contingency and wartime losses as the exceptions. Although acceptable wartime loss rates are not published, we believed our initial losses of 16-20 percent per month to be excessive. We knew we could not stop the losses completely, but we did bring them to a more than manageable level of less than two percent.

     Cold, armed Afghanis seeking fuel for cooking and heating stoves accounted for a sizeable amount of our fuel losses. The impoverished Afghani, whether he was a bachelor, husband or father seeing a large tanker of fuel, did what most other men would at least consider doing in his situation. He forced the truck to stop, took as much fuel as he needed or could store, and sent the contracted truck on its way. The thought of US military reaction to a small amount of missing fuel from such a large tanker or to broken seals and possible contamination of fuel intended for aviation purposes did not enter his mind. He was only concerned with staying warm.

     Experiences of Logistics Task Force 264 were far from unique, but different from what we were initially prepared to encounter. Logisticians are no longer operating in a linear environment behind the forward line of troops, and we are relying heavily on the contracted support of local nationals to move supplies through military areas of responsibility.

     Our opponents will continue to present us with challenges and adopt different tactics as we adjust to and overcome each obstacle. Logisticians must be prepared to surmount these obstacles efficiently to maintain the adage that "Nothing fails due to logistics." The most effective tools were, are and will continue to be our persistence and our capacity and our willingness to adapt and to think in unconventional terms. These qualifications fostered the desire and ability of Logistics Task Force 264 to establish and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with the local nationals and their leaders that proved critical to our mission success in Afghanistan.

Return to Autumn 2004 Index