Quartermaster Commentary
CPT Sean P. Kelly
I deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom under the impression that I was going to be a liaison officer (LNO) between my corps support group (CSG) and a Reserve Component corps support battalion (CSB) from Beaumont, TX. The CSB was responsible for a forward logistical element (FLE) in Mazar-e-Shariff, Afghanistan, with the mission of providing logistical support to the Jordanian Army field hospital.
After a couple of weeks, my mission drastically changed. I was sent to Mazar-e-Shariff with one mission: "fix it." The infrastructure, operations and base security needed a complete overhaul. Soldiers also needed to get a grasp on what supplies and equipment were on hand and try to regain accountability.
First Major Task
The mission of the FLE for Logistics Task Force 46 was to provide
Class I (rations), Class II (general supplies), packaged and bulk Class III
(petroleum, oils and lubricants), Class IV (construction and barrier materiel),
Class VI (personal demand items), Class VII (major end items), Class VIII
(medical supplies) and Class IX (repair parts) to the Jordanian Army field
hospital and Jordanian Special Forces soldiers who secured the field hospital in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The FLE also ran and secured the
arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) and operated the airfield
tower. The FLE was responsible for safe landings of all resupply flights. This
was the first major task that needed overhauling.
All resupply flights were under cover of darkness, which provided its own set of challenges. The runway was the most vulnerable target. The FLE needed a plan and needed efficiency. Not a single one of my Soldiers was an air traffic controller or had ever operated an A/DACG. However, if we wanted resupply, then we needed to adapt and overcome.
Our first airfield mission was the textbook example of not having a plan, with complete inefficiency and downright danger. It took us nearly three hours to unload the aircraft, reassemble, gather all our security forces and convoy back to the base camp. For planning purposes, from the entrance to the base camp to the base of the airfield tower was less than a quarter of a mile away. Because this first mission took place during the transition of authority, I could sit back and see what changes we needed to make. I quickly realized that the reason we were so inefficient was because we had no plan, and no one actually had an assigned job. First, we needed to build a sand table so we could go over step-by-step what each Soldier would be doing. The Soldiers never really visually saw what their counterparts were doing. We also went through a series of battle drills and rehearsals. We needed to cut down our time on the airfield and operate as a well-rehearsed team. Just getting back to the basics and doing the right thing allowed us to cut our time on target to one hour from landing to departure. Before every mission we rock-drilled and rehearsed actions on the objective, as well as conducted an after action report (AAR) on what we could have improved.
The second improvement was to increase the quality of our support to our customer, the Jordanian Army. One of the Jordanians’ many complaints centered on rations and our Class I supply point. The previous command had set up a Class I point with three refrigerated "reefer" vans (two of which were inoperable) and more than 20 huge CONEX containers purchased locally. We had three situations that needed resolution quickly. The first problem was that no one knew what was in each CONEX. There was no inventory accountability, and this led to our second problem of rotating stock. The third problem was a limitation on the number of fresh food enhancements to the Unitized Group Rations-A (UGR-A) that we were able to store because only one of the three refrigerated vans was operating. This resulted in issuing UGR-Heat and Serve meals day-in and day-out. The Jordanians knew what we were capable of issuing to them, and they often complained after weeks of just "heat and serves," supplemented by the Army’s standard Halal meal.
To make these improvements to the Class I point, we first conducted a complete stock inventory. Then we labeled each CONEX with its contents posted on the outside. Next, we needed to establish the first-in, first-out concept. We needed to rotate all stocks and move stocks forward as we were resupplied. The Jordanians refused, not accepting anything that had expired - and rightly so. As for the "reefer" vans that did not refrigerate perishable foods, the standard answer was "I don’t know why they don’t work, Sir." Wrong answer! We quickly found out that the "reefer" vans were not hooked up to the correct generators. Quick and easy fix. Now, with three, fully mission capable "reefers," our ability to store perishable foods increased twofold. This was a step in the right direction to improving our relationship with the Jordanians. All this step took was a little adult supervision, and a basic understanding of supply support activity operations and commodity accountability.
Plan of Action
After improving resupply operations and the quality of
rations support to the Jordanians, we needed to completely overhaul the camp
infrastructure and security operations. We had to develop a plan of action.
Typical missions included base camp design and closure, force protection
analysis, ammunition supply point upgrade, main supply route maintenance, and
basic public works missions in support of base camps.
A book of standards, commonly referred to as the "Red Book," was developed by United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineers. The "Red Book" provided a blueprint for planning and requirements for base camp construction and maintenance. A similar book of standards known as the "Sand Book" was developed for the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. This "Sand Book" field guide was modeled after Chapter 9 of FM 3-34 (Engineer Operations), titled "Engineer Combat Service Support and Logistics." FM 3-34 outlines base camp operations and provides infrastructure and base camp layouts. The CENTCOM "Sand Book" tells month-to-month what the camp should look like and what improvements to plan to make. With the "Sand Book" as a guide, we realized that we needed some major improvements.
Before we started these infrastructure and security improvements, we realized we needed to do three things: request engineer/carpenter support, figure out what projects we were going to do and request the appropriate supplies, and discuss our plans with our neighbors the Jordanians, especially when securing the camp. The Jordanian Army sent a company-plus sized element of their special forces soldiers with their field hospital staff to provide security for the camp. This sounds good on paper, but the Jordanian Army’s methods of securing the camp and the US Army’s methods are completely different.
In order not to offend the Jordanians in any way, we were very careful to assume the US Army’s "teach, coach, mentor" role. Not only did US Soldiers have our own disagreements on security for the base camp, there seemed to be an internal disagreement between the Jordanian special forces commander and the Jordanian hospital commander. The Jordanian hospital commander did not want the camp to become a "fortress," as he would say. He wanted the camp to be inviting because he believed anything less would deter Afghani patients from coming for much-needed medical attention. In the end, after a few rocket attacks and random rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire on the camp, the Jordanians realized that much more security was needed.
We first tightened up front gate procedures. The front gate was too accessible. The solution was to locally purchase 55-gallon drums from an Afghani merchant, fill them with rock and dirt and place them as obstacles on the main road to slow down the cars and trucks coming to the gate. This security measure, of course, did not sit very well with the hospital commander until we promised to paint the Jordanian flag and United States flag on every other barrel - not too tactical a solution to the hospital commander’s displeasure but a compromise.
We used an Army Engineer handbook to figure out how far apart to separate these barrels to control the speed of vehicles approaching the main gate. This was an attempt to stop a suicide bomber from smashing through. We then placed lined, wire-mesh barricades filled with dirt and rock (called HESCOs because of the manufacturer’s trademarked name) in front of the triple-strand wire that stretched around the camp to block any high-speed avenues of approach. We later set more triple-strand in front of the HESCOs to act as "slow go." Instead of just one deterrent (triple-strand wire), we had three.
Nontactical Compromise
That also took some negotiating with the Jordanians,
another nontactical compromise. Before setting up the HESCOs, we told them our
plan. Immediately, the Jordanians said "no." If the Jordanians would allow
HESCOs around the base perimeter, we offered to build towers in six locations
around the perimeter to protect Jordanian soldiers on guard duty from the
elements. The Jordanians agreed with the HESCOs and also gave the go-ahead to
build six spotting towers that were as high as two CONEXes, which we already had
plans to build in the first place. The lesson learned? Force protection may be a
huge priority for the US Army, but coalition counterparts may not see the
situation the same way. We chose to find ways for the Jordanians to "buy into
our program." We always remembered our goal: protection of troops.
Another major problem was trash and trash disposal. Our two cultures had different viewpoints. The Jordanian Army and the US Army had different standards for keeping the camp clean. We felt that the camp’s appearance was a direct reflection on us. Our solution was to hire a local contractor to pick up the trash. The bigger issue became what to do with the collected trash. We decided upon bringing all trash collected to a location at least one mile away for burning and then burial. Sounds easy enough? Wrong.
No matter what was collected as trash, the local Afghanis wanted it. Eventually, we realized our local contractor was getting "shaken down" for the camp’s trash. We decided to escort him to the burn site, set up 360-degree security around the site, watch him burn the trash, bury the trash, and to keep any Afghanis from trying to jump into the fire to retrieve any salvageable trash. Local Afghani citizens did try to come through our perimeter at the burn site. It was important to make sure the camp’s trash was destroyed because a lot of our trash was also medical waste.
Trash pick-up was a big issue for us - not only for the camp’s outward appearance, but also for sanitary purposes. I gathered all our Afghani trash collectors, put them at double-arm interval and walked with them from one end of the camp to the other, showing them everything we expected them to pick up. We took this walk a couple of times because they would sometimes miss what we defined as trash. I will never forget the day I looked out of the tent to see the Afghani trash collectors walking on line without me organizing them to pick up trash and clean the camp.
Once we got the mission down and every Soldier understood that his job was more than just pumping fuel, rotating stock or inventorying medical supplies, everything went more smoothly. Each Soldier’s job was whatever needed to be done to survive. We not only had issues trying to do our job in a hostile environment where rocket fire and stray RPGs were the norm, we also had to provide support to the Jordanian Army that has different procedures and standards. It took a lot of patience and hard work from both sides to understand each other and live together. Working with an army within the coalition for Operation Enduring Freedom can be very challenging, but very rewarding. It provides a firsthand look at how different coalition forces operate, interact, live and overcome cultural differences. It also provides an insight on how different countries view their roles in the global war on terrorism.